



BUILDING **URBAN SAFETY**

THROUGH **SLUM UPGRADING**



UN HABITAT
FOR A BETTER URBAN FUTURE

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Building Urban Safety through Slum Upgrading

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FOREWORD



UN-HABITAT's research shows that a total of 227 million people in the world have moved out of slum conditions since 2000. This means that governments have collectively surpassed the Millennium Development Goal on slums more than two times over.

Indeed it is commendable that 22 million people in developing countries moved out of slums each year between 2000 and 2010 as the result of slum upgrading. While this is welcome, the overall reduction in the world's urban divide still requires greater effort since the *absolute number* of slum dwellers has actually increased from 776.7 million in 2000 to some 827.6 million in 2010.

This means that 55 million new slum dwellers have been added to the global urban population since 2000. It is thus troubling to reiterate yet again that the progress made on the slum target has simply not been enough to counter the growth of informal settlements in the developing world.

This is unsatisfactory. It is inadequate, and it can lead to social danger.

Here we present an important collection of studies which clarify the enormity of this challenge. It is the product of critical reflection on current slum-upgrading projects in widely different cities from developing countries. Each piece seeks to understand a neighborhood and the way people live in it improves urban safety.

Far beyond overcoming spatial and legal obstacles, slum-upgrading must be about social change for the better. Smart cities offer everyone better opportunities and a better way of life.

Excluded from the city's opportunities, physically, politically and economically marginalized, slum dwellers are particularly vulnerable to crime and violence. They face an acute risk of becoming victims or offenders and live in a state of constant insecurity.

From the very start, these conditions should be the number-one concern of any upgrading project. Put another way, the safety of slum dwellers cannot be taken to be an *incidental consequence* of the upgrading of their neighborhoods. Rather, it must be considered an *explicitly planned outcome* of upgrading.

To date, few cities have incorporated a coherent component to prevent crime and mitigate violence in their urban development agendas. Impact on urban safety has occurred somewhat unexpectedly.

That is the main lesson to be drawn from the pages of this book: urban policy integration. Urban development emerges from prosperity, through adequate and sound planning, management and governance; it comes to be fully enjoyed once urban safety is guaranteed.

I wish to acknowledge the generous support of the Government of Italy and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency towards the preparation of this publication, which contributes to our quest for better, smarter, greener, and more equitable cities without slums.

Joan Clos
Under-Secretary General, United Nations
Executive Director
UN-HABITAT

PROLEGOMENA: URBAN DEVELOPMENT AS URBAN SAFETY

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Among the several forms of urban development interventions, slum-upgrading offers an incomparable opportunity to provide urban safety for the poor. Slum-upgrading, the orchestrated process to improve the built environment of a human settlement, could mobilize many different actors in diverse policy areas at various levels. And it could give momentum to the idea that improving a neighbourhood comprises an overhaul of all dimensions of its life, including the freedom of citizens from the occurrence or risk of injury, danger, or loss, that is, their safety. Contemporary crime prevention tools are up to the task. Progressively, the field has shifted its main concern from reducing measurements of either crime or violence to improving the quality of life. A holistic notion of “safety” has been brought into play and slum-upgrading interventions set a suitable scenario to realize its practical implications.

The Safer Cities Programme of UN-HABITAT has realized that policy makers and urban managers can avail themselves of these auspicious circumstances through a careful consideration of four key factors: the degree of

social cohesion, the extent of urban inequalities, the risks of the built environment, and the scope of inclusiveness in urban governance. Experience has shown that authorities are better equipped to build urban safety when they formulate inclusive urban upgrading policies, which in turn include project components that redesign the morphology of the urban environment to favor self-protection, that profit from and foster the increase of social links –reinforcing social cohesion–, and that reduce the various social inequalities, abating exclusion and bridging the gap of the *urban divide*. It is easier said than done, indeed. However, a good start is to bear in mind the impact that one would like the upgrading intervention to have in any or all of these four key factors.

The intervention has to consider, firstly, the necessity to strengthen social cohesion. The concept of social cohesion refers to the strength, or weakness, of the network of personal, familial, professional, and neighbourly relationships that characterizes urban life. It reminds of the importance of the inclusion of all the political, social, cultural, and community groups coexisting in the city.



A road network in Hangzhou, China © Shutterstock



Medellin, Colombia © Castilla Noche

Specifically, it evokes a myriad of dimensions such as the celebration of diversity, a sense of belonging and a shared future, as well as empathy, solidarity, and confidence between citizens. The concept points to the significance of social interaction and union, for atomized societies, where the value of persons crumbles, are more inclined to tolerate violence.

The second way to include a component of safety in urban development is to think about the importance of reducing the *urban divide*. It is not a problem of poverty, but rather of disparities between social groups and between neighbourhoods that could cause the frustration that influences the level of crime. Disparities concern incomes, access to basic services, and participation in political decisions. Cities of Africa and Latin America are significant examples. Even though there are exceptions, there is a strong correlation between urban disparities and criminal violence.

A third way to do it is considering the effects that the urban environment may have on citizens. The size, the morphology and the structure of cities can encourage violence, incivilities and deviant behaviours. Big cities, generally, are more violent than smaller ones insofar as the anonymity of big metropolises and the temptations they arouse are more propitious to delinquency, impunity and to the development of gangs and mafias. Simply put, some cities are more soothing than others, have more attractive public spaces, more lively streets and experience thus less segregation. A deleterious environment, characterized, for instance, by insufficient light-

ing and the destruction of public spaces, increases the possibility of committing a crime, according to research conducted by UN-HABITAT.

Most importantly, it becomes considerably easier to incorporate safety into urban development when it is accepted that urban planning is not only a technical matter, but one related to local governance, i.e., the political management of the city. In a city, priorities regarding the issues of development and safety cannot only be established. They need to be understood, agreed upon, sanctioned, and followed. This takes leadership and capacity. And it is a process that involves numerous actors, far beyond the governmental sphere. Understood in this fashion, local governance, based on solid and accurate information, permits to offer, for instance, better services, promote community life, develop effective public transports, and organise a better policing. Negotiation, steering and joint initiatives, in turn, support a long-term vision to construct urban safety and constitute thereby the core of responsible urban management.

The importance of considering these four factors has been well established by the latest findings of UN HABITAT regarding the pace of urbanization. The proportion of people living in slums around the world is declining. But more citizens live in them than 10 years ago. The figure is somewhere around the 828 million and augmenting, most of them living in developing countries. Even if Asia alone lifted 172 million people out of slum conditions in the same period, in the global South, rapid and unplanned urbanisation, along with poor, inequi-

table and exclusory urban governance and management, has resulted in the proliferation of informal settlements, where the urban poor experience the worst consequences of the economic, spatial, opportunity and social divides of contemporary cities.

Far from being an unfortunate consequence of some sort of linear development drama, that all human societies are due to reenact, slums are a byproduct of irresponsible policies, insufficient infrastructure and pressing rural-urban migration. Indeed, slums are severely neglected areas: housing is inadequate; services are deficient; facilities for recreation or capital investment, simply nonexistent. Additionally, when confined to remote locations, slum dwellers are impeded to access justice and security. The worst part is that these conditions cannot be terminated by decree; it is impossible to simply “clean” the city.

Furthermore, slum dwellers and urban poor face a particularly acute risk of crime and violence. They are defenseless, in outright vulnerability to these phenomena. Often, they rank either among the prime victims of urban crime or the common perpetrators. Authorities and popular depictions of slums tend to disregard this simultaneity. Crime in informal settlements may be pervasive. Yet, it is also important to acknowledge the deeper causes of insecurity and violence and take into account the incidence of poverty, economic inequality, social exclusion, gender prejudice, and youth unemployment. Moreover, it is essential to consider the responsibilities and failures of state institutions, not only to protect more favored citizens, but also to guarantee the safety of slum dwellers.

Several initiatives to upgrade these dwellings in cities around the world have acknowledged several of these facts. Rather than forced evictions or relocations, which have exhibited its limitations and undesired effects on livelihoods, cities as diverse as Medellín, Port Moresby, or Rio de Janeiro –and yet so similar, in so far as in all of them pockets of wealth and poverty co-exist in close proximity– have approached holistically to the upgrading of slums, with satisfactory results.

Similarly, urban development literature has progressively recognized that the material enhancement of a slum, for which institutional and regulatory changes must occur in the first place, is only part of the story. To unlock upgrading and inclusion of slums, there are other dimensions that need to be addressed focusing on a second area: governance. Social, cultural and economical conditions need also be upgraded along, with the active involvement of members of the community, lest the almost imminent failure of the project. Not only amenities are crucial, but also social cohesion and thus its *sine qua non*, urban safety.



Medellin, Colombia © Julián Roldán

During the past two decades crime prevention strategies have been increasingly integrated in comprehensive urban planning practices. Visible attempts to do so first appeared during the 1990's as government policies gradually shifted from repression, authoritarianism and neglect in dealing with the main challenges of rapid urbanisation, to more comprehensive and participatory approaches committed to involving local civil authorities and community based organisations in the progressive implementation of integrated slum upgrading programs that include law enforcement as well as social and situational prevention strategies.

Today, local authorities and urban planners have come to terms with the idea that urban crime prevention and reduction can be best attained by addressing specific demands of local residents for social inclusion, security and safety, through their direct involvement in planning integrated improvement of their neighbourhoods. Upgraded living conditions and empowered communities are the main outcomes sought by this type of integrated urban planning. This entails enhancing the ability of people to respond positively to problems of crime and violence. It means, as well, to allow their meaningful participation in planning and designing their urban public space, a more effective policing, and other features of the built environment that allow for self-protection.

The chapters that follow analyse experiences on this matter. They gather and comment the testimonies of project staff, practitioners and academics regarding the impact of slum upgrading initiatives in urban safety. They derive from six case studies that UN-HABITAT's Safer Cities Programme recently commissioned. Projects were thoroughly analysed in Dhaka, Bangladesh; Doula, Cameroon; Medellin, Colombia; Nairobi, Kenya; Port Moresby; Papua New Guinea; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Relevant project and national documents, together with field visits, interviews, and focus groups with community leaders provided the data.

As the aggregated reading of the chapters shows, many challenges still lay ahead. Appropriate and relevant indicators to assess security and safety baselines, prior to upgrading interventions, must be resourced. Moreover, these must reflect local concerns and expectations. Indicators allow managers to properly incorporate communities' voices into the objectives of integrated urban interventions. Information flowing from such sources will significantly contribute to engage stakeholder participation in local decision-making nodes regarding the planning and developing of urban interventions, enhancing in this way effective local governance.

In this same regard, many countries hold as a priority the enactment of modern national legal and institutional frameworks. The aim in these exercises is to establish functioning steering and coordination mechanisms between central, regional and local level government authorities, explicitly drawn to respond to the specific needs of urban poor and newly settled rural migrants. Institutional capacity building of local government agencies is another main concern. Many cities need to develop their capacity to prepare projects and allocate resources efficiently to address different scales of needs and types of interventions.

Furthermore, local security and safety conditions critically depend on developing sustainable community ownership of public spaces and service infrastructure delivered through urban improvement programmes. Fruitful interaction in upgraded areas between grassroots organisations and local networks of government agencies to address issues such as gender based violence, community access to police and justice services, maintenance of upgraded service infrastructure and public spaces, dealing with squatting in neighbourhood conservation areas, among others, will require the incorporation of capacity building components in the design of integrated urban intervention projects. This will support community empowerment processes as well as more responsive services by local government agencies to community needs and demands.

All these challenges, in conclusion, reiterate one main lesson: urban safety is a matter of urban managers and planners not just a matter of criminologists or criminal justice experts, while a slum-upgrading program is not a simple collection of technical actions to be performed independently of each other and of other elements of urban development. Both areas, safety and development, are integrated; one cannot be edified without taking an explicit foundation on the other. The corollary of their intertwining is a comprehensive intervention, better situated to improve the physical characteristics of a neighborhood and its inhabitants' quality of life.

If such is the case, it is possible to suggest the way forward. It is necessary to keep empowering the communities to face crime and violence, by providing educational, cultural, and sportive services, contributing to create decent jobs, and promoting a non-violent resolution of conflicts. Their resilience has to be strengthened; and vulnerability, kept at bay, especially of unemployed youth and women. It is also necessary to keep improving the physical space, with proper street illumination, accessible bus stations and markets, adequate public spaces –just to mention a few instances. The bulk of these tasks, however, can only be pursued through a carefully crafted process of steering and involving of the social actors that have a stake, whether they know or ignore it, in building urban safety. This could be done mastering that tool that will become crucial to face our inexorable urban future: inclusive urban governance.

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AN INTEGRATED UPGRADING INITIATIVE BY MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES: A CASE STUDY OF **MEDELLIN**

[Fernando Patiño]




A view of Medellín, Colombia. © UN-HABITAT



2,223,078

MEDELLIN POPULATION

* 2005 CENSUS



Introduction

During the 1980s and 1990s, Medellín achieved world infamy because of the high recorded rates of violence, as well as its annual rate of homicides, which was 335 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1991. From 1992, the curve of violence started to decline gradually as a result of the implementation by the local government of a series of policies and programmes, which included preventive and control oriented activities. 2002 was a turning point in this dynamic which led to a faster reduction in levels of crime and violence. In 2007, the homicide rate had dropped to 26 per 100,000 inhabitants, a figure that can only be explained by the confluence of different factors that are analyzed in this case study.

As a start to the new millennium, and on the basis of lessons learned by the city over time, the Municipality of Medellín started to test an approach that articulates more clearly safety and peaceful coexistence policies with the urban improvement programmes implemented in critical areas of the city. Now, the advances made by Medellín since 2004 are starting to make it seem a flagship for urban and safety policies.

Assessment Methodology

Between December 2008 and January 2009 the author revised UN-HABITAT Slum Upgrading and Urban Safety materials, collected and revised documents and reports on the Medellín experience, and conducted interviews with public authorities, practitioners and academics linked with urban and safety issues. Two field visits were carried out in the areas where the Municipality implemented the slum upgrading initiatives and where it is now implementing Integrated Urban Programmes.

Medellin at a glance

According to the 2005 census, Medellín has a population of 2,223,078 which makes it the second largest urban center in Colombia. Together with the metropolitan area that integrates nine other municipalities of the Valley of Aburra, it has a total of approximately 3,500,000 inhabitants. The city has a density of 5,820 inhabitants by square kilometer and 46.7% of the population is men and 53.3 % is women.

During the past 50 years Medellín progressed from a medium-size city of 500,000 inhabitants to a metropolitan area. This growth is explained by successive waves of massive migrations. The first during the 1950s and 1960s was an effect of the political violence in the Colombian countryside. The second was caused by economic factors linked with the transformation of the rural economy during the 1970s, and the last came from the rise of the armed conflict experienced in the past two decades due to the expansion of the influence of illegal armed groups and drugs cartels.

Medellín is the second largest economic center of Colombia. The city represents more than 8% of the National GDP (11% with its metropolitan region), and is one of the most productive regions of the country. It has a per capita GDP of US\$3,794, higher than the other main cities of Colombia, and its business density of 25 companies by each 1,000 inhabitants is the country's second highest. Industry represents 43.6% of the gross internal product of the metropolitan region, services 39.7% and trade 7%. The industrial sectors are textiles (20%), chemical and related products (14.5%), foodstuffs (10%) and drinks (11%). The other 10% comprises sectors such as mechanics and electronics, among others.

Medellín has an urban structure of acceptable quality but highly segregated, confining almost a million people away from the urban facilities in areas of high risk or with visible signs of deterioration. Despite the strong differences in urban development between city zones, the public services have a high coverage, with 98.8% of the houses having electricity, 97.3% have running water and 91% have telecommunications.

The urban area of the city is divided into 16 *comunas* (urban districts), grouped in six zones. These *comunas* are divided into 249 neighborhoods and 20 institutional areas (university campus, industrial and commercial districts). The rural area is divided in five *corregimientos* (rural districts). Each *comuna* and *corregimiento* has a Local Management Board elected by the citizens for a four year period. These local boards fulfill functions related with the municipal programmes on economic and social development and public works, and monitor the public investments and the provision of the municipal services.

In addition, the Boards participate in the territorial and sectoral distribution of the allocated budget.

Medellin, being situated in a narrow valley surrounded by mountains, has limited space for urban expansion. This has meant that in recent decades the growth of the city has had two main characteristics: vertical growth and a lateral growth occupying the slopes of the mountains. Both areas of growth have been disorderly and without continuity. Generally, the neighborhoods situated in the high parts of the slopes are spontaneous and unplanned. Influenced by these social and geographic characteristics, the city has had a pattern of urban segregation, which additionally has been strongly influenced by the successive waves of violence that have affected the city.

Facing a similar situation in the main urban areas, the National Government adopted in 1995 an Urban and Social Housing Policy that included a set of laws and policies, which was conducive for the adoption of municipal policies in this field. In this framework, Medellin promoted and implemented PRIMED, the *Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Informales de Medellin* (Medellin Slum-Upgrading Programme) as a pioneering initiative in Colombia, supported by the International Development Bank.

Issues of insecurity, crime and violence

Since the 1980s and 1990s, the homicide rate in the city of Medellin has been above the national average. For nearly 20 years the city has experienced a complex situation regarding social and safety issues due to dynamics associated with drug trafficking and urban guerrillas. This led to a homicide rate of 381 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1991, which was considered the world's highest. It was also far in excess of the national average in Colombia which, at that time, was 79 per 100,000 inhabitants.

It is unsurprising that from then until now, insecurity has been one of the most widespread concerns of the people of Medellin. The city experienced the emergence of parallel orders headed by irregular armed groups, bands and gangs, all of this in the context of the armed conflict and drug traffic around the country. Several factors contributed to this process including the booming drug trade, the increasing urbanization of conflict, and the crisis in the heart of the city's economy: the textile industry.

The dismantling of the Medellin cartel after the death of Pablo Escobar in 1993 did not change the level of violence. The state failed to create an effective presence in the city and could not recover its monopoly on force. The 1980s was a decade *"in which converged many different forms of violence, expressed in private justice groups and gangs of organised crime, per-payment killers, popular*

militias, violence against property and from the property, which makes many analyst and academics declare, not only the existence of a generation without a future, but also of a city without a future" (Granda and Ramirez, 2001). During the 1990s the city emerged as an arena for political confrontation between guerrillas and paramilitaries, *"that blur[ed] the boundaries between criminal organisations linked to the illegal economy, armed groups with communitarian roots and the hierarchical units of the guerrillas and paramilitaries"* (Giraldo, 2007).

"Security" became for many years a private service, which meant an occupation for many people and a significant source of income for others in collecting illegal "security taxes". In this deteriorating scenario, social and political citizenship disappeared from the public spaces and people confined themselves behind locked doors just to survive. This created deep cracks and disparities among those parts of the population which could not find neighborhoods with adequate spaces for recreation and coexistence.

Between 2000 and 2002, disputes between the paramilitaries and the guerrillas escalated, so that in 2002, some 81% of homicides and 70% of the kidnappings in the Department (province) of Antioquia took place in Medellin (its capital), so that despite being an urban center the city experienced a war situation similar to those in rural areas (Giraldo, 2007).

From the early 1990s, the curve of violence started to decline gradually as a result of the implementation by the local government of a series of policies and programmes, which included preventive and control-oriented activities. For a while, the indexes continued to be high with the homicide rate staying above 150 per 100,000 people, well above for Colombia and the Latin American region. The turning point came in 2002, which led to a faster reduction in levels of crime and violence. By 2007, the homicide rate had dropped to 26 per 100,000, a figure explained by the confluence of different factors. *"In the period 2002-2005 there were coordinated and integrated actions of the central and local levels, allowing for the de-escalation of armed conflict and urban indicators and resulting in a significant improvement in safety and in tackling of murderous violence"* (Giraldo, 2007).

This reduction can be explained, mainly, as a result of the policies implemented by the Municipality since 2002. They were consolidated between 2004 and 2007 when the Municipality incorporated the strengths of its predecessors to a new approach that included some elements of the model developed by Bogota, especially in areas such as the citizen culture and preventive measures.

In its Municipal Development Plan, called *Medellin, a commitment of all citizens*, security and peaceful coexistence were one of the main components of the programme called *Medellin, good governance and partici-*



City of Medellín, Colombia. © UN-HABITAT

pation. In the sections of the city which supported the Municipal Development Plan, violence was cited as one of the most serious existing problems and the proposed programmes included a whole component on safety. This involved the management of public space for living, transformation and modernization of security agencies and justice, violence prevention, care for the prison population and, given the serious impact of armed conflict in the city, a peace and reconciliation programme that supported the demobilization process of members of illegal armed groups and their reintegration into society.

It is important to mention that the focus on security and co-existence was part of a programme that also included civic culture, citizen participation, and institutional development. Among the programmes implemented were Youth with Future, *METROJUVENTUD*, *Peace and Reconciliation Programme*, *Victims of Conflict Programme*, and *Aggression Prevention Network*.

In general, all measures and programmes put in place yielded positive results in reducing crimes that alarmed the public such as homicide, theft of vehicles and high-impact crime. However, some sectors became concerned about issues such as complaints of human rights violations by the demobilized armed groups, the increase of sexual and domestic violence, and the humanitarian crisis caused by the increase of forced displacement. (A. Garcia and V. Vargas, 2008).

Urban safety in Colombia: particularities aroused from an internal armed conflict

Colombia's problems are long standing and are deeply tied into the country's violent history. Chronic and intractable warfare among leftist guerrillas, paramilitaries, cocaine traffickers and the army has wreaked such havoc on the countryside so that 3 million of its 45 million inhabitants had become refugees and hundreds of thousands were officially declared victims of the armed groups. Due to these structural dynamics, the last few decades of the twentieth century were characterized by the increase of a wide spectrum of forms of crime and violence.

This trend is particularly noticeable in cities such as Cali and Medellín. In this regard some analysts say that since the end of the 1980s there was a gradual urbanization of the armed conflict that has affected the country for more than 50 years. Indeed, cities in the country have progressively become the sites of crime and violence characteristic of the armed conflict, as well as practices linked to drug trafficking. This happened at the same time as other forms of crime and violence, not necessarily linked to the armed conflict and drug trafficking, increased. In this sense, it is important to stress that the gradual development of such forms of violence and crime has also been accompanied by increasing inter-relationship between those forms of "traditional" crime and those derived from the armed conflict and drug trafficking.

In the case of Medellin, the impacts of the urbanization of the armed conflict and the dynamics of drug trafficking are clear. Periods of armed conflict or escalation of narco-terrorist offensives coincide with the patterns of increase in homicides. In the same way, the steepest decline in the homicide rate coincided with the launch and implementation of peace initiatives by the national government (Giraldo, 2007). Without doubt, there is a correlation between security policies and indicators at the national level and the results at the local level, however, as shall be seen, this doesn't mean that the municipal policies and the responses of civil society have not been, and are not, crucial in improving security. (A. Vargas and V. Garcia, 2008).

New approaches on urban safety policies

In Colombia, in addition to the rates of violence due to the armed conflict and drug trafficking, urban violence and its manifestations have emerged as a serious problem throughout the country, becoming the centre of the local public agenda. In Bogota, the significant increase of violence rates led to a point where security issues stopped receiving typically marginal and fragmented treatment to become a priority issue for the authorities. For this reason, both cities became the place for the formulation and implementation of public policies regarding security based on wider and integrated conceptions, that is, with actions and strategies from a human security perspective, which have shown satisfactory results (A. Vargas and V. Garcia, 2008).

As a result, the 1990s stand out as a time of change and innovation in handling crime and violence. The treatment of these issues in the cities through the 1990s is linked to such innovations. From this perspective, changes that referred to the redefinition of the field of security and the delineation of responsibilities and guidelines for their management are relevant. Similarly, the past decade has been marked by the flowering of local initiatives, particularly in urban areas, which address safety in a more preventive and integrated way. Until the 1990s security was virtually confined to a military and repressive treatment. The abandonment of these forms of design and implementation of safety is an ongoing process that has led to redefinitions that are re-orienting the policies developed over the past fifteen years in the country. Such processes are redefining, among other things, the emergence of concepts such as citizen security and peaceful co-existence, as well as the introduction of standards and procedures designed to manage security from alternative perspectives.

In this regard, the 1991 Constitution redefined the balance of powers in handling safety and since then, at least in constitutional terms, the main responsibilities rest on

local authorities as police authorities in the municipalities, responsible for the co-ordination of all public entities working in this field. As shown in many urban safety experiences, both the notions of security and peaceful coexistence, as the redefinition of responsibilities in the management of security have been instrumental in generating local initiatives to mitigate and control the effects of crime and violence in cities.

There are also national guidelines adopted during the last five national administrations (1990-2010) that reinforced these trends. It should be noted, however, that this is a process that is far from being national. Rather it is a process that tends to concentrate markedly in three major cities: Bogota, Cali, and Medellin. These cities have had the political will and the institutional capacities to lead local processes. Their experiences illustrate various ways in which the issue of security has been incorporated into government agendas at the municipal level. It is important to note that there is disparity in the quantity and quality of documentation for each of these experiences. While in the case of Bogota there is abundant literature on programmes and activities developed, in the other two cities this literature is more fragmented (Rivas, 2007).

A city that reacts to the spiral of violence: fifteen years of local safety policies

Particularly noteworthy is the turning point in public policies for handling violence in Medellin at the start of the 1990s. This change was characterized by the consciousness among the political authorities of the city and other key stakeholders that other approaches should be used to address social conflicts, without neglecting the use of military force and the application of law and punishment. The presence of this awareness is reflected in the design of safety public policies, understanding that it might be mainly focused on addressing the social causes of violence

This change was manifested most strongly in two administration periods (2001-2003, 2004-2007), but the effort began in previous years. A retrospective summary of the safety policies implemented by the various local governments in Medellin in recent decades can be found in the papers published by Angarita and Betancurt.

Angarita classifies policies until 2003 in five periods. In a first period, set in the 1960s and 1970s, local committees were established to assume civic activities and some public functions to "contribute to beautifying the city" with activities of "social cleaning", consisting of the temporal reclusion of beggars and small bandits. Years later, this "social cleansing" has transformed into periodic murders of "undesirables", socially justified by some

sectors arguing that justice does not operate. These facts reflected the absence of a public policy on safety and reveal the indifference or the lack of awareness of what was slowly developing in the social context of Medellín.

The second period runs from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. The city experienced a wave of violence and narco-terrorism. To address these dramatic challenges the national government set in motion, through a Presidential Advisory Council, a programme called *Alternatives for the future of Medellín*. This initiative was developed in the framework of the political enthusiasm generated by the new Constitution adopted in 1991 and had several hits, one of which was that for the first time in the history of the city, organisations and leaders from very different backgrounds (employers, trade unionists, community, women, youth, churches, NGOs) were summoned to work in a collaborative effort. However, in the second half of the 1990s, this programme was gradually dismantled, leaving many unfinished actions and a nostalgic taste of frustration among its participants, while the problems were still accumulating.

In the mid-1990s, a third period was marked by the adoption of a Security Strategic Plan for the city as part of the Municipal Development Plan. An Office for Peace and Coexistence was opened and specialized programmes to prevent violent conflicts were promoted. There was a better approach in confronting the various forms of violence, and for the first time the local government developed a programme to promote a demobilization process of militia groups. Some achievements were made and some errors were committed and this was a big step forward compared to the gaps in the past.

The fourth period was in the late 1990s and is determined by the implementation of the *Citizen Coexistence*

Programme, designed and implemented with the support of the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB). This programme had some limitations from the beginning, generated by some of the conditions imposed by the IDB and by the insufficient commitment of the Mayor. Despite this, there was a process that aimed to give strategic responses and promoted some efforts for overcoming the most significant causes of violence in the city.

The fifth period represents 2001-2003. During this period there was a near paralysis of the IDB project, in the midst of bureaucratic and administrative difficulties. In 2002, the national context was marked by the triumph of President Alvaro Uribe, whose emphasis was on enforcement and tough policies. This orientation was enthusiastically welcomed by the local administration.

In addition to supporting the military operations deployed in some critical areas of the city, the local government had made proposals aimed at those associated with armed groups, which resulted in a programme called *Return to Civility*, which began in mid-2003. Initially this programme was not well-received by local armed groups, however, at the same time the national government advanced in a negotiation process with the paramilitary groups. As a result of these agreements, in November 2003 more than 800 paramilitaries operating in the city were demobilized and began a reintegration process supported by the Municipality.

A new administration took over in 2004, leading a broad coalition that unified new political forces around a proposal for reconciliation and social inclusion. The new Mayor began his period after the demobilization of the paramilitary group “Bloque Cacique Nutibara”, and the new administration agreed to carry on the implementation of the re-integration process, working very



City of Metro terminal in Medellín, Colombia. © UN-HABITAT

Some Results of the 2004-2007 Municipal Development Plan

Safety and Pacific Coexistence Component

- The registered investment in Safety and Pacific Coexistence Programmes represents approximately USD 80 million.
- The main programmes implemented are:
 - a) Reinforcement of the relationship between policy, civil authorities and community through the operation of Local Safety Committees.
 - b) Improvement of justice infrastructure (Local Justice Houses)
 - c) Building of 20 Police Immediate Response Centers (CAI) and a new police station.
 - d) The Peace and Reconciliation Programme, which seeks to re-socialize demobilized population (former soldiers of paramilitary groups) has 4,130 direct beneficiaries, participating in educational and communitarian programmes.
 - e) The Youth Future Programme benefits 12,000 young people who have the opportunity to participate in training activities (Education for Work, Values, Social Skills, Civic Responsibilities and Human Development)
 - f) A Manual was adopted on Peaceful Coexistence (popularizing the new Police Code) which was formulated with the participation of 25,000 people. Some 582,500 citizens participated in events oriented to the socialization of this new instrument.
 - g) A total of 24 civic agreements were signed around strategic projects implemented by the Municipality.

Participatory Budgeting Component

- More than 2,724 projects implemented by more than \$ 192,000 million of Colombian pesos (approx. USD95 millions, formulated in a participatory process and approved by the Communal Councils.
- There were 8,806 Neighborhood Assemblies with 66,000 participants.

Social Urbanism Component

- A total of 497,000 square meters of public spaces generated within the Urban Integrated Programmes (PUI).
- Five new park-libraries were built located in areas with the lowest human development indexes, equipped with 539 computers and working to promote cultural and civic encounters. By December 2007, they were visited by about 1,700,000 people.
- Park EXPLORA, a cultural complex, was built with a total area of 37,250 m² (15,354 m² for public space). This park is visited by 400,000 people per year.
- The Northeast PUI: The cumulative investment in the period 2.004-2.007 in this critical area, with a very low HDI, exceeds \$ 250 millions of dollars. The area now reflects a growing economy: 300 new businesses opened in these neighborhoods.

close with the National Government. To coordinate this process, the Municipality relaunched the Peace and Coexistence Office with a new denomination, Peace and Reconciliation. A new approach in safety policies was adopted, based on a territorial perspective.

Confluence of Safety and Urban Policies (2004-2007): Medellín's Municipal Development Plan

The Municipal Development Plan defined as its main objective, *"to promote human development for all the people in Medellín, which means the strengthening of the capabilities, opportunities and freedoms of citizens"*. This objective would be achieved through the implementation of good governance and participation, social inclusion, productivity and competitiveness, a city for reconciliation and integration with the region and the world.

The Good Governance and Participation Component was designed to face two main problems. First, the lack of legitimization of the state, which is expressed in politicking, corruption, distrust of in the public entities, lack of civic culture and non-recognition of the cultural diversity. To face this problem, the actions led to developing a new citizenship with a social ethic, to promote a cultural development, to guarantee the exercise of people's participation and to strengthening governance.

A second problem was the violence associated with the illegal armed groups who are disputing the territory, the high rates of murder, the privatization of safety and justice, and the forced displacement. These problems were attacked by preventing violent behaviors and promoting new ways and mechanisms for conflicts resolution.

The programmes and projects are articulated in four crosscutting strategies. These were civic culture, promoting a cultural transformation of the city's inhabitants; community organisation and citizen participation, through the establishment of a municipal system for planning and social control; transparency and institutional development, strengthening the administrative capacity to attend the communities' demands and establishing new channels for public communication and finally security and co-existence, which included public policies oriented to prevent and control crime and violence, improve the management of public spaces, transform and modernize safety and justice infrastructure, reintegrate the demobilized groups and to attend the prisons population.

It is important to highlight that it was in this period (2004-2007) that an explicit confluence of safety policies began, with generation of public spaces, urban renewal, and socio-cultural programmes, in an innovative territorial approach described as "social urbanism".

Medellin: Pioneering national experiences on slum upgrading

The city has an important trajectory with social housing and slum upgrading programmes. Medellín is, with Bogotá and Cali, one of the pioneering cities in Colombia promoting slum-upgrading programmes through an integrated approach. The most relevant of these programmes was PRIMED (Medellin Slum-Upgrading Programme), whose territorial approach is based on the habitat's attributes and is framed within the guidelines of the Urban and Social Housing Policy developed by the National Government in the 1995. In Colombia, a set of laws and policies was adopted, during this period, which was conducive for the adoption of municipal policies in this field, namely: the Law on Urban Reform in 1989, the Law on Social Housing in 1991, the Municipal Development Plans and Public Services Acts in 1994.

Medellin Integrated Slum-Upgrading Programme, PRIMED

PRIMED had two phases: phase 1 ran from 1993 to 1997 and phase 2 from 1988 to 2003. The programme had two important background references: a municipal project implemented in 1984 in the slums located around one of the city's landfills (Moravia) which incorporated community participation and social inclusion components and the increased violence and insecurity that had affected the city since the mid-1980s, specially in the poorest areas.

The rapid growth of informal settlements, home to 48,800 families in 1993, and the increase in rates of violence led to the Presidential Council for Medellín and the Mayor of Medellín to promote and develop the programme with funding from the National Government, the Municipality, the community and the German government through KfW Bank. For the intervention strategy, different levels of informality were defined based on physical, economic, social and juridical criteria.

The main variables taken into account for this characterization were geological suitability of the area, access to utilities, road plans, previous public programmes, levels of state intervention, socioeconomic status of the residents and their willingness to participate, the urban boundaries and geographic distribution. Three levels of informality were defined:

- **Level 1:** areas comprising neighborhoods that are in the process of normalization with continuous intervention by the Municipality, which require specific actions for improving housing and environment.
- **Level 2:** areas conformed by neighborhoods in a consolidation process, requiring actions in basic infrastructure, housing and tenure regularization.
- **Level 3:** areas that need preventive habilitation and informal settlements occupied recently.

Informal Settlements Situation in Colombia

In the major cities of the country, 16% of residential area is occupied by informal settlements. However, there are significant differences between cities: Bogotá (15%), Medellín (21%), Cali (9%), Barranquilla (28%) and Bucaramanga (7%).

Urban area of the precarious accessions

City	Area (Has)	Proportion of the residential area %
Bogotá	1,875	15
Medellin	1,323	21
Cali	405	9
Barranquilla	715	28
Bucaramanga	124	7
5 big cities	4,442	16
Cities > 300,000 hab	1,690	19
Cities 100, 000 - 300,000 hab.	1,031	24
Total national	30,145	24

Source: IGACy Catastros decentralized. Taken of DNP-Conpes 3305 of 2004. Calculations of DNP

PRIMED - Components Phases I and II (% of Total Investment)

COMPONENTS	PHASE I	PHASE II
Planning and Management	3.6%	
Legalization of Tenure	3.9%	1.6%
Slum-upgrading	38.3%	58%
House Improvement and Relocation	40.9%	26.5%
Hazard Mitigation	0.5%	
Community Participation	4.4%	3,8%
Administration and Consultants	8.4%	10.1%

Source: UN-HABITAT, 2005

The identification of these levels led to the priorities for action in the first phase of PRIMED to be those settlements on Level 2. The programme utilized an approach that defined zones and not neighborhoods as the level of intervention, believing that this definition contributed to a more comprehensive land use planning, a more effective linking to the city level, a more efficient governmental intervention and a strengthening of participatory mechanisms.

The programme defined six specific objectives. These were the establishment of adequate planning and management, community participation, physical upgrading, house improvement and relocation, legalization of tenure and geological hazard mitigation. The components included in the two Phases and their respective percentages were:

As can be seen, in the first phase the slum upgrading, house improvement and relocation components represented 78.4% of total investment, showing the emphasis on the physical-territorial component of the programme. In the second phase, the percentages of each component of investment had some little variations to increase the investment in slum upgrading without affecting the focus of the programme.

PRIMED has been listed as one of the most successful slum upgrading programme in Colombia and is an important reference point in Latin America. In the first phase, the funding came from national entities (31.4% mostly from the subsidies fund); international co-operation through the German bank KFW (contributing 31.3%); the Municipality (24.6 %) and the community (12.5%). In Phase II the Municipality increased its contribution to 62.2%, the national government dropped to 22.2%, the German government to 12.2% and the community to 3.4%.

As mentioned, within the strategic components the community participation had a relevant role, establishing three types of actions:

- Supporting promotion and dissemination activities of the programme in the intervention areas
- Training activities, in order to qualify and provide tools to communities for their active participation in designing and defining the zonal investment plans
- Participatory planning processes

For this purpose, different structures and opportunities were created for participation, such as the Thematic Committees and the Area Committees. Although the increase in violence in the city and particularly in human settlements with the highest indices of social exclusion was one of the main motivations for the launch of PRIMED, none of the two phases included a component specifically oriented to the issue of safety and crime prevention. These issues were managed separately by the Government Secretary in co-ordination with the national government.



City of Medellín, Colombia. © UN-HABITAT

Integrated Urban Programme (PUI, Comuna Noroñeintal) – Medellín

General Definitions: An Integrated Urban Programme (PUI) is defined as an urban intervention model that integrates the physical and social components within an inter-sectoral and participatory framework, aiming at solving specific problems of the communities that inhabit a territory affected by the dynamics of poverty and exclusion and which has suffered a general absence of the state. The first PUI was developed at Comunas 1 and 2 of Medellín, which have the lower human development indexes in the city. The methodology is designed so that all public entities' work is co-ordinated by a management board and the community accompanying the ongoing process, giving legitimacy and sustainability to all interventions.

Scope: The area of influence of the Metrocable (aerial branch of the subway system built in the northeastern part of the city). It benefits 150,000 people in 12 neighborhoods of the Comunas 1 and 2 (158 hectares).

Components: Improvement of houses in high risk areas, generation of public spaces, improvement of mobility, environmental programmes and provision and improvement of urban facilities. All these components are articulated through an inter-sectoral and consultative management mechanism.

Investment: \$436,000 million Colombian pesos (approx. USD \$200 million).

Main Interventions:

- 125,000 square meters of public spaces generated or improved
- 18 new parks (eight neighborhoods have parks for the first time)
- Park-Library Santo Domingo
- Zonal Centre for Economic Development (CEDEZO)
- four pedestrian bridges and eight high level crossings in the Lineal Park Quebrada La Herrera
- four pedestrian paths (2.8 lineal Km)
- slum-upgrading project in Juan Bobo neighborhood (Habitat Best Practices Award 2008)
- eleven fairs organised with micro entrepreneurs of this zone
- twenty-five community events oriented to promote pacific co-existence with more than 300,000 participants

Main Impacts:

- investment in social and cultural programmes is four times more than in the construction of the Metrocable, the main investment in physical infrastructure
- some 92% of the workforce are residents of the area benefiting from the intervention in an area where unemployment rate is 40%
- a 300% increase in trade in the sector and, with the creation of a commercial boulevard in the sector, commercial establishments in this street rose from 18 to 239
- significant reduction of rates of violence and insecurity, mainly in intra-familiar violence and burglary
- promotion of new community leaderships, strengthening of social and community organisations and increasing levels of citizen participation

Social Urbanism: An innovative approach with promising results

As a start to the new millennium, the Municipality started to test an approach that articulated more clearly safety and peaceful co-existence policies in the urban improvement programmes implemented in critical areas (slums and low-income neighborhoods) of the city. This new approach was included within the Municipal Development Plan (2004-2007). As one of the central elements of this plan there were a series of programmes aimed at the urban and social transformation of the most excluded areas of the city, which are grouped under the concept of Social Urbanism.

Social Urbanism principles are based on the explicit assumption that the physical planning interventions should be supported on the recognition of citizens as the key actor. It is assumed that any territorial intervention and public infrastructure investment should be supported from its inception in processes that ensure the equitable ownership of the city by the widest range of social segments and pursue a more equitable and livable city. All actions were undertaken within the framework of integrated urban interventions, which is constantly accompanied by the communities as main supporters and promoters of the projects. It must be conceived with the people and must be built with the people.

This type of urban interventions aim to pay the historical social debt of the city with the poorest communities, balancing the territory inequalities through the creation of qualified public spaces that facilitate people's interaction, the provision and improvement of urban facilities and the development of housing programmes in risky areas.

The *generation of public spaces* is one of the most outstanding components and thus promotes:

- Opportunities for people to meet one another and the peaceful co-existence of citizens;
- Reaffirmation of the meaning of public;
- Generation of political subjects that promotes the transformation of the city.

The *provision and improvement of urban facilities and infrastructure* component includes:

- Building of high quality public facilities and infrastructure such as libraries, schools and parks;
- Improvement of existing damaged or poor-quality infrastructure;
- Building urban paths and bridges in low-income neighborhoods, creating the possibility for moving from one place to another through adequate and pleasant streets where new ways of co-existence are promoted.

Within the *housing component* were included two processes:

- Generation of new housing programmes in areas of expansion, creating alternatives for the relocation of population living in areas of high vulnerability;
- Slum upgrading programmes, which has helped to improve conditions of populations located in areas with high risk.

These projects were implemented in areas of the city with low human development indexes and accentuated problems of violence and social conflicts. The main instrument used to operate the concept of *Social Urbanism* is the *Integrated Urban Programme* (PUI, abbreviated in Spanish). Below follows a more detailed description of the objectives and results of the first PUI implemented in the city.

The Present Phase (2008-2011)

The administration elected for the period 2008-2011 supports the continuation and deepening of the Social Urbanism approach as one of the best evaluated policies of the former Municipal Development Plan. The new mayor declared that *Social Urbanism* is based on three pillars:

- Urban renewal and social transformation of a city to find a balance for a life in society.
- Promotion of public spaces that allow all citizens to enjoy them and encounter with others regardless of their race and their economic position.
- Public education and culture, conceived as tools for the development of the city and society, and key elements for inclusion and equity.

As a result of the priority given to such interventions, the new City Plan increases the PUIs from two to six: the continuation of the PUI Comuna 13 and the start of the PUI Center East, the PUI Iguana Creek, the PUI Altavista, the PUI Northwest and the PUI Moravia.

More explicit integration between Urban Interventions and Security Policies

One of the most important advances in the conceptualization of the new Municipal Development Plan of Medellín is the more explicit integration between the Integrated Urban interventions with the Safety Policies.

This is expressed in the Inter-Institutional Agreement “Safety Contours and Surroundings for Pacific Coexistence” that have been signed by the Secretary of Government, responsible for safety policies, with the Urban Development Corporation (EDU), responsible for the

implementation of the Integrated Urban Programmes.

Through this agreement, the municipal government plans to implement the Slum Upgrading Programmes (PMIB) of the Municipal Plan (2008-2011) including from the first steps, the promotion of local alternatives for Urban Safety within the urban areas of intervention, which aim to deal with the three factors affecting urban security: social development, physical environmental and institutional performance.

To accomplish this task they will use the Social Housing Fund of Medellín - FOVIMED - as a financial instrument and the Secretariat of Government and the Urban Development Corporation - EDU - as the executing agency responsible for the technical feasibility and the co-ordination of housing projects. This agreement, currently under way, involves three phases.

Phase 1: Planning

Stage 1 – Situational Assessment: to identify the different physical, economic and environmental aspects of each area, causing social conflicts at family and community levels that stimulate or generate violence in the communities.

Stage 2 – Awareness raising, information and consultation: to produce and disseminate information about the various components of the project in order to motivate the community to commit and participate.

Phase 2: Implementation

Stage 1 – Application of the Manual for Peaceful Co-existence (developed by the Municipality through a consultative process): to promote processes of appropriation and community activities on civic culture and peaceful co-existence based on the principles of the Manual for Peaceful Co-existence, in the communities with developing processes of social housing and resettlement.

Stage 2 – Subscription of Civic Pacts: building through participatory processes with different actors in the PUI's areas oriented to peaceful use of public spaces and public venues with the strengthening of community life and social relationships.

Stage 3 – Proposal for Urban Design: production of an urban design proposal to reflect a situational prevention approach – the modification of the physical environment to eliminate conditions that facilitate crime.

Phase 3: Monitoring, Assessment and Systematization

Stage 1 – To monitor and evaluate the educational and training processes developed in the community, in order to measure the impact generated by the



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project “Safety Contours and Surroundings for Pacific Coexistence”, these activities will be conducted in three urban areas with these types of interventions: housing projects in slum upgrading areas, housing projects in areas for urban expansion, and housing projects in urban renewal areas.

The areas where the planning phase of this new approach is implementing are four areas where the Slum Upgrading Programme prioritizes their interventions in this period: Núcleo Cerro Santo Domingo, Núcleo Nororiental Alta, Núcleo Comuna 13, and Núcleo Comunas 8 y 9 Santa Elena.

Key Challenges

The main challenges of the process that has taken place in Medellín are:

- Constant tensions faced trying to balance between its conceptual and political approaches and demands - often contradictory – with the vision and policies promoted by the national entities (ministries and security forces) and this is common to all Colombian local authorities
- Pressure from the media and public opinion that demands more and more safety, and that often does recognize the progress achieved in reducing crime figures. The perception of insecurity increasing from time to time can be due the resonance of certain cases in the media, and is not always related to a real deterioration.
- Impact of the regional context as municipalities and neighboring rural regions generate dynamics of violence and insecurity associated with the internal conflict in the country, which often impact negatively the city. Medellín is currently affected by territorial and power disputes between illegal armed groups (guerrillas, paramilitaries and drug traffickers) in Antioquia and other neighboring departments.
- Sustainability of the model, which needs to be consolidated and institutionalized. Social urbanism, as an approach that integrates social, cultural and physical interventions with safety policies and programmes,

needs to be taken on by all sectoral institutions and urban stakeholders.

"The combination of safety policies and social investments was thought for these projects as an inseparable couple. Nothing is isolated".

Jesus Ramirez, Government Secretary of Medellin, 2009.

"Modern lifts, schools and libraries help transform poor neighborhoods of Medellin into a model to combat violence".

O Estadão, São Paulo, 2008.

"Medellin has changed. Four years were enough to make a radical change that transformed a conurbation of ghettos in a city for all, taking to the streets a society that has lived hidden in their homes for years because of fear."

El País, Madrid, 2008.

Lessons Learnt

The advances made by Medellin, which made it begin to be seen as a flagship for urban and safety policies, are based on a set of principles. *Social urbanism* is based on the idea that any territorial intervention should be based on an integrated social management process. Under this approach, the six elements that underpin any urban intervention are:

- Action through integrated urban projects, promoted in areas with higher rates of exclusion and inequality
- Carefully planned and efficiently implemented interventions, adopting an integrated schedule for the various interventions of municipal units, and operating through an integrated management
- Cultural and educational facilities designed as symbolic references that aim to dignify the most excluded communities, with high quality design and a wide range of cultural offer
- New social housing and upgrading programmes targeted to the most vulnerable, including specific alternatives for relocation of families living in risk areas
- Recovery of streets and public space as a fundamental value through promoting an intensive programme that includes boulevards, linear parks and emblematic streets that reconnect these areas with the city
- Safety and citizens' co-existence are assumed, more and more explicitly, as inseparable elements in the upgrading and renewal projects, now being incorporated from the earliest planning and design stages of integrated urban programmes

Perhaps the main lesson to be learned from the experience of Medellin is that the best investment governments can do is what is defined and led by the com-

munity. Many of the projects promoted under the social urbanism approach are the result of a participatory exercise that was institutionalized in the city. Through the participatory budgeting, communities prioritize their needs and collectively express their dreams and ideals of the city.

Young people are the priority in social and urban policies and key actors for social and situational prevention programmes implemented within the priority areas. The type of public spaces generated and recovered, youth-oriented employment generation programmes and the specific strategies targeted to youth at risk reflect this decision.

The turning point in the policy implemented by the Municipality of Medellin was the adoption of an approach that seeks to overcome the stereotypes that placed on one side the perpetrators and in the other the victims, that stigmatize some areas of the city as dangerous and sources of violence; that think that in the same areas in which violence occurs and criminality are forging life and hope. This approach responds to the purpose of advancing beyond the reduction of homicides and crimes in critical areas, generating alternative solutions to recover the voice and the dignity of those who have been excluded from the right to the city, either by poverty or by violence.



Medellin, Colombia. © UN-HABITAT

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Key Informants

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- Jesus Ramirez, Government Secretary of Medellín.
- Jorge Giraldo Ramirez, Researcher, University of EAFIT, Medellín.
- Mauricio Zapata, Social Coordinator, Urban Integrated Programmes, Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano, Medellín.
- Pablo Emilio Angarita Cañas, Researcher, Universidad de Antioquia, Medellín.

SAFETY AND SECURITY IN SETTLEMENT UPGRADING: THE CASE OF **PAPUA NEW GUINEA**

[Donovan Storey]



Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. © UN-HABITAT



254,000

PORT MORESBY POPULATION

* 2000 CENSUS



Urbanisation and informal settlement development in urban Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea remains a predominately rural country. Only around 20% of its 6.3 million population lives in urban areas. However, it is undergoing a rapid and difficult urban transformation which poses a number of serious challenges. Critical amongst these are: increasing poverty, high rates of informal settlement growth, absence of key services, inadequate infrastructure, and sustained crisis of urban crime and insecurity. Effective urban institutions and planning mechanisms have yet to emerge to meet these challenges. This has meant that many of the problems Papua New Guinea's towns and cities are facing have rarely been addressed effectively.

This study draws upon primary documents, secondary materials and previous research experience related to the growth of Papua New Guinea's urban informal settlements and the responses of urban authorities in the form of upgrading. Limited data exists on informal settlements in Papua New Guinea, hindering both research and policy. As well, for a number of years there has been no systematic upgrading policy with regards to the country's rapidly growing informal settlements.

Often informal settlements are seen as havens for the country's infamous criminals (or *raskols*), and thus broadly undeserving of development. While in recent years there have been invocations of partnerships regarding the mobilisation of customary land for urban development, and subsequently services and infrastructure, there has been limited actual implementation. When upgrading strategies in Papua New Guinea have been pursued in the development of land, the extension of services or the provision of infrastructure, this has often resulted in *increased* social tension and competition. This study seeks to outline why this is the case, and in so doing illustrate the complexities of upgrading in Papua New Guinea¹.

¹ The focus of the study will predominantly be on the largest city and capital, Port Moresby, though reference will also be made to several provincial urban

Urban informality & the limits of planning

The 2000 Census indicated that Port Moresby² had a population of 254,000, but numerically this is probably only half the story. Current estimates, even of government departments and planners including the National Statistics Office itself, suggest the 'real' population to be at least the double, around 500,000. Of this number at least half live in partially planned or unplanned informal settlements, though data is limited.

Largely driven by high rates of migration (officially 3.6% annually), many of Port Moresby's estimated 100-plus informal settlements represent a milieu of cultural identities and affiliations, especially given that Papua New Guinea is a country made up of an estimated 800-plus language groups. The Two Mile settlement illustrates the typically rich ethnic diversity of settlement demography in Papua New Guinea, as showed in figure one below.


The growth of settlements has been considerable in recent years. In the late 1980s it was estimated that Port Moresby had around 40 settlements, 16 of which had undergone some upgrading and service provision through the 1980s. Today those numbers are much greater, with the proportion of 'improved' sites a great deal less.

Even in places where upgrading has taken place in one form or another, many of these improvements have long since been vandalized or abandoned. Consequently, in the vast majority of urban informal settlements today there is little in the way of legally obtained infrastructure and services. What limited urban policy exists has instead focused on the discouragement of settlement and the denial of water, sanitation and tenure security.

experiences.

² Port Moresby lies within the National Capital District (NCD) and is administered by the National Capital District Commission (NCDC). The NCDC enjoys local government status, but not governance of policing, which remains under national purview.

FIGURE 1.1: Two Mile Settlement 2002



Source: Donovan Storey

Similar patterns and rates of growth are evident in a number of other major urban centres outside of the National Capital District (NCD), particularly Goroka (30,000), Lae (120,000) and Mount Hagen (80,000). Here *almost all population growth* is occurring in informal settlements, typically on customary land in the form of peri-urban 'villages'.

Such settlement occurs via 'rental agreements', often verbal, between migrants and landowners. Consequently, in the case of Goroka, only two of the city's estimated eight largest settlements are on state land, are formally recognized, and are considered for upgrading funding. The last significant attempt to do so was as part of a national sites-and-services and upgrading policy in the 1980s. Today, these two sites are the densest in terms of population and what services and infrastructure were put in place have long been overrun and severely deteriorated.

Indeed, despite their informality or perhaps due to it, most migrants and poorer residents prefer the greater space of peri-urban settlements with the greater likelihood of access to gardens³, water (via creeks) and (open) toilets. These locations of course also provide the greatest challenges for upgrading: there is reluctance from customary leaders to allow planning and infrastructure to

be developed on 'their' land, and authorities rarely recognise that such communities have the right to such 'urban' services. Indeed, prevailing beliefs that settlements are havens for criminals, organised crime, and communicable diseases such as HIV result in little public sector desire to divert scarce resources to peri-urban areas.

These views, that informal settlements are primarily dysfunctional and dangerous areas, were even expressed in the Goroka Rapid Urban Sector Profiling for Sustainability (RUSPS)⁴ exercise. Yet, there is often little in the way of research to support such prejudices covering some 60% of the city's population⁵.

Despite clear and growing need, urban planning strategy for many years has been the active denial of settlement integration into the urban fabric. This is compounded by the widespread lack of resources devoted to dealing with urban issues. Public resources to meet the needs of the city's settlements are but a fraction of what is required. Even limited public housing systems are on the verge of collapse, with the National Housing Corporation (NHC) largely insolvent and the subject of a full audit in 2008⁶.

³ Gardening is a critically important source of food but also income. A recent study on urban gardening in Port Moresby estimated that half the city's fresh green produce (approximately 50 tons) was grown in informal settlements.

⁴ RUSPS is an accelerated action-oriented assessment of urban conditions in a city. It entails undertaking a rapid analysis of the current urban situation in thematic areas with relevant stakeholders.

⁵ For example, UN-HABITAT Goroka City Profile, pages 5 & 17.

⁶ 'PNG Housing corporation target of probe'. Post-Courier, September 24, 2008.

This has also meant that there has been little in the way of a strategic response to settlement growth. The National Capital District (NCD) Urban Development Plan offers little in the way of planning for settlements other than noting problems resulting from illegality, among others, and is wholly silent on issues of crime and safety. The National Capital District Commission's (NCDC) *Settlement Strategic Plan 2007-11*, developed by the NCDC to more specifically deal with informal settlements, lacks resources and institutional support. Though the Plan identifies two pilot project sites, these have not been pursued through to implementation. In neither pilot was safety specifically identified as a significant threat to project objectives, or related to outcomes.

The lack of a critical mass of upgrading initiatives is due to limited resources and capacity but it also reflects the difficulty of controlling settlement and patterns of development on customary land - which accounts for around 40% of land area within the NCD, for example - and peri-urban areas, where formal authorities have limited regulatory power. It further reflects a broader policy view that those in peri-urban settlements do not have any rights to services, infrastructure and security - a view held in much of Melanesia (Storey 2003).

The lack of government commitment toward settlement upgrading - and indeed the active avoidance of it - is coupled with an emerging crisis of urban poverty and thus affordability. With the majority of the urban working population earning barely more than a subsistence income - even formal sector workers only earn around K80 or US\$30 a fortnight⁷ - urban poverty is at crisis levels in many of Papua New Guinea's cities. A Gordon (Port Moresby) resident remarked to a national newspaper story on housing affordability 'Olgetape go long haus rent namipelabaikaikaiwanem [All our fortnightly earnings is consumed by the rental fees. What are we going to eat?]⁸. With few opportunities to escape poverty, many urban residents, particularly those living on customary land, have been historically reluctant to pay for infrastructure and services, even when there has been a possibility of such benefits resulting from token fees.

Settlement Upgrading: tracing an irregular commitment

In Papua New Guinea urbanisation is clearly placing great burdens on infrastructure, basic services, and environmental health. Poorer neighborhoods, especially informal settlements, are characterized by a lack of infrastructure services often resulting from their 'illegal' tenure status or lack of power to shape public expenditure.



Goroka, Papua New Guinea. © UN-HABITAT

A lack of lighting and roads accentuates problems of dangerous and isolated spaces. Nevertheless, the popular connection between settlement populations and the country's problematic urban crime situation has tended to prevail in public policy, meaning that the extension of services and infrastructure to informal settlements has been given limited priority or commitment over time.

Where sites and service and upgrading programmes have taken place, initially as part of the National Settlement Policy (1973) and then in the 1980s and early 1990s, gains have been rapidly lost through demand pressures, a lack of cost record and land disputes. Squatting around improved areas also led to conflict between 'formal' and 'informal' residents. *Wantok* (relative/kinship ties) demands on infrastructure and services have led to unsustainable use patterns and sabotage of facilities when services were no longer sustained or provided.

Conflict over land affected by upgrading and 'squatting' have also often resulted in conflict and dispute, and the reluctance of landowners to make further land available for development. Coupled with a equal reluctance of urban managers to develop informal settlements and a declining level of managerial and technical capacity, there has been over time a gradual abandonment of a number of earlier upgrading efforts, often furthering tensions between residents, authorities and recently private sector providers. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the challenges of urban development in Papua New Guinea are greater than the upgrading of individual settlements. As Abbott (2002: 308) has stated, 'a settlement cannot be isolated from the city of which it is part'. Even wealthy and formal settlements suffer from inadequate services, loss of water, electricity and deteriorating infrastructure.

⁷ In contrast, rental rooms with shared facilities in the city's informal settlements can cost as much as PGK150 (US\$60) a week.

⁸ 'Port Moresby rents go through roof'. *The National*, January 11, 2006.



Goroka, Papua New Guinea. © UN-HABITAT

Crime & safety concerns

It is difficult to seriously tackle the development issues facing urban Papua New Guinea without reference to crime and its impact on safety and urban policy. Papua New Guinea's cities and towns have suffered from deteriorating levels of safety for much of the period since independence in 1975. In the Pacific Island region Port Moresby, Mount Hagen and Lae have earned somewhat of a benchmark reputation for high levels of crime and violence. Port Moresby is regularly selected as one of the world's most dangerous and least livable cities because of its high crime rate, poor public facilities and services, and high levels of poverty.

Crimes range from petty theft and burglary to more substantial incidences of armed robbery, pack rapes and hijacking of public and private transport. This has created a number of well-known unsafe areas, most notably but not confined to 'the settlements'⁹. *Raskols* ('youth' criminals) are often the principal targets for public anger over crime, and are often linked to one or more informal settlements. However, research on *raskolism* by Goddard (2001) and Dinnen (2001) has demonstrated that *raskol* gangs can equally encompass poor and middle class males and neighborhoods.

In reality, violent crime can occur at any time and place, which heightens a sense of public unease and escalates the fear of crime beyond perhaps the actual threat. Still, it has become common for settlements to be connected to broader urban insecurity, and *raskols* to much of the criminal activity which takes place. Port Moresby, in particular, is a dangerous place and there have been few successful interventions, either in policing or prevention. While 'strong' police responses were initially seen as the most appropriate and hoped for effective response, the police in recent years have been seen as part of the problem of escalating violence and 'payback'. Indeed, *raskol* gangs may seek open confrontation with the police as part of their 'badge of honour' and struggle for power. In turn, police responses of beatings, torture and murder are seen as the only recourse open to control individuals and communities, especially given frustrations with the efficacy of justice systems in handling juvenile crime and violence.

There is little doubt that the security situation in Port Moresby, and in regional centres such as Mount Hagen and Lae, reflects but also contributes to high levels of poverty and restricts the ability of government, civil society and the private sector to extend and maintain infrastructure and services. Many settlements in Port Moresby have limited access to services because private and public providers cannot operate safely in a number of areas. Infrastructure maintenance is often the most needed in communities effectively considered 'no go' zones.

⁹ The term 'settlement' is often used in Melanesian cities to refer to informal settlements or slums. While seen more positive and accurate than 'slum', 'settlement' has begun to take on a pejorative meaning. Being referred to as coming from a 'settlement' is more often than not likely to result in stigmatisation, especially for youth.

This reinforces marginality and poverty in general and also a decreasing level of access to potable water; problems with waterborne diseases through high faecal counts; a high level of communicable disease through overcrowding; problems with solid waste disposal and limited safe space at night, due to the lack of public lighting. A lack of safety in settlements has discouraged private sector investment in infrastructure development and service delivery.

In Papua New Guinea fear and insecurity are driven by endemic levels of domestic violence, youth gangs/*raskols* and the ineffectiveness and corruption associated with policing (NRI 2006: 3). Urban crime in many cities is increasing and in some, such as Port Moresby, has become a part of daily life. A UN-HABITAT report in 2005 (pp.36-37) indicated that 'typical' crimes included burglary, carjacking, assault, drug dealing, pretty crime and other property crime; that most perpetrators were aged between 15-20 years old; and that nearly half of all crimes (48%) involved violence. More than two-thirds of households surveyed in Port Moresby in 2005 reported that they had been the victim of crime over the previous 12 months, while more than half reported having been affected by two or more types of crime (multiple crimes) over the same period (NRI 2006:12).

Insecurity and violence, though, is not limited to Port Moresby. Victimisation surveys undertaken in 2004-5 (NRI 2007) indicated Lae residents faced higher levels of crime than Port Moresby. Across Papua New Guinea similar threats to safety held, notably that between 61-78% of urban households reported being a victim of crime in the previous twelve months; that respondents felt that safety was deteriorating and that community cohesion was the most important factor in creating safer communities. Of note, communities also sought more secure compounds; less household crowding and greater community participation in crime prevention – all fundamental goals of settlement upgrading.

Recorded crime levels in Papua New Guinea are high, yet this is despite much crime and violence in poorer and more marginal communities going unreported. Typically people are wary of involving police agencies and the legal system which they do not see as representative of their values and interests. Those known to have committed crime will in many instances have *wantok* (kinship ties) in the police force and/or legal sector and will use these connections to avoid prosecution, making the reporting of offences pointless and even counterproductive to victims. Police are often perceived as not interested in pursuing reported crime.

The impact of urban crime and insecurity has social costs. For small island economies and generally tight-knit social structures these costs are particularly high. In mapping the incidence of crime it is clear that in most urban areas both the perpetrators and victims of crime live in the same or nearby communities. Surveys have shown that in Papua New Guinea people were more concerned about the level of safety in their own household and community than the city as a whole, resulting in an emphasis on linking community development, safety, and opportunity.

Settlement policy as a source of conflict

Government policies towards informal settlements, when they have been evident, have often exhibited high levels of intolerance. Demolition and calls for settlements to be cleared and residents to be 'sent home' are frequent, and a new wave of state violence was evident again in 2009. This denial of rights and attribution of the ills of urban development to settlers prevails in the press commentary and permeates social and institutional consciousness (Koczberski *et.al.* 2001). It has arguably resulted in a deliberate strategy of 'de-servicing' informal settlements; that is the active denial of essential services and infrastructure to growing communities in order to dissuade current and future settlement as well as punish communities blamed for crime.

Although a Settlements Strategic Plan is in place, there have been limited resources employed to support implementation. Typically, in the absence of state policy, police action has determined relations. Indeed, attacks and clearances of settlements are often at times in variance with official policy on housing and settlements. As an example, in June 2009 heavily armed police escorted tractors which destroyed houses, shops, food gardens and illegal power and water connections in Five Mile settlement after a recent spike in violence¹⁰.

During the operation, which was promised to be one of several, policemen were ordered to *brukimlek nah an* (break legs and hands) of those in defiance to clean up campaigns directed at alcohol sales¹¹. Somewhat ironically, this 'cleaning up' was followed by a call from the police for government to invest in affordable housing, infrastructure, social services and planning for the city's rapidly growing informal settlements¹². In short, policing has become de-facto settlement policy where no national and coordinated strategy exists¹³.

10 'Port Moresby squatter settlement demolished by police', Radio Australia June 26, 2009.

11 'PNG Police stomp unlicensed food vendors'. The National, June 29, 2009.

12 'PNG government should provide affordable housing'. The National, June 28, 2009.

13 Such hostilities have not been confined to housing but also include a broad simmering conflict with informal sector workers which has characterised relations between the poor and authorities, most notably in Port Moresby, for a number of years.

The dynamics of settlement upgrading and conflict

Responses to crime tend to elicit different responses from urban residents and politicians, but are critical to the level of support or otherwise to settlement upgrading and development. Though the poor are far more affected by crime their voices are manifestly absent from policy dialogue. Generally 'elite' perspectives prevail, that see informal settlements as havens for crime and criminals. Common responses typically involve the demand to 'clear' settlements, control population movement, or send migrants 'home'. Such responses though have the effect of reinforcing marginality, destroying capital and exacerbating poverty.

It is important to note that people often seek to live in settlements with *wantok* for reasons of security (Ivoro 2003). On the other hand, those living within unsafe areas wish to see a more positive and effective response to their problems, which includes addressing crime but also positively address poverty, a lack of infrastructure and socio-economic marginalization. Several surveys in Papua New Guinea have also highlighted that visibility of policing, especially at the level of community and in the form of police posts, is also seen as important.

The importance of 'soft' infrastructure

To date upgrading efforts have been limited to formally recognized settlements on public land such as Goroka in the 1980s. These have tended to focus on the physical and infrastructure needs of communities. Less emphasis has been towards issues the poor themselves see as vital in community development – employment, social cohesion, and safety. It is often these 'softer' needs of settlement development that go unmet. Yet, the 'hard' gains of infrastructure may be quickly lost, through poor maintenance, unregulated community use, a lack of 'ownership' and community conflicts.

In Papua New Guinea, there are examples where community members of informal settlements have managed to negotiate basic water and electricity provision, but often this has been destroyed over time or terminated by providers through lack of payment. Often residents do not see payment as being their responsibility, and infrastructure and services to be solely the job of government. That *wantok* connections or patronage relationships with politicians will result in 'free' provision are widely shared faiths in many informal settlements. It is clear then that managing risks, expectations and community power dynamics is crucial to the successful and sustainable implementation and maintenance of community development projects (Muke&Gonno, 2005).

Upgrading, conflict & land

Upgrading poses considerable and unique challenge when customary land is involved in the extension and provision of infrastructure and services. Often, the costs of 'compensation' prove to be prohibitive, especially for local government but also for private/public service providers. This was the experience in Mount Hagen in the early 1990s, where water supply projects led to conflict with customary landowners who claimed compensation and threatened violence if such development went ahead.

The extension of infrastructure such as power lines and pipes has provided great difficulties for peri-urban informal settlements when such development results in even the minor impact on land. This creates strong disincentives for service providers as future maintenance also involves continuing negotiation, invariably including compensation claims and/or threats¹⁴. Even upgrading communities on 'freehold' land in a context where customary land prevails creates somewhat of an opportunity cost for customary leaders, settlers, landowners and government agencies alike.

Upgrading experiences in Africa have shown that if upgrading leads to higher costs through cost recovery, residents will move to less expensive informal settlements on customary land. Informal systems and relationships which have built up over periods of time in 'unimproved' communities may indeed be favoured, prevail and ultimately be more beneficial for people than the newer networks created in upgraded settlements. It has been documented elsewhere that when greater security of tenure does not occur through upgrading, cost recovery and the maintenance of infrastructure and services by communities and providers is poor (Werlin 2005). Eventually, this leads to a collapse of what progress was made.

This would appear to place land tenure at the heart of sustained upgrading improvements, but this presents difficult challenges in Papua New Guinea where the vast majority of settlements are on unalienable and often contested land. Successfully negotiating land issues from potential areas of conflict will likely necessitate innovative strategies with stakeholders which are able to bridge informal and formal planning systems.

¹⁴ Nevertheless, customary land need not impede upgrading. Evidence from Ghana suggests that much can be achieved within informal customary systems, and in many cases these provide more egalitarian and secure outcomes than formal titling (Chome & McCall 2005).



Informal settlements in Goroka, Papua New Guinea © UN-HABITAT

Upgrading, power and status

Upgrading also results in shifting power relationships, and these may also be a cause of conflict. Though urban design and enhanced utilities, such as lighting, is positively linked to enhanced safety there are often winners and losers in the nature of upgrading and the location of resources. Upgrading, especially when it involves tenure, shifts dynamics between renters and landlords and even exposes such relationships. Evidence from South Africa indicates that poorer households, renters and 'backyard' dwellers may indeed lose through upgrading. Intra-community and community/government conflict has resulted in settlement upgrading from a lack of understanding of such complex dynamics (Lemanski 2009). This may be important in places where 'landlords' additionally act as service providers, including security.

In Papua New Guinea, and Melanesia more generally, the status of customary authorities - community 'big men' - may be challenged or undermined through upgrading, and this may result in significant though not always readily observable tensions. Most informal settlements in Papua New Guinea are characterised by high rates of ethnic diversity, with 'big men' in a constant struggle for power. Yet the impact of upgrading and settlement policy is rarely outwardly cognisant of the impact on leadership as a source of tension and ultimately project failure.

Of the greatest tensions created through upgrading, managing raised expectations and ensuing frustrations and conflict has been the most evident. Recent efforts to mobilise customary land for settlement upgrading in Port Moresby has proven difficult for this reason. A lack of ownership of any community development, even which comes from government, ultimately undermines

power. Subsequently, all actual and potential projects need to be 'owned', especially if this undermines rivals, but even if this claim or struggle threatens the project itself.

Towards enhancing safety through upgrading

A number of studies have thus highlighted the complex relationships between settlement upgrading, safety and conflict. The Safer Cities Programme of UN-HABITAT (2007:240-2) has outlined how safety and crime prevention can be addressed through upgrading and service delivery, though much needs to be learned through specific experiences such as Papua New Guinea.

If anything, such tensions are more clearly felt in settings where conflict is the prevailing norm between informal settlements and authorities. Customary land tenure and the importance of traditional authorities also add further important dimensions. Successful upgrading invariably builds in specific efforts at consensus building and mechanisms of conflict resolution. As a principle, upgrading programmes should not negatively affect the welfare of beneficiaries, especially the more vulnerable. Yet, upgrading often affects communities structurally and spatially, and impacts on social dynamics which may even decrease individual and community security. Existing physical layouts of informal settlements may reflect kinship networks which create many 'eyes and ears' as well as demarcating ethnic boundaries. Ethnic clustering in informal settlements is a marking of territory, but it also contributes to group safety through surveillance.

Participatory upgrading & safety

Representation of communities in decision making is a significant weakness in urban planning in Papua New Guinea. In only a few settlements are there clear lines of responsibility and accountability which cut across ethnic lines. Even where some form of organisation exists, such as the Goroka Settlement Authority advocacy group (GSA), there are no legal mechanisms for engagement in decision making. This is typical of a general crisis in stakeholder identification and involvement in urban development projects in Papua New Guinea, which encourages corruption, patronage and inefficiencies in policies and programmes. Of interest, *raskol* gangs are one of the few clear examples of inter-ethnic social networks, though rarely are youth leaders encouraged or able to participate in dialogue.

There are examples of upgrading which have more successfully dealt with broader claims and needs of residents in Papua New Guinea, and much can and should be learned from these. Typically, these have been smaller scale and have involved a long process of developing partnerships and trust.

Interestingly, these may not be considered 'typical' (i.e. infrastructure-based) settlement upgrading approaches, but the Yumi Lukautim Mosbi project (YLMP) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)'s Integrated Community Development Project (ICDP) for settlement areas in the National Capital District (NCD) demonstrate what can be achieved through a graduated and organic approach to settlement development.

The YMLP combines crime prevention and urban safety through linkages between provincial government, law and justice agencies, the private sector and communities most affected by crime. It is an initiative supported by AusAID and is run under the Law and Justice Sector Program. It is managed by the Urban Safety Advisory Committee of the National Capital District Commission (NCDC) which consists of representatives from the corporate sector, donors, women and youth councils, the church, media, police, local government and community representatives. YLM is characterised by a number of innovative and multi-sectoral solutions which meet community needs.

It focuses on four core pillars, namely:

- Promotion of sport and youth engagement, particularly through schools and informal settlements
- Reintegration and skills development, which specifically targets the inclusion of private sector involvement, skills development and employment creation
- Awareness of urban safety through positive stories, use of media and examples of community initiatives
- Community engagement, where communities are encouraged to develop forums which build consensus on needs and seek funding for these initiatives

In the YLMP there has been a deliberate and carefully planned strategy of community engagement which has been used to clearly establish needs but also ownership. To a great extent the success of YLMP has underlined the limitations of institution-based approaches in favour of community-focused innovations which build partnerships around meeting essential needs.



Local open air market in Goroka, Papua New Guinea © UN-HABITAT



Local dumping site in Goroka, Papua New Guinea © UN-HABITAT

In the past there has clearly been a lack of traction in projects which have been wholly ‘owned’ by government or donors. One of the key reasons for recent successes in YLMP has been that the community itself feels that it directs priorities, and these priorities reflect their actually existing conditions. Partnerships have succeeded, arguably where past initiatives driven by donors and the public sector have failed, because they have tapped into a broad demand for change across society and engaged communities and institutions, both public and corporate, which have vested interests in addressing crime, poverty and a lack of infrastructure and social services.

As a result, PNG Power has embraced the extension of electricity into areas to create safer lit spaces, and in return communities that take responsibility for such infrastructure can participate in broader social development opportunities under the YLM project. In many respects this provides an example of an approach which simultaneously meets the needs of individuals, communities, government and business, and offers the opportunity for each to claim ownership of the project and benefit from its success.

JICA’s Integrated Community Development Project (ICDP) engagement since 2005 has been oriented toward enhancing capacity for upgrading of the NCDC and of communities themselves and in several communities there have been valuable lessons from community engagement.

Pilot projects have resulted in the construction of a community hall, bore well, improved sanitation and water supply, as well as skills training and health awareness. Such gains however have been hard won, and in some cases ephemeral. Even successful projects were fraught with potential conflict amongst members of the community and with traditional landowners and several pilot projects had to be abandoned due to physical assaults on contractors and project staff.

A key finding in evaluations of the ICDP was the care required in building understanding and consensus around projects in settlements, and the need to understand complex social dynamics which impact on expected progress (Sagir&Kombakon.d). Problems have been an unwillingness to pay for community development projects, usually due to perceptions of corruption or the belief that improvements are ‘gifts’; changing gender roles; ethnic divisions; patron-client relationships and expectations of leaders; and conflicts with traditional landowners over community development and upgrading and ownership.

LESSONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of lessons emerge from an analysis of the complexities of upgrading and its relationship with crime and safety in Papua New Guinea. Developing housing, infrastructure and services to settlements is both critical in making Papua New Guinea's cities safer. But upgrading programmes, in isolation to the broader dynamics and drivers of settlement/government relations in urban Papua New Guinea, are unlikely to result in marked and sustained improvements in settlement conditions and policy. There is a clear need for a sustained shift in approach to settlements in Papua New Guinea, if upgrading projects are to realize any gains.

Upgrading implies institutional capacity and governance in order to support and maintain gains. One key problem has been the inability of institutions, service providers and communities to effectively sustain improvements over time. It may be argued that settlements that have undergone 'improvements' in the past have greater problems with density, inadequate services, crime and failed infrastructure than 'unimproved' and peri-urban settlements.

Upgrading requires consistent dialogue with communities, or projects will result in frustration, unmet and unrealistic expectations and ultimately little positive change. When 'promises' and expectations of development have not been met in the past, the result has often been frustration and violence. Effective community development in Papua New Guinea requires moving from a constraining regulatory framework towards the building of partnerships and trust. These 'soft' areas of community infrastructure should not be ignored.

Customary land provides complexities, but need not be an ultimate impediment to upgrading. A decreasing proportion of settlements are developed on private or state land. Any meaningful city or national upgrading policy will inevitably require developing strategies which allow some progress to be made in settlements on customary land.

Upgrading inevitably challenges prevailing power relationships and this remains a strong cause of conflict and violence. In cultures where status is linked to the control and distribution of resources settlement upgrading plays a central role in either meeting those expectations, or escalating frustration and community tension.

Understanding and identifying leadership within communities is critical in successfully defining the champions of settlement upgrading and development. 'Leaders' may include traditional 'Big Men' representing ethnic migrant groups, customary landowners (who may be absent physically from the settlement), church leaders, women or *raskol* leaders representing youth gangs. Mediating across these groups is critical to positive and sustained intervention.

Successful upgrading requires planning and implementation which is cognisant of existing conflict and develops strategies to manage new sources of conflict. Resourcing community dialogue and the development of conflict resolution mechanisms have been widely recognised as important tools in upgrading elsewhere, and are even more necessary in Papua New Guinea.

A number of past upgrading and sites and services policies have actually increased community conflict and failed to effectively promote safer communities. Ultimately, any successful informal settlement policy in Papua New Guinea needs to address issues of safety, insecurity and crime and build social cohesion. Upgrading should ultimately result in communities with enhanced levels of safety.

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ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES IN SLUM UPGRADING INITIATIVES: **NAIROBI** CASE STUDY

Elijah Agevi and Paul Mbatha




Nairobi City, Kenya. © Julius Mwelu/UN-HABITAT

3,500,000

NAIROBI POPULATION

* 2008 CENSUS



Background

Urbanisation, Slums and Urban Safety

Since independence in 1963, urbanisation in Kenya has proceeded at a tremendous pace that has increased the urban population from 750,000 in 1962 to 9.9 million by 1999. It is estimated that by 2015, urban dwellers will constitute more than 50% of the total population¹. Nairobi's population was estimated at 3.5 million, as of 2008. The overall population density of Nairobi is 3,079 people per square kilometer (CBS 2001). This density, however, varies greatly across the city with informal settlements experiencing high densities in excess of 90,000 people per square kilometer (GoK, 2001 in Research International).

The rapid urbanisation process has been accompanied by key challenges including inadequate shelter, unemployment, environmental degradation, increase in crime, poverty and poor infrastructure and social facilities. The acute shortage of adequate housing in urban areas is seen in the proliferation of slums and informal settlements where the majority of urban residents now live.² In Nairobi alone, about 60% of the population lives in informal settlements and the number is expected to double within the next 15 years³.

In general, urbanisation has outstripped the capacities of the Government of Kenya and local authorities to guide the physical planning and growth of urban areas and to provide essential services including safety and security. Inadequate public services have been cited as one of the main factors behind increased levels of urban insecurity. Other factors include failure to incorporate security/safety related issues in urban management policies, strategies and programmes.

Programmes targeting renewal, re-development and/or upgrading of informal settlements often fail to focus on certain key aspects that have direct effect on safety and security from the onset. Some factors contributing to this situation include lack of knowledge and awareness of the links between planning, good governance, service provision and safety and security; and limited number of practitioners or professionals with the necessary experience and orientation on urban safety. Furthermore, the design process of slum upgrading programmes suffers from both lack of appropriate tools and information to guide inclusive planning processes that inculcate safety and security principles.

Urban Safety and the Broad National Development Agenda

Urban safety and security appears to be a major area of concern for the Kenyan government. This is demonstrated in a number of government development blue prints. In the Vision 2030 document, safety and security is envisaged as one of the strategic areas under the political governance pillar. The overall goal for the security sector under Vision 2030 is "a society free from danger and fear". It is presumed that increased security will directly attract more investments and lower the cost of doing business while, at the same time, providing Kenyans with a more secure and working environment.

Vision 2030 aims to provide "security to all persons and property". More specifically, this will be achieved through, among other efforts, promoting public-private cooperation and civilian and community involvement for improved safety and security and deepening policy, legal and institutional reform for improved enforcement (Kenya Vision 2030)⁴. The Urbanisation and Housing Sector in Vision 2030 states that it will seek to address issues related to urban development that have a direct impact on enhancement of urban safety.

¹ UN-HABITAT, "Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme Strategy Document", Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2008.

² Government of Kenya, "KENSUP Implementation Strategy 2005-2020".

³ loc. cit..

⁴ E. Agevi and P. Mbatha, "Urban Safety and Security: Key Issues For Urban Policy Consideration. A Paper to Inform the Process of Formulating a National Urban Development Policy For Kenya", 2008.



Downtown Nairobi, Kenya. © Julius Mwelu/UN-HABITAT

In addition, the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development (MoNMD), created in 2008, identifies safety and security as a key result area. MoNMD's goal is to "make the Nairobi Metropolitan Region safe and secure for person and property through sustained reduction in crime and other adverse incidences including mitigation against disasters". Some of the safety and security measures will include ability to respond to emergency situations across the metropolitan area and the integration of metropolitan infrastructure and amenities conscious of the safety and security needs of the citizens.

Assessment Methodology and Scope

This case study examines to what extent issues of safety and security have been integrated into the project development and implementation cycle of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP). The study specifically focuses on experiences drawn from Nairobi, and involved participatory approaches such as focus group discussion, observation, and careful analysis of key programme documents. The assessment is more biased to Kibera and, in particular, Soweto East village upgrading process, as this was the pilot site for KENSUP.

Context

Generally, settlements are poorly planned and lack basic infrastructural services and amenities, inadequate housing, inadequate access to clean water and waste management systems. Roads are in poor condition, many of which double up as community spaces for meetings and playgrounds for children. The locations assessed in this report include Kibera, Mathare, Korogocho and Kahawa Soweto, all within the boundaries of the City Council of Nairobi. The living conditions in these settlements are representative of the state of urban poverty in the country.

Kibera⁵ has high population densities, poor sanitation and water quality, low access to basic services like health care and education, and low incomes, and widespread insecurity of tenure. Population densities are well over 90,000 persons/sq.km (GoK, 2001, Research International). The majority of the residents make their living from the informal sector. By 2005, more than 50% of Nairobi's labour force worked in the informal sector (CBS 2006, UNCHS 2001 in City of Nairobi Environment Outlook, 2007). Also, due to a deeply corrupt system of land allocation and profit extraction over the years, 80% of Kibera's residents are tenants of illegal structure owners⁶.

Insecurity remains a big challenge in Kibera and indeed in other informal settlements under review. The main forms include mugging, harassment and burglary and robbery with violence is also common in the area. Rape, which in most cases is unreported, is also a major problem. The area has remained volatile since the 2007 disputed presidential elections with the youth being highly charged and 'ready for any action'. Another worrying feature of crime in Kibera, as in other areas is that younger and younger people are drifting into crime.

Mathare is one of the oldest informal settlements in Nairobi, located north-east of the city centre. It is made up of 11 previously well-organised villages and is characterized by low-quality shelter, some form of cooperative housing/and land buying company housing and upgraded zones through the efforts of Pamoja Trust (PT)⁷. Mathare 4 area has been upgraded through a creative partnership of the Government of Kenya, the Catholic Church and other stakeholders.

⁵ Kibera is located about 7 km from city centre, occupies an area of about 2.5 square kilometers, and has nine villages: Silanga, Lindi, Soweto, Kisumu Ndogo, Kianda, Laini Saba, Gatwekera, Makina and Mashimoni.

⁶ W. Olima and S. Karirah-Gitau, "Land tenure and tenancy concerns and issues in Kibera", WSP-ESA, The World Bank, KUESP Preparatory Group Task, Final Report, unpublished manuscript, 2000.

⁷ Pamoja Trust is a local non-governmental organisation, based in Kenya that supports urban poor communities in addressing problems of inadequate housing and infrastructure.



Korogocho Slum in Nairobi, Kenya. © Jackson Kago

Kahawa Soweto is about 20 kilometres north of Nairobi. The settlement was initially owned by a white farmer who sold it to the residents through the Soweto Kahawa Settlement Committee. Residents in the settlement mainly commute to the city center for casual jobs. A few of them have informal businesses or retail shops while others practice subsistence agriculture and keep pigs, goats and chicken. There are no reliable alternative sources of income in the neighborhoods such as formal industries.

Korogocho, located in east Nairobi, is about three squarekilometres with a population of about 400,000. It is the third largest slum after Kibera and Mathare. Unemployment is high, and several residents engage in the sale of illicit brew and hold informal jobs. Some 60 % of the homes in Korogocho are headed by women⁸. They are often single with little or no income. It is felt that the youth also 'control' the proceeds associated with the Dandora dumpsite. Tenant-landlord conflict is high in the settlement.⁹ Tenure insecurity is a key feature of the settlement, which is situated partly on public land and partly on privately-owned land. Korogocho is prone to high incidences of drug abuse, organised gangs, and access to and use of illegal firearms. Korogocho is currently benefiting from an upgrading process co-ordinated through the debt swap initiative between the Italian and Kenyan Governments. The framework¹⁰ is different from the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme, with the Ministry of Local Government being the lead Kenyan Government actor in the process.

These informal settlements are perceived to be unsafe and insecure - reasons and nature of insecurity vary from one area to the other. Furthermore, although the phenomenon of gangs is not new in Nairobi, particularly in informal settlements, a type of well-organised, aggressive and brutal gang is emerging with no respect for human life and which do not appear to be deterred by the government security apparatus. Gang activities include extortion of money through controlling bus stops and transport nodes and enforcing rents.

Safer Cities and Safer Nairobi Initiative

Overview

The Safer Cities Programme of UN-HABITAT has been helping the City Council of Nairobi to implement a Crime Prevention and Urban Safety Strategy and Action Plan. The process began in 2003 following a request from the City Council of Nairobi (Ministry of Local Government). The overall objective of the urban safety strategy was to "reduce crime and insecurity in a sustainable way by addressing their root causes". This was to be achieved through, among other methods, improved and focused action by the council, partnerships between different institutions and increased coordination and integrated action at the community level. The City Council passed a resolution on a Safer Cities Action Plan.¹¹

⁸ For reference, see http://www.anglican catholic.org/MSSP_Flyer_2009.pdf

⁹ The structures in Korogocho are quite crowded with an average of 5-6 persons per room as compared to the Mathare slums with 4-5 persons per room of 6 square metres (average size).

¹⁰ Coordination by the Ministry of Local Government.

¹¹ See CCN, General Purposes Committee of 2nd February 2005.



Mathare slum Nairobi, Kenya © Julius Mwelu/UN-HABITAT

Formulation and Implementation of Urban Safety Strategies

The city of Nairobi is in the implementation phase of its Urban Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy. The Safer Nairobi Initiative is a joint initiative between the UN-HABITAT and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister & Ministry of Local Government (ODPM&MLG). The Urban Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy presents new and innovative approaches to safety, crime and insecurity in cities, and is built around four pillars. These are better enforcement of laws and by-laws; improved urban design and environment; support for groups at risk and empowerment of the community.

The strategy challenges the traditional responses to addressing issues of crime and urban insecurity. A Programme Coordinating Office is already in place and located at the City Council of Nairobi to oversee the implementation of a number of projects. A national replication framework for the Nairobi experiences has been proposed. Some activities under the strategy that have been implemented within the slums areas are recognized within the framework of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme. This is after a request was made to and accepted by, the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme, to undertake these activities.

Within this framework, the Silanga-Undugu playground in Kibera, which was initially in an extremely unusable condition, underwent improvements through technical support and funding from a local/international NGO, Kilimanjaro Initiative, and UN-HABITAT.

The field was identified as crime hot spot, and was not used due to the perceived danger of mugging, and harassment particularly rape of women. These issues were raised during a participatory safety audit that was carried out in the area. The community members identified the need for improvements on the playground which were viewed as necessary in reducing the risk of mugging and for meaningfully engaging the youth. The results are that the youth have a better facility for their sports and leisure activities including music concerts that contribute to their social development and engage them in wholesome activities away from idleness and vulnerability to crime and violence.

The Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme

Overview

Launched in 2004, the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) is a collaborative initiative between the Government of Kenya and UN-HABITAT. The Initiative is a key core poverty reduction strategy and the programme is anchored in the UN Millennium Declaration, specifically Goal No7's Target 11, which focuses on improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020¹². The programme is in implementation phase and was designed to cover all urban areas of Kenya, starting with selected settlements in Nairobi Mombasa, Kisumu and Mavoko.

¹² For Kenya, the figure of slum dwellers whose livelihoods will be alleviated is 5.3 million. This will be done at an approximate cost of KES \$883.76 Billion, i.e. US \$11.05 Billion (Ministry of Housing, 2008).

KENSUP was formulated to serve as a roadmap in the implementation process and outlines the programme's vision, objectives, institutional framework, partnership arrangements, and strategic interventions. The key actors involved at the strategy implementation include the Ministry of Housing (also in management) through the KENSUP Coordinating Unit, local authorities and UN-HABITAT and other development partners.

Goal and Objectives of KENSUP

The goal of the Programme is to improve the livelihoods of people living and working in slums and informal settlements in the urban areas of Kenya. This entails promoting, facilitating, and where necessary, providing security of tenure, housing improvement, income generation and physical and social infrastructure including addressing the problems and impacts of HIV/AIDS. All these are designed to be done through engaging full and active participation of key stakeholders.

According to the Volume I of the Implementation Strategy 2005 – 2020 of KENSUP, the Programme has the following objectives:

- Develop a nationwide slum upgrading and management framework
- Operationalize the principles of good urban governance
- Provide a broad range of social and physical infrastructure services
- Provide security of tenure and improved housing
- Enhance opportunities for income generation and employment creation
- Attract private sector finance and encourage investments in slum upgrading
- Promote a culture for environmental conservation and management
- Enhance the capacity for research, planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and replication of shelter and human settlements programmes
- Address and mitigate the prevalence and impacts of HIV/AIDS

Safety and security were not specifically included in the KENSUP goals and objectives. The study was, however, not able to adduce any evidence that at KENSUP level there were systematic efforts made to pro-actively incorporate safety and security concerns into the programme's design and implementation processes.

Actors

KENSUP benefits from a wide range of actors¹³. The main lead institutions in the implementation include the Kenyan Government, the local authorities, UN-HABITAT, NGOs, CBOs and other development partners. The Programme has generated external interests and a number of development partners have indicated their willingness to support it. These include the Swedish International Development Association, the World Bank and the French Development Corporation among others. The role of civil society and private sector in supporting the process has also been underscored.

Programme Coordination mechanisms

"The multi-faceted nature of slum upgrading and diverse interests involved poses a challenge to effective coordination. To ensure co-ordination at and between the various stakeholders at national, local and settlement levels, it is essential that each structure is fully operational and able to play its role effectively."

Sida & GOK, 2007-Aide Memoire

The KENSUP Strategy document is fairly comprehensive in terms of its strategic interventions, some of which were indirectly intended to address issues related to safety and security. For example, there are certain strategies targeting issues of unemployment and income generation, access to microfinance and credit systems, tenure security, personal security and safety, concerns of vulnerable households and disadvantaged groups including HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation as well as inadequate social infrastructure etc.¹⁴ Impact on people's livelihoods has been minimal due to co-ordination challenges.

Analysis of key Programme Components

An analysis of KENSUP documents, interviews and focus group discussions shows that issues of safety were not explicitly considered either at the design stage or during the implementation. It is also clear that, although the programme tried to be as inclusive as it could, some critical actors were not included in the process. For example, police and safety experts were not fully and systematically integrated into the project cycle.

¹³ *loc. cit.*

¹⁴ G. Marin and S. Wakeham, "Review on KENSUP Strategy", 2009.

KENSUP components and impact on safety as of January 2009

Component	Impact on safety related goals	Areas where efforts to meet the goals/objectives have been met ¹⁵
Community mobilization, organisation and participation	- Participation in socio-economic surveys - Participation of grassroots people in decision making particularly women and youth e.g. through Settlement Executive Committee¹⁶- this provided the community an opportunity to identify issues that affect them including safety and security	- Laini Saba, and Soweto East in Kibera - In Kahawa-Soweto, community members with the assistance of the Pamoja Trust have undertaken comprehensive enumeration exercises
Preparation of City/Town development strategies and land use master plans	Social and physical mapping which sought to identify the residents in the area helped people to get to know and network with each other	Communities in Kahawa-Soweto have already approached City council for allocation and regularization. Draft Local physical Development master plan for Kibera is in place. City Development Strategy for Kisumu prepared earlier under Cities Alliances arrangement.
Shelter improvements	Participation in implementation processes and being paid has economically empowered members of community	N/A
Provision of physical and social infrastructure / amenities	- Access roads and residents were paid as they worked on the project - At the decanting site in Kibera-Soweto, space has been set aside for a nursery school¹⁷	In Kibera, Kahawa Soweto, Mavoko, Mombasa and Kisumu. This has been attained while providing some of infrastructure and social amenities such as schools and health centers.
Environment and solid waste management	Several water and sanitation projects are ongoing, particularly those supported by CSOs and to some extent by UN-HABITAT	In Mathare numerous groups are undertaking garbage collection activities as a source of income generation. This is also happening in Kibera.
Liaison with micro financing and credit systems	Housing cooperatives and daily saving groups have been formed. People come together and get to know each other and, more importantly, help in addressing one of the indirect causes of insecurity - poverty	Savings schemes in Soweto e.g. Mweireri Self Help Group
HIV/AIDS concerns	No major efforts around this component have been reported	N/A
Conflict prevention and management	SEC leadership trained in this and other aspects. This is key in averting conflicts before they degenerate into violent conflicts and crimes	Laini Saba, and Soweto East in Kibera
Support to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups	No direct support/interventions provided to these groups specifically women, youth and children	At the decanting site and proposed housing in Soweto Zone A, people with disabilities and elderly are expected to be located on ground floor of the flats.

Source: Field survey, 2009

¹⁵ Given the diversity of stakeholders, its very difficult to get unanimous decisions/concurrence on the achievement of the goals and objectives.

¹⁶ Safety and security can be seen as a governance issues, and in particular the extent to which vulnerable groups, such as women and youth, are involved in major decision making processes that shape their lives.

¹⁷ There is however no evidence that safety design principles were applied.

The issue of whether or not KENSUP has focused on safety and security issues can best be construed by asking the following central question: will achieving the broad Programme objectives of KENSUP directly impact on urban safety and security in the settlements? This may turn up or highlight unplanned and relevant safety-related results.

Some strategic components of KENSUP are outlined in Table 4.1 where their indirect reference or contribution to urban safety and security goals are indicated. The table shows tentative impacts and areas where efforts have been made to achieve the goals of KENSUP. The information is based on interviews, reports and surveys conducted by the Government and other stakeholders.

Community Participation and Sustainable Community Development

Community participation

The issue of community participation is one of the components or broad objectives of the KENSUP process. The study established that community members were involved to some varying degrees in participatory socio-economic and physical mapping exercises, needs assessment and prioritization, design exercises and in the relocation process from Soweto East to the decanting site in Kibera (April 2009). The question we must ask is: have some of these actions being undertaken and if not, why not?

KENSUP is acknowledged to have played some role in building bridges between the community and the Kenyan Government. Findings from this study indicate that community members, particularly those that have worked closely with KENSUP, have been widely exposed to various capacity building activities. These mainly focused on boosting their leadership and conflict resolution skills among others. Their participation has either been directly at the project implementation stage or through the Settlements Executive Committee¹⁸.

Community members were also involved in the socio-economic mapping exercise and design workshops. In case of Kibera, community members were happy to closely associate themselves with recommendations that were made around the need to provide facilities such as adequate street lightning, road construction and community facilities, which in practice have a direct bearing on safety and security.

It is true that community participation brought in facilities and decisions that improved security such as street lights because these were priorities for the people¹⁹. This was the case for the Adopt a light High masts lighting initiative in Kibera and other informal settlements in Nairobi. It is important to note that this was not envisaged within KENSUP's initial designs.

Conflict Prevention and Management

Slums and informal settlements in Kenya have a wide range of players with varying interests, activities and motives that at times can be in conflict with each other. Some include tenants, resident and non-resident structure owners, landowners, public authorities (central and local government), civil society (NGOs, FBOs and CBOs), private sector (financiers, business operators and professionals) and international development agencies.

The formation of a broad based and inclusive local level group, the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC), was in itself a good effort in minimizing conflicts and facilitating conflict resolution mechanisms. KENSUP has facilitated a series of training sessions on conflict prevention and management, particularly targeting the SEC. Although there has been no systematic monitoring of the impact of these capacities, there have been cases where these skills have been useful in averting potential violent conflicts.

Access to Basic Urban Services and Community Facilities

Overview

Availability and access to urban services and community facilities play an important role in the social development of its citizens. Studies have revealed that the availability of facilities such as play grounds for young people can significantly lower their chances of engaging in crime. Furthermore, these facilities play a vital role in enhancing youth talents and self actualization.

Yet the availability of and access to these facilities remains a great obstacle in the slums and is often missed out in planning and development processes. In most slums, open spaces are limited - in Kahawa Soweto, there are no community open spaces, and available literature as well as interviews indicate that community members meet or socialize along the road due to lack of public spaces.

¹⁸ SEC in Kibera is the better established compared to those in other settlements such as Kahawa Soweto. In Kibera committees have been elected for Soweto East, Laini Saba and Silanga.

¹⁹ A recent comprehensive study on informal settlements in Nairobi revealed that "as many as 63% of slum households report that they do not feel safe inside their settlement. And 27% report that their household, or at least one person in it, actually experienced a criminal incident over the previous 12 months" (World Bank, 2006).

Role of the council in provision of urban services and community facilities

Generally, the City Council is unable to meet the heavy demand for the provision, maintenance and management of social amenities, particularly social halls and playgrounds, not only in informal settlements but also in other formal estates. This is attributed to rapid urbanisation, inability to raise enough funds for maintenance and bad governance among other factors.

Possible options for increased provision of social facilities would include developing a framework of collaboration between the City Council and government ministries,²⁰ in which the latter provides more funds for maintenance and avails personnel to manage such facilities. The utilization of the Constituents Fund (CDF) and the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) in the provision and maintenance of social amenities is also a promising option, which has not been effectively utilized in complementing the KENSUP²¹.

The Silanga-Undugu playground in Soweto East (Kibera), upgraded as part of the CCN-urban safety strategy implementation, provided an opportunity for engaging young people in sports. It is one of the few football pitches in Kibera serving the whole informal settlement. Improvements on the football pitch, which was in extremely bad condition, began in 2006 with technical and financial support from the Kilimanjaro Initiative²² and UN-HABITAT. This is one of the projects being implemented with the KENSUP knowledge and within the framework of Nairobi Crime Prevention and Urban Safety Strategy and Action Plan. Thus, there was a deliberate attempt to bring the concept of urban safety into slum upgrading. The initiative is, however, not fully anchored into the thinking and operationalisation of KENSUP.

Although not a part of KENSUP, a number of activities have been carried out led by local faith-based organisations such as Comboni Fathers with involvement from the Safer Nairobi Initiative, the donor community and national government organs. Activities include the upgrade of the sports field, the theatre and the performing arts amphitheatre.

Safety audits have been conducted in two villages and a participatory visioning exercise initiated with community members on the 'Korogocho We Want'.

In addition, young artists in Korogocho have contributed to the development of the Korogocho Peace Game which is a mapping of the slum that shows the positive and negative social, economic, environmental, and spatial realities (including crime hotspots) of Korogocho. Such activities play a role in raising awareness of crime and violence issues and seek to provide opportunities for community members, especially young people, to be actively and positively engaged in activities away from crime and delinquency.

Physical infrastructure

A number of physical infrastructure projects have been implemented under the KENSUP, and some of them have the potential of enhancing urban safety and security in these areas. For example, part of the proposed 12 kilometre access road linking in Kibera area has been built to improve access into the settlement. Other initiatives such as street lighting, water reticulation and storm water drainage will also contribute to enhancement of safety and reduction of fear of crime.

High mast lighting has also been fitted within open spaces perceived to be crime hot spot areas. This has mainly been through Adopt-a-Light, a private-sector initiative and some of this high mast lighting provision is in Kibera and Kahawa Soweto. Some of the social and economic impacts include the ability of informal traders to open their businesses late. Incidences of mugging and rape have dropped drastically.

Forging of partnerships with the police

The role of the police in urban development, particularly in promoting urban safety, is not explicitly stated within the KENSUP framework. This is unfortunate given that the police are key actors in crime detection and prevention. However, demands by community members for increased presence of the police in informal settlements have seen the creation of an administration police post in Kibera by the Government of Kenya. A number of police booths have strategically been located within the interior of the settlement, but they remain non operational due to shortage of police officers. Community based policing forums have also been organised by the community members and the administration police, in collaboration with civil society organisations²³.

²⁰ Many of the Government Ministries are currently decentralizing services to the local level i.e. ward level, but without a decentralization framework that can guide the process.

²¹ There are about fourteen sources of devolved funds at local level that KENSUP can creatively tap in. These include road maintenance Levy, school bursary, HIV/AIDS, LATIF etc.

²² Kilimanjaro Initiative is a non-governmental organisation formed to address the problems of youth in the urban areas of East Africa. It aims to do so by providing young people with opportunities that will enable them to take on a constructive role in their communities.

²³ Safer World together with Peacenet has been active in organizing community policing in Kibera in collaboration with others. This initiative however has not been fully anchored in KENSUP.



Slum upgrading project in Kibera. Nairobi, Kenya 2011. © Julius Mwelu/UN-HABITAT

The lack of effective Community Policing Policy and Strategies has rendered the links between the Community and Police weak, ad hoc and not institutionalized. In the case of Kibera, the fact that UN-HABITAT-KEN-SUP offices are located in the chief's camp has to some extent fostered mutual understanding and respect.²⁴ In Kahawa Soweto, it was noted that there is a fairly good and open working relationship between the local administration and the chief and administration police on safety and security related issues. Broadening and deepening this relationship would add value to the enhancement of safety in Kahawa Soweto.

Generally, the Provincial Administration and the Kenyan police are yet to embrace fully the concept of community policing, which has resulted in limited trust between the public and government law enforcement agencies. At times, community members have ended up taking the law into their own hands. In some issues, the relationship between the police and community members particularly the youth has been characterised by mutual mistrust and violent conflicts. Reforms in the police sector are inevitable and urgently needed.

²⁴ This has to some extent enabled the provincial administration particularly the chief and administration police to be more responsive to the safety and security needs of the community.

Sustainable Urban and National Development

Social Integration and reduction of exclusion

Social economic studies carried out before the KEN-SUP revealed that the level of education achievement for most of the household members is low; meaning that majority of the people cannot access competitive job opportunities in the city. This situation remains largely unchanged and largely explains why most of residents in informal settlements are unemployed or self-employed. A major recommendation from the baseline reports was that the slum upgrading initiative should plan to work with people with relatively lower levels of education who are not likely to access formal employment in the modern sector.

Attempts have been made towards this direction where the community contracting model has to some limited extent been utilized in a number of ongoing activities. For instance, the construction of the access road from Mbagathi–Soweto–Karanja²⁵, sanitation block and 600 houses at the 2.5 hectare decanting site has provided casual employment opportunities to many of the unemployed youth.

²⁵ So far 0.5 kilometer of 12 km long access road has been completed as per April 2009.

Even though many development actors have been advocating for the increased usage of community contracting model in the slum upgrading process, this study has noted that there are great challenges in readily and directly applying this model in Nairobi. The lack of technical, financial and managerial skills such as general book keeping, lack of track records and equipment, bureaucratic procurement requirements and access to credit finance hinders effective involvement of communities in the process²⁶. It was reported and confirmed from the Adopt a Light Initiative that lighting/provision of electricity has a strong link with good school performance for the youth.

Working with vulnerable groups

Vulnerable households are those which do not enjoy the support provided by networks outside of the household or within the household and suffer both social and economic insecurity²⁷. People falling in the category of this vulnerable group form a sizeable population of the informal settlements.

Some of the measures that had been envisaged in the design of the KENSUP include providing specifically targeted income generating activities and other social measures such as education for these groups; collaborating with partners in supporting widows, orphans, the elderly and the physically challenged members of the community to improve their lives; technical, financial and social support derived from activities such as the formation of support groups and the creation of orphanages and the creation of homes for the elderly, all of which would help reduce social vulnerabilities. Many of these areas have, however, not directly been addressed or any action implemented.

Addressing Issues of Economic Empowerment

Some of the main causes of increased urban insecurity and crime in Kenya include deepening poverty, the sharp rise in income inequalities and exclusion and lack of employment opportunities. Empowering the urban poor economically can positively lead to the reduction of urban insecurity and crime.

The upgrading activities in Kibera have to some extent contributed to the empowerment of the targeted community. The youth in particular have been able to get some income through the ongoing construction activities. Contractors are encouraged to fully utilize local labor and local buildings materials. This has been incorporated as a requirement in the bid documents.

It would be simplistic to conclude that the jobs created through the ongoing activities are adequate or sustainable. In Kahawa Soweto, Pamoja Trust, a local NGO has supported community members in setting up saving schemes as a long-term measure to address both shelter and income related insecurities. Through the scheme community members are keen to regularize and upgrade their settlement. The youth in Mathare are also involved in garbage collection activities as a source of income and enhancing their environment and these employment opportunities help to empower and inspire young people away from idleness, crime and violence. Sustaining these efforts will require forward looking strategies that will also focus on the creation and widening of employment opportunities for various categories of community members.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

From the analysis and assessment done under this study, it is safe to conclude that issues of safety and security have continued to be downplayed at the design and in the implementation of urban development programmes in Kenya, including slum upgrading initiatives. Safety and security issues are not explicitly stated or reflected in the implementation matrix, and therefore not tracked and monitored. It was also clear that there were no deliberate efforts made to pro-actively mainstream issues of safety and security into the core business of KENSUP.

This is despite the centrality of the issue in the lives of residents of informal settlements. Some 30% of Kibera residents rated safety and security as a basic need after food, water, housing and health. (Adopt-A-Light Report, 2005). Furthermore, the World Bank study (2006) on slums in Nairobi shows that 63% of residents in these settlements felt unsafe within their neighborhoods.

²⁶ The Procurement Act imposes conditions that are pro-poor community contradicting model.

²⁷ loc. cit..



One of the main streets in Korogocho slum in Nairobi, Kenya 2010. © Julius Mwelu/UN-HABITAT

Key Lessons

Discussions with key stakeholders at different levels raised important insights on the nature and effectiveness of current institutional arrangements of the KENSUP. It was explicit that some of institutions are not operational²⁸ while terms of reference for others don't clearly spell out their coordination role. The existence of a well-established and properly co-ordinated institutional framework can play an important role in ensuring that issues of settlement upgrading including safety are comprehensively dealt with. This in turn will facilitate the development and implementation of crime prevention initiatives within slum upgrading programmes.

On the other hand, the participation of different actors—government, community, UN-HABITAT and the civil societies while not properly coordinated is still commendable under the prevailing circumstances. The civil society institutions in particular have been instrumental in community mobilization and sensitization exercises and in supporting the implementation of small social and physical infrastructure projects. This has mainly been in Kibera and to some extent in Kahawa Soweto. A number of lessons were learnt from this assessment. There is a need for clearly defined roles and responsibilities of local authorities and municipal governments in national upgrading initiatives and programmes.

KENSUP was conceptualized and designed without clear focus and bias to safety and security. This could be partly due to non-involvement of an inclusive and integrated team with varied professional background and experiences including safety and security. Working in partnerships can be quite challenging - the roles of various stakeholders should be clearly identified and communicated early in the process to ensure that all key components are included and spearheaded by the most suited actors. In addition, leadership in the initiatives should be clearly defined and working modalities understood by all partners and stakeholders. The impact of bad practices in the past has resulted in poor participation of people in the process. Past initiatives in slum upgrading and low cost housing have not benefited the target group. It is important to ensure that information on safety, security and upgrading is readily and regularly available to the community members at the lowest level.

It is evident from the above analysis that issues on safety and security could not have been adequately addressed given that even the planned core components of the programme have not been systematically attended to.

²⁸ For example the Multi-stakeholder Support Group (MSSG) is presently not operational despite its great potential as platform for broad stakeholder consultation and exchange for best practices etc. Similarly Inter-Agency-Coordination Committee is equally dormant. On the other hand the Inter-Agency-Steering Committee (IASC), key in inter-ministerial coordination and policy direction meets irregularly and hence not effective.

Even where some attempts, albeit indirectly, were made to incorporate urban safety related issues within the KENSUP Programme, it is important to note that the focus on safety was incidental rather than by design. It was not proactively planned, implemented and tracked as such. It is fair to conclude that safety and security issues are often not seen as key in the planning and implementation of upgrading programmes in Kenyan urban centers including Nairobi city and KENSUP is not an exception.

Recommendations

A major lesson emerging from this assessment is that the KENSUP generally lacks a clear focus and strategic inventions on issues of safety and security. One of the key recommendations is that all active players in the slum upgrading including policy makers, process designers and implementers should try to ensure that urban safety and security issues are prioritized from the onset of slum upgrading initiatives.

- Prioritizing Safety and Security Issues.* Urban safety and security issues should be prioritized at the onset of slum upgrading initiatives and requisite tools and support be provided to teams designing and implementing these initiatives. It is an imperative to incorporate crime prevention through environmental designs in institutions of higher learning and government training institutions in order to mainstream crime prevention in the work of local authorities.
- Role of Local Authorities in Urban Safety and Crime Prevention.* The role and mandate of local authorities (LAs) in slum upgrading including enhancing urban safety should be better articulated and capacitated. This will enable LAs to be more visible and capable captains in slum upgrading and in enhancing urban safety and security and crime prevention. This is because LAs are responsible for urban planning and management practices that are directly related to improving urban safety and security. Their capacity to develop, coordinate and implement programmes effectively should be pro-actively strengthened and enhanced.
- Coordination, Accountability and Institutional Arrangements.* There is a need to ensure that relevant ministries work and coordinate more closely with local authorities in the provision of services that have a bearing on safety and security in slum areas. Institutions should be even more accountable and transparent to communities as this will increase their participation in and ownership of initiatives. Building trust at all levels is key to the success of any initiatives including slum upgrading, crime prevention and enhancing safety and security.
- Partnership, Neighborhood Safety and Crime Prevention and Physical Planning.* There is a need to articulate and enhance the role of partnerships in supporting local crime prevention and mainstreaming urban safety issues within urban development programmes and particularly in situ upgrading initiatives. The need to link up crime prevention with innovative physical planning, urban design and space management practices has been underscored throughout the study. Urban design, planning and management are vital tools in achieving this goal but were not adequately applied within KENSUP. There is a need to strengthen the flow of information particularly between the slum dwellers and other stakeholders involved in slum upgrading and urban safety and security.
- Economic Empowerment.* Economic empowerment of the youth should be part of the broad slum upgrading agenda, and should encompass, among other things, establishment of employment creation strategies that will provide equal opportunities for jobs, create more entrepreneurship opportunities and provide more skills that make young people increase their employability. This in turn will reduce their vulnerabilities and chances of sliding into crime. Mechanisms need to be put in place to enhance the use and institutionalization of community contracting processes. This is particularly important if the youth are to benefit from the proposed interventions on more predictable and sustainable basis.



A girl carrying water for domestic use in Korogocho slum in Nairobi, Kenya. © Julius Mwelu/UN-HABITAT

Highlights from Other National Slum Upgrading Projects Other Related Upgrading Projects of the Government of Kenya

Project/Programme	Comments
Korogocho Upgrading Programme This is located approximately eight kilometres from the city centre in Kasarani Division in the Eastlands of Nairobi. It is next to the infamous Dandora dumping site.	- Joint Initiative of Government of Kenya with support from Government of Italy through debt development swap - The approach is different from that KENSUP with more emphasis on security of tenure through the Community Land Trust (CLT) and the need to prepare and implement improvements of the physical, economic and social living conditions - Main programme pillars are: physical, which includes, land, housing and infrastructure; social which include, health, education, recreation, the aged, disabled, security and safety and economic which involves employment and income generation - Safety issues under the Korogocho Initiative fall under social activities, and are to be considered in socio-economic mapping activities.
Mavoko Sustainable Neighborhood upgrading Programme²⁹ – This is part of KENSUP. Mavoko which is located about 20 km South-East of Nairobi, is currently one of the fastest growing municipalities in Kenya	- Focus on self help housing approach on one of two parcels of land set aside by of Kenya, On the second parcel of land an inclusive and integrated housing scheme will be developed incorporating all income groups together so as to share infrastructure and social facilities. - Mavoko M.C lacks adequate planning capacities besides its fast growth - lacks major infrastructure services and facilities such as sewer lines - has inadequate community facilities, - safety and security considerations have not been incorporated in the programme.
Kisumu Slum upgrading - This is part of the KENSUP. Kisumu is located in the western region of Kenya about 400 kilometres from Nairobi.	- focus on construction of critical social infrastructure-schools, health facilities, rehabilitation of social halls and market centers etc - As with other initiatives links with safety/security have largely remained weak.
Mombasa Slum Upgrading Programme- This is part of KENSUP. Mombasa is the main port town of Kenya located along the Indian ocean about 500 kilometres from Nairobi.	Focus on construction of critical social infrastructure comprising school, health centre, connecting road, water reticulation and street lighting. Classrooms constructed at MjiwaWangombe are rated highly by both ministry officials and local stakeholders. Although there has been no intervention targeted at safety and security, some of activities undertaken have potential of impacting on safety and security of community. Street lighting is a case in point.

²⁹ This scheme is being undertaken under KES \$100 million debt swap between Kenya and Finland Governments.

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ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES IN SLUM UPGRADING INITIATIVES: THE CASE OF FAVELA BAIRRO, **RIO DE JANEIRO**

[Marianna Olinger]



Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. © Bruno Mendez/UN-HABITAT



6,000,000

RIO DE JANEIRO POPULATION

* 2006 IBEG



Context

Rio de Janeiro is the second biggest city in Brazil, with more than six million inhabitants. It is one of the main economic, cultural and financial centres in the country with a GDP of more than USD 60 billion (IBGE/2006), ranking 30th in the world.¹ The city is internationally known as a major tourist destination, but also for the high levels of violence that have plagued it since the mid 1980s, rising cocaine consumption and trade, and an accompanying “war on drugs” policy.

Homicide is a major offense in Brazil. The number of homicides registered annually in Brazil between 1994 and 2004 increased from 32,603 to 48,374, peaking in 2003 at 51,043. From the data available of 84 countries, Brazil’s homicide rates were the fourth highest, with two other Latin American counterparts in the top five positions (Colombia and Venezuela).² The homicide rate in the city of Rio de Janeiro was at 57.2 per 100 thousand inhabitants between 2002 and 2004, certainly one of the highest on the continent. Homicides are not evenly distributed throughout the city. Young men, black or mixed race and poor are disproportionately affected by lethal violence when compared with the total population.

Similarly, Brazil figures on the top of the list of occurrence of fear of insecurity. It was on the first echelons in the 2007 UN-HABITAT Global Report on Human Settlements. In a survey carried out in 2008 in the city of Rio³, 75% of respondents stated violence and safety were the worst aspects of living in Rio. In the same source, the police force was considered the least trustworthy institution, with 65% of respondents stating they did not trust them. This statistic is due in large part to changes in the scale and organisation of the criminal groups that have dominated drug trafficking in the *favelas* (slums) since the 1980s, the appearance of paramilitary groups in the last decade, and police violence.⁴

Crime patterns in slums and other informal settlements in Rio are not the same as in the formal city. Within the *favelas*, crimes against the person are the biggest problem (homicides, domestic violence and beatings), while crimes against property are virtually inexistent. In the “formal” city, crimes against property are the most striking. Although sample studies suggest that the homicide rates are higher in *favelas*, there are no available statistics to compare overall homicide rates in *favelas* versus formal settlements throughout the city, since the police records show crimes only in greater neighbourhoods.⁵

The latest data from Rio’s municipality documents more than 1,000 *favelas* in the city.⁶ *Favela* dwellers in Rio are not a homogenous group but broadly speaking *favela* dwellers are mostly either mixed race or black with many descending from slaves or from poor internal migrants, mostly from north-eastern Brazil.

Institutional and Legislative Frameworks for Crime Prevention and Public Safety

Institutional setting for crime and violence prevention and repression in Brazil

The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 states that public safety and security is the State’s duty and “all citizens’ right and responsibility”. The Constitution established that responsible institutions for public safety and security are the federal police, road federal police, rail federal police, state (provincial)⁷ civil and military police and the fire brigade.

¹ The 150 richest cities in the world by GDP in 2005. City Mayors Statistics

² Julio Waiselfisz, *Mapa da Violência dos Municípios Brasileiros*, Organização dos Estados Ibero americanos para a Educação, Ciência e Cultura – OEI, 2007.

³ Published by Rio Como Vamos movement at www.riocomovamos.org.br

⁴ For further information on the drug trafficking and paramilitary groups in Rio see Arias, 2006 and Justiça Global, 2008.

⁵ In certain regions it is easier to make assumptions on that since most parts of the neighborhood are occupied by one or more favelas, but that is not true for all regions.

⁶ Data from Instituto Pereira Passos.

⁷ Reference to “state” with lowercase letter, refers to provinces, different from “State” with uppercase letter, which refers to the national State.



Favela slum at night, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. © Mauricio Hora

The federal police is responsible for the investigation of national or inter-state crimes and the prevention of drug trafficking at the national level. The civil police have the mandate of judicial, investigative policing, and the military police is responsible for ostensive policing⁸. The fact that the institutions responsible for the polices at the local level are under the states' responsibility meant that, for a long time, municipalities did not feel entitled to intervene directly in public safety or security - this only began to change in the past decade, when public safety was understood as more than just policing.

The Constitution gives municipalities the option to establish municipal guards. Their mandate is to protect "cultural heritage" and to protect public buildings and services. Municipal guards are not police organs, and don't have the authority to carry out investigations or ostensive policing. The municipalities can also act towards public safety and security by imposing administrative restrictions on rights and liberties such as limiting times for selling alcohol or the functioning of bars and restaurants. The importance of municipalities for public security and safety has been growing in the past years, especially in regards to social and economic policies as prevention strategies.

⁸ The Constitution defines the functions of ostensive policing as immediate prevention and repression of crimes.

The National Public Security Policy

Ten years after the Constitution was written, the National Public Security Secretariat (SENASP) was created to assist the Ministry of Justice in defining and implementing a national public security policy and supervising the public security institutions and organs in the country. However, the SENASP acts in a context characterized by the autonomy of police institutions – under the states' responsibility, without power of authority over them⁹.

In 2003, the SENASP began to implement the Unified Public Security System (SUSP) in all states of the federation. The SUSP was organised in strategic axis. These were knowledge management, institutional restructuring, professional training, prevention, investigations, external control and social participation and violence reduction programmes. In 2008, reinforcing the work initiated in 2003, the Federal Government launched the National Programme for Public Security with Citizenship (PRONASCI), which has as its main focus the integration of public security policies with social policies for prevention, control and repression of crimes.

As the Federal Government has no authority over the programme implementation at the state and municipal levels, the SENASP team develops a series of conditions upon which the Federal Government sends financial resources for state and municipal governments to implement the programme. Among these conditions are the development of plans of action that include community-based identification of priorities, the establishment of goals and the monitoring and evaluation of processes and impacts.

The Favela Bairro Programme

Background

After decades of public policies focused on removal and exclusion, Favela Bairro was the first programme of its magnitude in the city to recognize the shortage of dwellings and make an attempt to integrate the already existing informal settlements into the "formal" city. The genesis of the name comes from the junction of the words "*Favela*" (the word for slum in Portuguese) and "*Bairro*" (the word for neighbourhood in Portuguese), meaning that the programme would transform slums into formal neighbourhoods. This was the biggest upgrading programme ever seen in Latin America state as there were 573 *favelas* (Conde *et.al.*, 2004) in the city in 1993, when Favela Bairro was launched, accounting for approximately 18% of the city's population (six million at the time).

⁹ As a federal republic Brazil's federal units (municipalities, states and the "union" – as the federal government is called) are autonomous institutions, resulting in a need for agreement between them to allow policies' management and implementation.



View of a Favela slum, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. © UN-HABITAT

Since the beginning of the 20th century there were government proposals for removing or displacing *favelas* and other informal settlements to peripheral areas, distant from the most expensive and central areas of the city. From the late 1960s to the late 1970s the government implemented such policies, displacing 70 entire *favelas* and more than over 100,000 people, just between 1968 and 1975 to peripheral and isolated parts of the city (Perlman, 2004). With the intensification of the removal policies, as they were called, community associations began to flourish with the aim of counteracting the removals and demand for better public services in *favelas*. In parallel to the removal policies, in the late 1960s the CODESCO was created, a state (provincial) study and executive group to promote the integration of informal settlements in the formal city through urban and housing interventions (Ferreira dos Santos, 1981).

The first slum upgrading projects in the city of Rio can be attributed to CODESCO, and one can identify the roots of Favela Bairro in the methodology developed by them at the time. In the years that preceded Favela Bairro's creation, smaller scale programmes like "Projeto Mutirão" and "Pró-Sanear" were already part of the municipal government's attempts to increase quality of life in informal settlements.¹⁰

The Brazilian constitution of 1988 was an important regulatory framework that supported the creation of Favela Bairro. The new constitution established means for the juridical regularization of *favelas* and defined the "social function principle" of public properties, prohibiting the removal of *favelas* and determining that existing *favelas* should be integrated into the formal city. At the same time, the constitution gave municipalities the main responsibility for planning and controlling public policies related to informal settlements.

The 1988 constitution also settled the national framework for public safety and security but did not attribute a mandatory role for municipal governments in assuring public security. The responsibility for policing and other public security institutions was given to federal and state governments. At that time, a traditional interpretation of public safety and security as related exclusively to policing was used by municipal governments as an excuse for not participating in the planning or execution of safety and security policies, since they were not responsible for police forces. In past years, the rapid increase in violence rates in the country, together with the pressure put on local politicians by their constituencies, has encouraged local governments to start investing in violence prevention and public safety.

¹⁰ For a detailed history of the projects that preceded the programme see: Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, 2003 (c).



Views of Rio by night from the heights of Providência, the 'City of God'. © Mauricio Hora

In 1993, Favela Bairro was developed as a result of a "City Plan" earlier in the same year when the municipal government created an "Executive Group for Popular Settlements – GEAP".¹¹ The group brought together municipal secretariats for Social Development, Education, Finance, Urban Planning, Environment and Public Services and the Planning Institute of Rio (IPLAN-Rio) among others and was responsible for the creation of the programme.

The programme, which later became a model for Latin America, was considered a pioneer at the time for proposing an integrated approach at such scale, for the partnerships it generated - involving the public and private sector, international agencies, and non-profits - and also because it was the first to recognize publicly that informal settlements, built without planning, could indeed be functional.

Objectives and Achievements

The Favela Bairro programme aimed to recognize the individual effort already made by the city's low-income residents who had built houses and offer public infrastructure that only collective, public effort was capable of offering, in this way "removing the main obstacles for the development of those spaces and their dwellers".¹² Despite the fact that lack of security of tenure often discourages people from developing or improving their land, dwellers in the case of Rio did not have many options since there was no effective housing policies accessible to the most vulnerable.

The programme's main objectives were to develop urban upgrading, comprising infrastructure (paving streets, and providing water and sanitation systems, among others), road access points, and structures that could provide social gains to communities (nurseries, sports centres, public squares, primary health care, among others) and promote their integration with the formal city.¹³ Initially, the programme was totally funded by the municipality with some components supported by federal government funding. In 1994, with the involvement of the Inter American Development Bank (IADB), the Programme grew in scale and reach.

Favela Bairro can be described as an integrated programme, primarily spatial, focused on public services and infrastructure provision, with components of community and social development. The programme is run by the municipal government, with funds from the Municipality, the Federal Government, the IADB (its biggest financial supporter) and the European Union and is implemented in partnership with the private sector and NGOs.

From its inception until 2003, the programme had intervened in 143 *favelas* and 25 other informal settlements distributed throughout the city. Quantitative results of Favela Bairro are impressive, since in 1993 approximately 600 thousand people had benefited from: 500 kilometres of water networks, 548 kilometres of sanitation networks, 1.7 million square meters of streets paved, and 600,000 square meters of leisure areas.¹⁴

¹¹ "Grupo Executivo para Assentamentos Populares".

¹² Interview with Sergio Magalhães carried out on 29 November 2008.

¹³ Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro e Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento, 2006

¹⁴ loc. cit.

Despite the impressive numbers, it is important to highlight that the Programme was highly unequal among different communities in terms of implementation and impact. The Programme, which is probably the longest lasting of its kind and the biggest in relation to investment (as of 2008, it represents an investment of USD \$600 million), was initially aimed at medium sized *favelas*¹⁵ (200 to 2500 dwellings). Although the adjustments were made throughout the programme's first (1993-2000) and second phases (2000-2006/8¹⁶), it remained relatively the same, with a stated mission of integrating the *favelas* into the "formal" city, through developing urban infrastructure, services and social policies.

Although the Programme is strongly focused on physical upgrades, investment in social development and support has been increased since its inception. Urban upgrading is focused on spatial and social infrastructures (including road access points, pavement, public lighting, geological risks prevention and building community centres, nurseries, sports, among others), community development actions (such as community participation during planning and implementation phases and educational activities directed at monitoring maintenance and environmental conservation) and land titling¹⁷.

The Programme has four main components of social development. Childcare and youth support services is divided into early childcare (0-4), full time education for children (4-6), after school support for children (7-14 and with the objective of preventing early drop outs), support for "at risk" children and youth. Employment and income generation is focused on job training, support for entrepreneurs, work cooperatives and individual service providers and adult education. Institutional development is based on monitoring and evaluation, research, training and technical assistance and social communications.

Programme components were initially decided following discussions based on lessons learned from previous upgrading projects by the GEAP group in 1993, although the intensity and proportionality of interventions in each community were decided through participatory processes with community residents. In this regard, social development components, which accounted for 5% of the total programme costs in its first phase, more than doubled in size in the second phase and is about to reach 30 % in the third phase.

It is also important to note that the second component points to a gender sensitive approach, since, as reported by some of the interviewees, it responded to a demand of women in the communities for safe places to leave their children while they worked. Programme managers also stated that they put effort into having at least as many women as men participating in income generation activities.

With regards to the maintenance of infrastructure, part of it was supposed to be incorporated by the companies that already did the maintenance of public infrastructure outside of *favelas*, which worked for some services such as garbage collection and lighting, but not for others such as water provision and sanitation, because some structures had deteriorated over time. For the maintenance of the infrastructure of pavements and public squares, among other things, local "desks," called "POUSOS – *Posto de Orientação Urbanística*" were created. The POUSOS were intended to provide local support and be the main catalyst of maintenance of infrastructures. Up to the end of the second phase, only a few POUSOS were functioning effectively.

Addressing Safety and Security Issues

Despite the already high levels of crime and violence in Rio in 1993, with skyrocketing homicide rates in *favelas*, the programme in its inception was not aimed at violence prevention, nor did it have a component that acknowledged the issue. The main actors responsible for programme creation and coordination for the first seven years believed that the absence of an expert in public safety or violence prevention in their team at the time was the main reason for not taking safety/security issues into account when developing the programme. The fact that public safety and prevention were commonly attributed to the state, due to the vision of public safety primarily as policing, created a culture where municipal governments all over the country didn't feel they have a role to play in the matter, as the national constitution attributes policing to state (provincial) governments.

Since public safety is not a simple matter, the political decision of "leaving the problem for who is responsible for dealing with it," was convenient for municipal governments until recently, when violence rates increased considerably and safety became a priority issue for Brazilian society. In the case of Rio, political disputes between the federal, state and municipal government over the past 18 years has worsened the situation.¹⁸

¹⁵ Although the Favela Bairro Programme was aimed at medium sized settlements, programmes to intervene in smaller and larger settlements were later created and implemented by the municipality inspired in the Favela Bairro methodology.

¹⁶ The second phase was not complete until 2008.

¹⁷ It is worth highlighting that "land titling" proved to be one of the most vulnerable components of the programme. An assessment by the end of the second phase showed that a very small number of the properties had been granted with formal registry. For the programme's third phase there is an IADB recommendation that land titling is prioritized.

¹⁸ The Brazilian political system is divided in three autonomous levels (federal, state and municipal), and as each level has its own financial resources they are not directly dependent on other level to function.



Women in Ponte do Maduro informal settlement in Recife, Brazil have gained secure tenure after 40 years of struggle. © UN-HABITAT

It appears to be a widespread belief that violence would decrease as a result of improving the population's living conditions, along with investments in education, employment and health. In addition, the fact that the programme would improve public spaces, lighting, and widen road accesses allowing vehicle traffic was considered a potential inhibitor of violence and facilitation for policing. This analysis may have been influenced by the fact that the relation of violence and social indicators, notably unemployment and income inequality, has been widely discussed in the past decade¹⁹.

It is important to highlight that assessment of the local context of crime and violence was generally informal and without any systematic process. Instead of identifying and mobilizing diverse local partners who could contribute to reducing and/or preventing crime, professionals involved did not feel compelled to address the issue of safety. This can be justified in part by the real danger posed by drug trafficking actors, compounded by the lack of dialogue between public safety authorities (state government) and the programme professionals linked to the municipal government.

Community Participation

Another feature of the programme was to focus on community participation as a way of fostering community development and legitimizing the plans developed in each community. The programme has an “intervention matrix” that is not rigid, but invites the community to participate in all phases of the intervention, from the planning stages. In the first phase, there was a strong partnership with community leaders and community-based organisations.

This changed significantly in the second phase, after programme managers stated that community representatives were under the influence of drug traffickers.²⁰ It is widely known in Rio that community leaders often served as middlemen between public servants and politicians who could not directly access drug traffickers, but who needed to access the territories they were controlling. This situation meant that most community leaders were linked to the drug trafficking and their position subsequently weakened in public opinion.

¹⁹ The major advisor for safety in the municipal government in the past fourteen years, published a book in which he defends the idea of crime prevention through building contextual architecture, although he was never involved in the program planning or implementation.

²⁰ The issue of community leaders being co-opted by drug traffickers in Rio has been subject of heated debates over the past decade. Many researchers agree that some community leaders end up under the influence of the drug trafficking, as others nurture different sort of ties with drug traffickers, since many of them were brought up in the same communities, sometimes went to school or played football together, or still because they need to negotiate with traffickers on a daily basis just to get simple things done (e.g.: Ask traffickers to not be openly armed in a public event, or that they allow service providers in the Favela).

Due to these claims, the Programme invested more in “community agents” starting in 2002. Community agents were people from the communities specially trained and paid by the government to be the main interlocutors between the programme managers, service providers and the target population.

There was a belief among some of the managers that the participatory approach would help in changing the relationship between *favela* residents and public spaces, promoting a favourable environment to work in violence prevention. This worked for some communities but not others. As pointed out, the programme was not equally implemented, and did not have similar impact in all communities.

Building Partnerships

In the first phase of the project (1993-2000) there was a strong partnership with community leaders, that later came to form a Non Governmental Organisation²¹. During that period, they were encouraged by the government at the time to form an association, and it was expected they would help to build a bridge between the government and the communities, to supervise the works. Community leaders were also expected to monitor settlements’ expansion, although they were never provided with specific training or tools for doing that, so the monitoring “task” was by and large informal. This proved to be challenging, putting community leaders in potential conflict situations since the project also brought with it land speculation.

In parallel with the second phase of the programme, the state government implemented a pilot initiative of community policing. Incredibly, the initiative had no dialogue at all with the programme. Public safety and security authorities directly involved in the community policing initiative reported that the fact that the public safety and security authorities (police and public security state secretariat) had no interaction with Favela Bairro staff made it even more difficult for the police to work in the areas where the programme was being implemented.

Since police and Favela Bairro staff were not coordinating with each other, they were unable to plan public safety or violence prevention interventions. In this regard, the municipality could have learned from other municipalities in Brazil. In the absence of a good relationship with the state government, which is responsible for the police and local public safety and security, they invested in crime prevention by integrating municipal guards in crime prevention programmes at the local level.

Even though the municipality created a municipal guard in the same year of the programme creation (1993), programme managers and other stakeholders interviewed stated that the programme did not deal with them either.

Programme managers stated that they considered engaging in dialogue with the police after 2003 – under state government responsibility – but this was never begun for two reasons. The first was because the state government safety policy, exclusively based on repression and confrontation, could make the relationship between the programme representatives and the community even more difficult if they were linked to it and it is important to highlight that the Rio police is considered one of the most corrupt in the world.

Secondly, political disputes between the municipal and the state governments, which were run by opposite parties at the time, made it impossible to build a sustainable partnership. Even though the programme has a component exclusively dedicated to institutional development, it is striking that safety and security were never included in specific training for programme staff nor did the programme have a public safety expert on its team.

Enhancing Social Development

Favela Bairro programme managers also thought the programme could impact upon “primary prevention” of violence through investment in social development along with the infrastructure’s upgrading²². In the second phase, programme managers reviewed the social development strategies focused on youth, perceived as a vulnerable at-risk group since they are disproportionately affected by violence in the city as victims and perpetrators, and decided to reframe some of the youth-targeted social activities.

Concluding that the social equipping implemented in the first phase was limited since they were not present in all communities due to costs involved, and the disputes between drug factions often made it impossible for youth from one community to “cross borders” to use the community facilities in a community under the control of a rival faction,²³ the managers re-designed these activities, showing important constraints on project activities created by violence.

21 The association is called “G16” which stands for Group of community leaders of the first 16 settlements where the programme intervened.

22 In a conference at the IADB in 2003 the Mayor described primary prevention as the provision of day-care for infants and keeping children and youth in the education system, and secondary prevention as activities for “at-risk” youth.

23 For further information on drug trafficking patterns in Rio and the involvement of youth see Dowdney, 2003.

Youth Interventions Outside the Favelas

A youth centre that used arts and culture as a tool for personal and professional development was established in a central city area to attract youth from different communities. This model is to be expanded in the programme's third phase, to begin in 2009. The decision to shift activities outside the slums is positive in regards to an attempt to integrate youth from different communities outside of the favelas but also shows the limitations of the municipality in working in favelas in the same way it does in the rest of the city. Despite this central youth centre being publicly recognized as a successful initiative by programme managers, donors and civil society actors, the community leaders interviewed resent the lack of initiatives inside favelas that could help rebuild the communities' self esteem and promote the positive use of public spaces within the favelas themselves.

Programme managers reported they felt a fresh outbreak of violence in the context of the programme implementation after 2002/2003, with disruptions to activities due to shootouts, and increased fear among the communities and programme staff. In fact, in this period there was a worsening of many violence indicators throughout the city, and perception of public safety also worsened among the city's population during the same period.

Despite the official statistics that homicides have been falling consistently since 1994, disappearances and police killings, classified as "resistance to prison"²⁴, increased dramatically over the same period, and there is debate among public safety experts whether homicides have really decreased or if the drop in numbers is due to a different way of classifying data, in addition to criminal efforts to make cadavers disappear.

Programme Phase 3

In the next phase of the Programme, to begin in 2009, a new component was included focused on violence prevention (IADB, 2006). The idea was to develop a pilot intervention in one of the communities targeted in the third phase. The initial plan, drafted by the IADB, suggested the creation of a working group to design the intervention plan. The recommended plan was expected to include a comprehensive analysis of public safety in the community and influencing factors, socioeconomic and victimization surveys, and mapping of public and social services available in the community.

The group was expected to be comprised of various municipal secretariats, including urban planning, education, social development, health, sports and leisure, narcotics use prevention and the municipal guard among others. The baseline data produced by the group was expected to contribute to the development of a strategy and will also set the ground for future monitoring and evaluation of the initiative. The initial idea was to measure perceptions of safety, efficiency of municipal services and the violence occurrence in the community, to be replicated in other parts of Rio, if successful.

IADB has emphasized the inclusion of a public safety component in the programme. Increased violence was identified as a significant obstacle for programme implementation and recommendation made that the programme includes a component of violence prevention in an eventual third phase²⁵. Even though violence has been cited frequently as an issue throughout the programme's development, managers neither felt compelled to nor had the knowledge to introduce a violence prevention component in the programme during the first and second phases. On the other hand, it is important to highlight the role played by the IADB in influencing the municipality to rethink its role in crime and violence prevention, a role motivated by awareness of the impact of rising rates of crime and violence in the programme's implementation.

Impact on Safety and Security

Despite the fact that some social indicators improved in the communities where the programme was implemented, a study carried out in 2005 states that due to quality of available data "...beyond expansion of public services, one is severely limited in assessing the impact of Favela Bairro on key development outcomes".²⁶

On the other hand community leaders and residents have been unanimous in praising the qualities of the programme when it comes to infrastructure and public services provision - with a highlight on water, sanitation and garbage collection - and also in increasing literacy. Despite previous studies suggesting that environmental design and the improvement of spatial and social conditions indirectly impacts crime and violence, an urban safety perspective or a "safety conscious" planning approach were never integrated in the overall site design.

²⁵ Projects' second phase completion report (IADB, 2006) - a document produced from a meeting with experts from different areas of IADB.

²⁶ Fabio Soares and Yuri Soares, *The Socio-Economic Impact of Favela-Bairro: What do the Data Say? Working Paper*, Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE), Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2005; Interamerican Development Bank, *Programa de Urbanização de Assentamentos Populares do Rio de Janeiro, "Favela Bairro" - Segunda Etapa (PROAP II), Relatório de Término de Projeto - Project Conclusion Report*, 2006. p. 42.

²⁴ *Resistance to prison (auto de resistencia)* is a classification for police killing during confrontation. Different studies suggest that all police killings nowadays are framed in this classification without investigation of the real circumstances of the killings. There is strong evidence that a significant number of these incidents are in fact summary executions.



Community participation in planning, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. © UN-HABITAT

The impact of the Programme on safety has been diverse. It is believed that the first phase of the programme impacted positively on crime prevention, despite such impact never having been monitored or evaluated. One of the communities targeted in the first phase, which has a history of armed violence due to disputes between different drug factions and the police, had a year without registering homicides right after the programme was implemented.²⁷

Failure to address safety concerns impacted on the Programme as in some instances, violent incidents stopped construction and delayed the end of the upgrading, requiring indirect negotiation although indirectly with drug traffickers to organise public meetings or “being forced” to employ particular persons on construction sites. There were also cases of team members, architects or engineers threatened with death because they were not working “as expected.”

Overall, there is no unanimity that Favela Bairro impacted upon public safety. While some stakeholders believe there was an impact on primary prevention, others think that after a first period of programme implementation, the situation might have worsened. In different interviews community leaders stated that they believed that programme implementation without any coordination with public safety and security authorities allowed the drug trafficking factions to occupy a more privileged, organised environment and benefit from better road access.

It is important to point out that attributing changes in the drug trafficking structures and scope of action to the improvement of spatial environment is an oversimplification of the problem. In fact, the safety situation not only in the city of Rio de Janeiro, but in the whole state of Rio de Janeiro has deteriorated over the past 15 years and this can be attributed to a number of reasons that are related also to a broader context in the region.

Some experts’ theories attribute the rise in violence to the spread of gun culture, increase in drug consumption, combined with ineffective drug control policies, and the upsurge of paramilitary (local vigilante) groups promoting “social cleansing” and exploiting other illegal markets such as illegal gambling games and informal transportation in Rio’s metropolitan area.

It is worth mentioning that different stakeholders, who believe the discussions were more focused on legitimizing decisions made previously than exploring alternatives and adapting the programme, questioned the participatory character of the programme. The fact that discussions were highly unequal as there was a considerable gap in the quality of information held by engineers, architects and the information held by the community, left little room for productive discussion.

There was no baseline research when the programme began, and therefore it is very difficult to evaluate the real impact of the programme. Different efforts were made throughout the programme to evaluate its impacts, but due to the different methodologies and samples used it was not possible to directly compare data.

²⁷ The dwellers of the community called “Casabranca”, are said to have hanged a huge sign praising “a year without deaths” after the programme implementation in the community (Interview carried out with Sergio Magalhães, on 29 November 2008).



Police surveillance helicopter in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. © Julius Mwelu/UN-HABITAT

The fact that the programme did not have any discussions with the authorities responsible for crime control and prevention was probably one of the greatest reasons for the lack of impact on community safety and security. There was no sharing of plans with police or other public safety authorities, nor were they invited to participate in steering committees. In general, programme staff and equipment didn't have safety or security problems during the programme implementation, although some of the contractors hired private security informally.

Another impact of the programme was an increase in land and property value where the programme was implemented. This caused land speculation that aggravated land disputes and might have contributed to an increase in other types of violence. When there is no rigid control of the use of land combined with lack of accessible legal mechanisms for conflict resolution, the chances are greater of land tenure related violence arising. Some community leaders interviewed attribute part of the violence against community leaders in *favelas* in Rio in the last decade to be linked to land speculation related to political disputes.

It is believed that the absence of coordination between the public safety authorities and the Favela Bairro programme might have helped to worsen the situation in the medium-long term, since it facilitated transport ac-

cess for criminals, and also increased disputes over land and properties, with no strong monitoring and mediation mechanisms, which ended up fostering violent conflict resolution mechanisms.

The second phase of the programme was marked by an depressingly high number of communities leaders assassinated or forced to leave their communities, although there is no available data comparing the occurrence of this trend in *favelas* with and without Favela Bairro, which makes it difficult to establish a link with the programme implementation, although some believe that Favela Bairro caused a dramatic increase in local political disputes.

Despite all stakeholders stating that violence was an issue for the programme's full implementation, when asked about what tools they used to deal with it, programme managers explained they "had to be flexible". It was explained during the project's implementation phases that drug traffickers usually did not interfere in the works since they knew that they were not linked with public safety, which otherwise could not be secured. Professionals feared that once the programme was viewed as part of a public safety attempt to prevent violence, it would threaten the power of criminal organisations operating locally, and therefore could become a target for such organisations.

Lessons Learnt and Way Forward

1. Favela Bairro has been considered a successful programme by many for a number of reasons. The programme served, and still serves, as a model throughout the region for its integrated approach, and its sustainability – having survived for more than 15 years, and throughout different governments. Despite the lack of sound baseline data, there is consensus that quality of life improved in a number of ways in most communities where Favela Bairro was implemented although that is not true for all.
2. Health indicators related to diseases transmitted by poor sanitation and hygiene habits seem to have decreased dramatically. Despite a survey carried out in 2003 to evaluate public perceptions of the impact of the programme in targeted communities which showed reasonable levels of community satisfaction – more than 50% in most items researched – there seems to have been varying levels of positive impact in different communities at different times²⁸.
3. The programme is about to begin its third phase and has various challenges to address, of which crime and violence are important. One of the most important lessons we can draw from this case study is that recognizing the impact of incidences of crime and violence on the programme, as well as the programme's potential role in preventing crime and violence, is central to its further development and the sustainable development of the city as a whole.
4. Although it is not possible for an upgrading programme alone that is not specifically designed to prevent violence to impact substantially on crime and violence incidence, Favela Bairro could have had a crucial role in this area. In this respect, there seem to be a growing belief that the police alone cannot be responsible for crime prevention, and that coordinated efforts are needed to change crime and violence patterns in the city.
5. Regarding the programme's implementation, it emerges that increasing or bettering street access combined with public lighting can be as much as a facilitator as a inhibitor to crime and violence incidence, if the intervention does not take into account crime and violence patterns, and does not work in co-ordination with public safety authorities.
6. When there is no rigid control of the use of land combined with accessible legal mechanisms for conflict resolution in the context of upgrading projects, the chances of land tenure-related violence are greater.



A slum in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil the year 1986.
UN Photo © Claudio Edinger

In this regard, it is important to have clear expansion limits and effective control, which might include geo-referencing, land expansion patrols and reforestation programmes, combined with affordable housing and public transportation policies to prevent the growth of informal settlements, so as to prevent conflict and violence that can arise from land disputes.

7. In addition, the expectation that community leaders would monitor the settlements' expansion in a context of violent territory disputes puts community leaders in delicate and dangerous situations. In this regard, it is important that the state takes responsibility for such control.

²⁸ It is important to mention that evaluations of the programme by communities vary depending on the time of the research. Usually the highest satisfaction rates are found immediately after the spatial intervention completion. For detailed information on Programme beneficiaries' satisfaction surveys see PREFEITURA DA CIDADE DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2005.



Landfills of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. © UN-HABITAT

8. Although the programme has invested in social development,²⁹ it is not clear to what extent these components have helped the communities' quality of life or crime and violence prevention. The social projects, besides being limited in terms of coverage, seem not to have been co-ordinated or part of an integrated strategy to promote sustainable development and defeat poverty and exclusion. Having co-ordinated policies that bring together different actors working together strategically and based on a comprehensive local diagnosis is key to ensuring sustainable change.
9. At the institutional level, the fact that the programme did not have formal mechanisms to assess the local context in relation to crime and violence is a weakness for a programme of such a large scale in a proven violent context. Developing formal mechanisms to assess the context related to safety and security should be a priority in all upgrading projects, since crime and violence can have a significant impact in local dynamics, and therefore, in the project's development.
10. On monitoring and evaluation it is crucial that a programme, especially of such proportions, has sound systems and includes baseline information previous to the beginning of the intervention to access programme impact.
11. Although violence was widely cited as an issue of concern during the programme implementation, safety and security were neither included in training for programme staff nor did the programme have a public safety expert on board, highlighting a gap in terms of capacity building that should be addressed in the future phases of the programme.
12. Political disputes between different levels of government overrode the public interest of the programme, and therefore it might have lost a great opportunity to influence positively, in the short term, crime and violence reduction in Rio de Janeiro.
13. It has been reported that in theory the programme is nearly perfect and integrated with health, education, garbage collection, reforestation and so on, but in practice its implementation is strongly politicised – and even clientelistic sometimes – and has been since the end of the first phase.

²⁹ Available data from the second phase of the project pointed to over 10% of total project costs were invested directly in social development activities, approximately 36 million dollars over 6 years, and this is to have an important increase in third phase as stated by a key informant.

14. Some of the beneficiaries interviewed attribute a possible worsening of violence and crime dynamics to political disputes generated by the programme implementation. This is a complicated issue that deserves to be explored further in order to find ways of minimising the impact that political disputes can have on programme development.
15. It is important to highlight that an upgrading programme in itself is not a “silver bullet,” if it is not carefully planned and co-ordinated with key actors in urban safety, including police. The Safer Cities Programme methodology gives us some insights of what could be done to address safety and security in upgrading projects as developing a local crime prevention strategy that address the causes and fears of crime tailored to priorities identified by local safety appraisals is key if one intends to impact violence and crime patterns.
16. At the same time, the institutionalization of a participatory crime prevention approach³⁰ at the city level by incorporating safety and security as a cross-cutting dimension should be considered in decisions and planning in the various departments of local government, the criminal justice system and civil society.
17. Despite the many challenges the programme still faces, especially in regards to crime and violence prevention, it is important to highlight the significance of the programme, as it was the first government programme in Rio to recognise the need to include informal settlements in the “formal city”.
18. This approach created the opportunity for thinking of the city as a complicated but integrated space, with different dynamics that should be valued and taken into account if sustainable development of the city as a whole is to be promoted.
19. This has been in direct opposition to previous removal policies, which played an important role in deepening social exclusion. The Favela Bairro Programme brought a perspective towards a solution, although the solution proved not to be simple or clear cut. It has an enormous challenge to be faced along the way but one must recognize the efforts already made and build from there.

³⁰ UN-HABITAT for Safer Cities 1996-2007, UN-HABITAT 2007.

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LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS FOR URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROJECT (LPUPAP), **BANGLADESH**

[Iftekhar Ahmed]




City view of Dhaka, Bangladesh. UN Photo © Kibae Park



3,500,000

DHAKA POPULATION

* 2007 WSUP



Bangladesh is the 7th most populous country in the world with a population of more than 153 million. It is also one of the world's poorest nations with a third of its population living in extreme poverty (UNDP 2008; WSUP 2007). While about only 26% of its population presently lives in urban areas, Bangladesh is expected to have more than 40% urban population by 2030 (see Fig 1). The capital Dhaka is one of the fastest growing megacities in the world with a population of more than 13.5 million, one-third of which lives in slums (CUS *et al* 2006). Between 300,000 and 400,000 mostly poor rural migrants arrive in cities annually in search of improved livelihoods (WSUP 2007), adding to the large slum population.

Given the country's poverty, weak governance and political instability, and frequent natural disasters, the urban poor have to fend for themselves against the regular fear of eviction and live in an environment of crime, violence and anarchy controlled by local ganglords. Slum dwellers have almost no voice in influencing policy decisions that affect their daily lives.

A large network of international and national NGOs operate in Bangladesh and many have community development programmes in slums (see for example, Alamgir and Watanabe 2007; DIG 2008). The government has relatively less engagement in such programmes but a notable example is the Local Partnerships for Urban Poverty Alleviation Project (LPUPAP), executed by the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development & Cooperatives and implemented by the Local Government Engineering Division (LGED) with funding from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and in partnership with UN-HABITAT.

The project was implemented during 2000-07 and has moved into a second phase entitled Urban Partnerships for Poverty Reduction Project (UPPRP), which plans for more intensive targeting of the extreme poor and provision of other services such as housing in addition to infrastructure, and augmenting the activities conducted under the LPUPAP's first phase. The LPUPAP was targeted

to benefit about 360,000 people in 75,000 households living in 338 slum communities and was implemented in three metropolitan cities – Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi – and eight smaller cities or *pourashavas* (city councils) – Barisal, Bogra, Gopalganj, Kushtia, Mymensingh, Narayanganj, Hobiganj and Sirajganj.

Through the project, upgrading of basic infrastructure in urban slums was integrated with the broader aim of building the capacity of the urban poor to alleviate poverty through the processes of:

- Supporting empowerment of the poor by participatory local level action, including community action planning and management, infrastructure development, skill development, micro-financial services and technical assistance
- Activating local government and other organisations to provide more responsive services to the local communities through multi-sectoral interventions with the facilitation of LGED through local government authorities.

The LPUPAP had an organisation structure from the grassroots to the national level. The slum communities are organised in Primary Groups comprised of mainly women. These groups implemented the infrastructure projects with the Community Development Fund and applied for the Poverty Alleviation Fund, through which they could receive credit for economic development. Each Primary Group had a chairperson, and the chairs formed Committee Development Committees (CDC), which co-ordinated the different activities. This was the basic structure, which extended beyond to various levels through a number of services and functions.¹ The LPUPAP/UPPRP works with local government authorities and attempts to improve their services to the poor.²

¹ This structure is followed also in the current UPPRP stage.

² Various LPUPAP and UPPRP project documents have been consulted for writing this report and a list of these is provided in the References section.



A picture of Karial slum (left), one of the urban slums in Dhaka Bangladesh: One billion people, one out of three slum dwellers are living in slum conditions. Dhaka, Bangladesh. UN Photo © Kibae Park

LPUPAP/UPPRP operates in a context of widespread crime and insecurity. Although not violent to the level of other cities in Africa and Latin America, the large extent of slums and corruption at all layers of society has resulted in crime and insecurity becoming “routinised” or ‘normalised’ into the functional reality of life” (World Bank 2007). The lack of policing in slums that are themselves not considered legal because of tenure insecurity has meant that the areas tend to serve as safe refuges for criminals, who use them as bases to expand their activities in the city. The poor in slums are particularly vulnerable to such crime as they do not have any legal recourse and cannot expect police help. Indeed, there is evidence of police collusion in crime.

In a survey of Dhaka slums, it was found that more than 90% of the respondents were affected by crimes consisting of 36 enumerated types (World Bank 2007). Three main types are consistently highlighted in project documents and by LPUPAP staff and community members. Firstly, the all-permeating control over slums by ganglords, or *mastans* as they are known locally, who run the collection and extortion of illegal ‘tolls’ (fees for allowing to operate) from a wide range of businesses, transport stations, construction sites and even small informal traders and workers. The *mastans* also control housing rents and supply of basic services such as water and electricity and charge extortionate rates from poor slum dwellers (see for example, Ahmed 2007; Banks 2006). Various criminal activities such as mugging, forgery and drugs, small arms operate under the patronage of *mastans*, who usually have political links to be able to operate themselves.

Secondly, linked to the first but significant on its own, is crime linked to consumption and dealing of drugs. This centres on heroin, but includes cannabis, sedative cough syrup and illicit alcohol. This is an overriding is-

sue highlighted in LPUPAP official literature as well as by staff and community members. Slum dwellers are often caught in between territorial battles among dealers over turf for drug peddling and are also victims of theft and mugging by addicts. In general but particularly in the evenings, a tense and uneasy atmosphere prevails in slums where drug use and dealing are common and many slum dwellers report of the insidious effect this has on their lives and especially on families with young men or boys as drug users are almost all male in Bangladesh.

Crimes against women are perhaps less visible than the other two types listed above, but are more deeply entrenched, possibly more all-pervading and often as lethal. Women in slums are generally burdened with more poverty than men, especially female-led households, and more vulnerable to domestic and familial violence. In Bangladesh, as in many other countries of the region, many forms of domestic violence against women exist and are often linked to cultural practices, such a dowry demand, early marriage and illegal divorce. Acid throwing is a particularly cruel form of assault on women prevalent in Bangladesh. Women are subject to a range of criminal and other offences such a sexual abuse and exploitation, trafficking, battering, assault, revenge crimes and harassment.

Assessment Methodology

This assessment was conducted based on the following methods:

- Review of institutional literature of the Safer Cities programme and other similar reports was done to gain a broader understanding of crime and violence prevention issues relevant to the programme

- Institutional literature and programme reports available from the LPUPAP/UPPRP office in Dhaka was reviewed. This was a crucial element as it allowed understanding of the chronological sequence of events and the conceptual framework of the programme that has served as the basis of this assessment.
- Interviews with LPUPAP staff at various levels including the Chief Technical Advisor and managers of project offices in Tongi and Mymensingh towns (see Appendix 1; also see Appendix 2 for the checklist of investigation issues employed for the interviews, derived from the structure for the study suggested in the UN-HABITAT ToR). Additionally, several consultants who were involved in providing policy directions were interviewed.
- Field visit to Mymensingh town, which allowed interviewing LPUPAP staff at the project office, a local Ward Commissioner and LPUPAP-supported communities. A focus group discussion was held with CDC leaders and other community members that allowed understanding of the reality on the ground and aspects of the programme at the community level.
- An earlier visit to Narayanganj town LPUPAP project office and communities in connection with a previous study (see Ahmed 2007) and findings of that study were also utilised in this assessment.
- Thematic analysis was conducted manually with the data gathered from literature and interviews. Recurrent issues and themes, as well as unique and outstanding ones, were grouped for analysis and reflection according to the structure for the study provided in the ToR by UN-HABITAT (on which the interview checklist was based). This structure is reflected in the sections and their sequence in this report.

Safer Cities Work Plan

The original project design of LPUPAP did not take safety and security issues into direct consideration. Violence, abuse and discrimination against women as well as gender inequality were serious problems in the LPUPAP communities and widespread in Bangladesh due to cultural notions about gender roles. The form of violence is mainly domestic and committed against women and girls.

Most Primary Group members were women and LPUPAP's organisational structure was focused around women; in general, women play a vital role in family and community development in such communities. The widespread domestic violence was acting as a barrier to achieving the project's objectives and was frequently raised as an issue in community meetings. In response, the LPUPAP asked the Safer Cities Programme of UN-HABITAT to help in assessing options for the develop-

ment and integration of a project component that addressed community safety, violence against women and access to justice.

UN-HABITAT runs a global programme for Safer Cities, which addresses urban crime and violence and has developed prevention strategies at city level for a number of cities in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Safer Cities Programme tries to strengthen the capacity of local authorities to address urban safety issues and promotes crime prevention initiatives through building partnerships. The experience of this programme was sought by LPUPAP for developing a framework for reducing insecurity at the community level, including prevention and reduction of violence and crime.

In response, a broad outline of safety concerns and ideas for action to develop a work plan for community safety and security was formulated through UN-HABITAT missions during 2002-03. To contextualize this, it was followed up by local consultants through discussions with communities to develop the options to address violence and identify specific areas for action. UN-HABITAT staff helped to develop a strategy through further community consultation to address gender-based violence and community safety and improve access to justice in the communities. The activities and findings were eventually consolidated into a comprehensive work plan for 2005-06 and recommended as a Community Safety component for LPUPAP.



Women washing utensils in one of the informal settlements in Dhaka, Bangladesh. © UN-HABITAT

The Safer Cities concept was interpreted in Bangladesh in the form of the work plan, developed through the above stages of community consultation. The plan had a set of four objectives, where each objective was defined in terms of purpose, preparatory and other activities, actors, tools and methods, and expected outputs. The objectives were to:

- Organise, empower and unite communities against violence against women and for improved community safety
- Improve local access to justice
- Build awareness amongst the communities with regard to violence against women, women's rights, human rights, civil rights and responsibilities, government and other services available, laws of the country and so on
- Empower women and girls in social, economic and cultural life³

The objectives of the work plan were implicitly long-term as it aspired to address issues that were deeply entrenched in social and community structure. The initiative would need to be sustained over a long period to achieve expected results, usually difficult to achieve within the confines of a fixed project time-line, unless the project identifies and implements strategies that support continuity and long-term mainstreaming extending beyond the project's duration. However, the work plan developed in this case does not seem to have been linked, at least explicitly, to any such long-term concerns. No clear mechanisms were identified that would carry over the project's concern beyond the duration of its time-frame.

Steps and Tools

The development of the Safer Cities concept within LPUPAP was carried out through the steps shown below in Fig 4. Community consultation was a quintessential process within the LPUPAP, driven primarily by the mainly women-led CDCs. At every step in the development of the Safer Cities component, extensive cross-linkages were made with slum communities through a series of workshops and consultation sessions. From the start, when the communities voiced concerns for safety and security, particularly on violence against women, through to linking UN-HABITAT to the communities and their leaders through workshops to seek their feedback to formulating a work plan and pilot project consolidated through a national workshop with CDCs - at every stage the outputs were achieved by attempting to match the communities' prime security needs with LPUPAP's institutional capacity.

On the other hand, the activities conducted at each step seem to have been confined to that step only and do not appear to have continued in the interim periods both at institutional project planning level and within the communities. Each step was spurred on by institutional initiatives, though communities participated with interest and often with strong expectation of future project activities during UN-HABITAT missions and engagement of local consultants. There does not, however, seem to have been much direct uptake by LPUPAP or CDCs. An evaluation report of 2006 shows that safety and security issues did not find emphasis in the LPUPAP project activities so far except for those conducted under the UN-HABITAT missions and consultant assignments.⁴

FIGURE 4: Steps in development of the Safer Cities component in LPUPAP



During the UN-HABITAT missions stage before the work plan was developed, the Safer Cities concept was interpreted as a campaign – in a similar vein to an awareness campaign. Development of the work plan allowed conceptualising how the formulated objectives might be put into practice in concrete terms.

³ Information presented in this section has been garnered or excerpted from the LPUPAP work plan project document.

⁴ Evaluation conducted by undisclosed independent consultants.

Three strategies for addressing safety and security issues were planned, based on the work plan. The first was a visioning exercise, which was a tool for communities to develop their vision of a safer community and thereby formulate a road map towards that vision. The second was a code of conduct, an agreement for the CDC members to abide by an agreed way of behaviour designed to promote the prevention of violence against women through personal example and at individual CDC family level. Finally, there was the correct interpretation of Islam: This is a strategy to draw upon the positive aspects of Islamic values towards family and women to prevent community violence that is often perpetrated by misusing the religion.

In all these strategies, particularly the last two, leadership was a crucial factor. Receiving the co-operation and support of local religious and community leaders in a way that they feel ownership of the project is important for the communities' acceptance. For example, if an *imam* explained to a family that the practice of dowry is contrary to Islam and leads to violence against women, there is a better chance of them listening than if a LPUPAP staff member explained it. As a key underlying strategy, the work plan has suggested that the activities under its objectives are linked with various types of local influential persons and leaders who might help advance the objectives at the community level.

Project Scope

LPUPAP comprised three components. The basic scope of LPUPAP when it started in 2000 was upgrading infrastructure in slums – primarily paving of walkways and constructing drainage channels – and provision of water-and-sanitation services – pumped water, community latrines and washrooms. This was the reason for selecting the Local Government Engineering Division (LGED) as the implementing agency. A social component – mainly community-based development through microfinance services and capacity building – was integrated with the physical intervention. Finally, by focusing on empowerment of women through CDC leadership development, local institution building and other activities, the project had an implicit institutional component.

LPUPAP was essentially an infrastructure upgrading project, hence sectoral, and implemented by the Local Government Engineering Division (LGED). The municipal authorities had no direct role, as LGED was the concerned local authority. However, it derived some support from local Ward Commissioners (see section below on Achievements) but this was a consequence of goodwill, personal interest and connections, not institutional binding.

Later, in 2002 when the Safer Cities concept was initiated, it was initially viewed simply as a 'campaign' and there was no focal point within the communities to move the agenda forward as it was still somewhat at a planning-and-consultation stage. Subsequently, when the work plan and four-city pilot project was formulated in 2004, it required a system of community-based monitoring and back-up to ensure that its objectives were being integrated with the regular functioning of LPUPAP and gaining ground. It required a substantial commitment from LPUPAP, which eventually was not forthcoming. This happened at a stage when LPUPAP was approaching its completion and the next project phase was uncertain, and also at a time of change of the Chief Technical Advisor.

Perhaps adding social and institutional components to an infrastructure and services project had already stretched the capacity of LPUPAP to be able to integrate a new component on community security. Even though this was not supposed to be an extra project, it would still require some institutional support, specialist staff, training, reporting, monitoring and so on which placed demands on an organisation already engaged in highly challenging work.

Thus, the Safer Cities initiative, at least as outlined in the work plan, was not implemented, and a component as planned (UN-HABITAT 2007) on community safety and security was not added. Despite a carefully detailed strategic plan and pilot project proposal developed through extensive consultations, not much has happened since the end of 2005 after the conclusion of the UN-HABITAT missions.

Although there are serious existing crime elements such as the operations of *mastans* and drugs, the LPUPAP felt these were beyond the scope of the project to address and required national level "top-down" intervention. The Safer Cities campaign thus focused on issues of violence against women that could be addressed within the community and could be handled within LPUPAP's capacity. Empowerment of women through their involvement in the Primary Groups and CDCs was an area of focus for LPUPAP under a 'gender' component. Within this component issues relating to violence against women are addressed, and the Safer Cities initiative somewhat inadvertently became subsumed within this component.

The workshops during the Safer Cities missions provided scope to LPUPAP managers and other staff members to gain knowledge and exposure on safety and security issues and this was subsequently applied to activities under the gender component. Thus, although a Safer Cities component was never implemented, its concerns found their place to some extent by strengthening an existing component.



Most street families spend their nights in the open – a nightmare for young, vulnerable girls who fall victims to rape and are forced into prostitution. Dhaka, Bangladesh. © Manoocher Deghati/IRIN

The main areas of work of the gender component that relate to safety and security of women are the prevention of the culturally-rooted practices of dowry, early marriage and domestic violence, and raising awareness of women's rights and entitlements. At a project office in Mymensingh town, the staff members related the implementation of women's safety and security measures to broader activities such as economic development, education and healthcare.

So far cases of direct violence against women have not been addressed systematically. Nonetheless, discussion is on-going at the UPPRP project level with the non-profit Bangladesh Legal Aid Services and Training (BLAST) for conducting training programmes on legal rights for female LPUPAP members and for provision of legal aid in cases of assault, rape and so on. BLAST has already been co-operating with LPUPAP on legal matters, for example, securing land tenure for a project community in Narayanganj city, and also in some violence-against-women cases.

Capacity Building

A range of training programmes are provided through LPUPAP for capacity building of Primary Groups and CDCs on aspects such as leadership, economic skills and women's rights as well as management of project activities. As a form of capacity building, some CDC members have been provided with exposure visits to LPUPAP

projects in other cities and also to land-sharing projects in Thailand and Cambodia. There are various anecdotal reports of how women have benefited from personal development and learning through LPUPAP and that they are now more capable and confident.

However, in the work plan developed through the Safer Cities initiative, there is no indication of direct or structured training programmes. Most of the suggested activities seem to rely on other tools such as community meetings, speeches by key persons and cultural and community events. The adaptation of the principles and approaches of the global Safer Cities Programme from the UN-HABITAT international level to the LPUPAP slum community level would require a series of trainings at different levels, but in the work plan there is hardly any recognition of the need for training. The assumption may have been that once the Safer Cities component was integrated into the framework of LPUPAP, it would benefit from the wide range of capacity building opportunities existing within the project.

Achievements

Although the Safer Cities initiative was not continued as planned, there are a number of areas where it has made an impact and there are some noteworthy achievements. LPUPAP's work has begun to address some community safety and security issues, indicative of potential for developing into a full-fledged programmatic initiative.

The Safer Cities initiative was successful in developing a strategic work plan for community safety and security through an intensive process of community consultations. Even though it was not followed up, it represents a road map for structuring future project components by adapting the work plan to the needs of other projects. In that sense, it has potential for wider adaptation and replication beyond LPUPAP/UPPRP to the national context of community development by a range of NGOs and other organisations.

As evident from repeated outputs of workshops conducted under the Safer Cities initiative, and also from reports by staff and community members, domestic violence against women in Bangladeshi slums is a serious community security issue. The activities conducted under the UN-HABITAT missions brought focus to this issue and raised awareness among LPUPAP staff and communities. Even though the violence against women prevention activities are not being conducted according to the way envisioned in the Safer Cities work plan, within LPUPAP/UPPRP this important issue is clearly a key focus area and is being supported in the communities. Already marriage registration to prevent early marriage and legal notice of divorce are enforced in LPUPAP communities, both of which generally uncommon in the urban poor context.

The overall support to women through a range of services – economic empowerment, skills development, education and health support and day care centres for children of working women – all contribute towards the empowerment of women with eventual benefits for the family and community, as well as towards the prevention of domestic violence. In general terms, although no in-depth studies have been conducted on it, there are many anecdotal reports on how the project has contributed to the empowerment of women in LPUPAP communities. Examples are cited of CDC members rising to the position of Ward Commissioners in local government and other such important posts from their previous poor situation with support from LPUPAP.

Women in these communities now have much more negotiating power with local authorities and in some cases have approached even the Mayor's office with their demands. Continuing over nine years, LPUPAP's efforts for women's empowerment has possibly reached a stage when communities are now ready to expand from domestic violence prevention to a wider range of community crime and security issues. It is an opportune moment for LPUPAP/UPPRP to support this process.

At the community level, an example from an LPUPAP project in Mymensingh city suggests that prevention of domestic violence is being given priority by women in communities after exposure to awareness-raising campaigns. One of the CDCs has created a 'Crime Welfare Fund' by setting aside 1% of the funds allocated

for infrastructure and economic development and uses that money for emergency domestic violence cases. This indicates that with minimal institutional support, slum communities are able to address important community issues such as safety and security. Therefore, the Safer Cities initiative has great potential for moving forward with some support from UN-HABITAT and LPUPAP/UPPRP.

The LPUPAP strategy of enlisting the support of influential local people can also prove effective for crime and violence prevention. Although the police seldom respond to calls for help from slum dwellers, because of links with Ward Commissioners in some cases community members have been able to access police help. During a visit to Mymensingh, a local Ward Commissioner was invited as chief guest at an UPPRP book distribution ceremony, thereby building a rapport with him with the possibility for future help. Such existing links can act as the foundation for a focused initiative to address crime and violence in communities.

In Bangladesh, when construction work on buildings or infrastructure begins, it is common to be approached by local *mastans* for 'fees' to be allowed to work safely in their area. However, in the case of LPUPAP's infrastructure work, they have been able to avoid *mastan* fees. Often *mastans* belong to the same communities and, because the work benefits the whole community and due to the intensive involvement of community members, *mastans* are unable to make demands as they would at a private construction site. There was a case reported though, when community members had to seek help to prevent *mastans'* demands. Initially the police were reluctant to help, but women from the communities asked for filing a police case.

It is generally uncommon for women from slums to make such demands, but because the women were thus empowered, they gained respect and eventually help from the police. In this case it shows that empowerment of women not only helps to address domestic violence issues, but also crime that affects the larger community.

Given the usual inefficacy of the national police system, community policing is an alternative that is often suggested. This however needs to be linked to the national system and its extra-judicial capacity needs to be defined according to setting, ideally conducted within the context of a community development project such as LPUPAP. It is reported that in LPUPAP communities in Kushtia city, community policing groups have already been formed and an example from Mymensingh was cited. In one community, about 20 young men have banded together and they raid drug dens and attack addicts and dealers.

This is supported by the Ward Commissioner and local LPUPAP administration, and drug use and dealing has been reduced. Some funds have been raised from the community by CDC members for expenses for this team, such as tea and snacks. Once again, communities have not been waiting for help to be handed to them; when given a framework of institutional support, they are able to develop locally appropriate strategies for preventing crime and violence.

Bangladesh already has an extensive network of NGOs working on gender issues, including the prevention of violence against women, and so LPUPAP's efforts in this field is not isolated, but part of a wider movement. Important links have been established with prominent legal aid services specializing in violence against women such as BLAST and Ain-O-Shalish Kendro, with the potential for developing into a wider network.

The government is also playing a role. For example, throwing battery acid at the faces of girls and women to disfigure them because of rejection, revenge or dowry demand was previously widespread in Bangladesh, but since the government has made it punishable by the death penalty and NGOs became active in helping victims, incidences of this crime are reportedly much reduced nationally. Continuing support to prevention of violence against women in its project activities would allow LPUPAP/UPPRP to contribute to and be part of a nation-wide initiative with potential for great impact.

Challenges

Despite some impact from the Safer Cities initiative, these achievements were made without the supporting framework of a specific project component on crime and violence prevention. There are thus conditions of crime and violence that remain to be addressed in the LPUPAP communities, requiring a larger initiative beyond domestic violence prevention activities.

Challenges exist in implementing such initiatives in this highly demanding context with limited institutional resources. Originally, LPUPAP requested the Safer Cities Programme of UN-HABITAT's help in assessing options for the development and integration of a project component that addressed community safety, violence against women and access to justice. Emphasis has so far been given mainly on the second issue – violence against women.

However, safety and security of the entire community extends beyond this, as indicated by the drugs and *mastans* problems repeatedly highlighted as the main crime and violence issues. Also, poor men are often also in need of access to legal justice; although there is some initiative in linking with legal aid organisations such as BLAST, facilitating access to justice as a fundamental human right needs to be considered within a larger framework to support current community development activities.

Larger crimes such as drugs and *mastans* are beyond the capacity of communities to address on their own. As one community member mentioned during the field visit, "There might be possible solutions, but we don't know them. These things [crime] are too big for us to deal with." In building on the work on domestic violence prevention initiated by the Safer Cities campaign, the challenge will be extending it to the broader sphere of overall community safety and security.

Perhaps the critical issue is that crime and violence prevention actions have so far been taken within an ongoing regular programme, not as part of a key strategic component. There is an overlap between crime and violence prevention and general development concerns. Whatever is being done is not documented or evaluated adequately, does not follow a work plan or any other institutional strategy instrument and relates to wider local influences active in promoting domestic violence prevention, such as the work of NGOs or the media, not specifically to only LPUPAP/UPPRP policy.

Despite some measures taken, the Safer Cities initiative is largely unknown to the communities, except for those who participated in the workshops during the UN-HABITAT missions and consultants' assignments. During a field visit to Mymensingh city, at a meeting with many CDC members nobody knew about Safer Cities when they were asked about it, although they were aware about the domestic violence prevention efforts of LPUPAP.

Safety and insecurity problems remain in the community: there were men with multiple wives and even within the group present at the meeting, there was a woman who had been abandoned by her husband. There is thus scope to address such challenges by moving forward with the work plan outlined under the Safer Cities initiative.

The problem of measurably assessing impact of crime and violence prevention initiatives, particularly reduction of domestic violence, is a reason why it is difficult to mainstream initiatives such as that of Safer Cities, particularly within the framework of a project that set out as an infrastructure-and-services upgrading activity.

Infrastructure projects result in concrete quantifiable outputs, therefore use of donor funds can be easily justified and the development efforts are visible. What is often not understood is that if local conditions are safe and secure, infrastructure projects have the opportunity to be implemented more effectively. Improved safety and security conditions allows better development opportunities, which is why it should be integrated into the overall project, not only as a separate component.

Improved infrastructure, such as better street lighting, roads and communal spaces, can assist in crime and violence prevention. Even though LPUPAP is a community-based infrastructure-and-services project, there does not seem to have been any effort at linking the construction work to crime and violence prevention.

Despite the connection with the Safer Cities Programme, this is an aspect that does not seem to have been given much thought. LPUPAP/UPPRP is in a unique position to establish the connection between improved infrastructure and crime prevention through its work in the combined areas of infrastructure-and-services provision and community development.

A project working within a defined scope allows setting feasible and achievable targets, which the LPUPAP has succeeded in doing by operating within its own niche. It was mandated to work with local government in cities other than Dhaka, so was spared from dealing with a comparatively more extensive and heavier crime situation in the large capital city. In selecting slums for the project, those with strong crime problems were avoided.

Similarly, in the case of crime and violence prevention, as a policy decision LPUPAP has restricted itself to domestic violence. Thus, while some impact might be achieved through this 'niche' mode of operation, larger community problems remain unaddressed that could eventually undermine the small achievements made.

The Way Forward

Although LPUPAP's work has made some progress on preventing violence against women, many challenges remain, particularly in addressing overall crime and violence in slum communities. The activities and outputs of the Safer Cities initiative offer lessons on how a project component on community safety and security can be designed through an intensive community consultation process, and its recommendations have the potential of moving up a step and being implemented at this stage in LPUPAP's organisational transition and development.

LPUPAP concluded in July 2007 and entered its second phase, UPPRP, in November 2007. Much of the project structure remains the same, so the Safer Cities work plan and recommendations made during the LPUPAP phase are still relevant.

The principal recommendation of this report is that the Safer Cities work plan should be taken up within UPPRP with a view towards developing pilot projects and other related activities. Conditions of crime and violence persist in urban slums and to begin addressing it systematically within the project's operational framework, beginning with a strategic plan that is already available and building upon it offers an ideal option.

Since it is three years since the work plan was formulated, a review is required and is best done through a consultative process. Similarly, locations and details of pilot projects would need to be reconsidered by assessing the present suitability of locations previously selected in 2005 and whether there are other areas where a pilot intervention might prove more worthwhile.



These women are heading for the nearby flood shelter established by the government. © Shamsuddin Ahmed/IRIN

If the idea of a focused crime and violence prevention initiative or program component is at all taken on board, it should begin with a consultative review of the outputs of the Safer Cities initiative with a view towards adapting them to the current UPPRP context. Together with a review of the work plan, it is necessary to develop and incorporate within it a set of urban safety indicators that are contextual and relevant, particularly to the concerns of the work plan to measure its impact after a period of implementation. On a broader level, such indicators are available from a range of sources such as UN-HABITAT's global Safer Cities Programme. These would need to be adapted to the local context through their review by a consultative process involving local experts and stakeholders.

UN-HABITAT's global Safer Cities Programme can play a valuable role in initiating the reassessment of the earlier initiative and supporting policy development and implementation of crime and violence activities within UPPRP project communities. UN-HABITAT can provide important back-stopping and support, the nature of which can be laid out in a Memorandum of Understanding in line with the Safer Cities Strategic Plan with Bangladesh as a partner (UN-HABITAT 2007b).

Even if the above approach is not followed, within the current project there is a need to clarify focus: at present crime and violence prevention measures and general development activities tend to overlap. Although such measures need to be integrated with the overall project activities, they should be understood and applied as distinct from other development services delivery because of the high risks and need for greater sensitivity and psycho-emotional support involved.

An important concept that should be considered within the policy framework is community policing, especially because of the lack of a police force responsive to the safety and security needs of the urban poor. However, this has to be developed in coordination with the existing law and order system to supplement, not as an alternative, because that might lead to gang formation and unauthorised extra-judicial action. There are some examples of informal community policing in the LPUPAP communities and these should be built upon to develop a system that functions appropriately at the community level.

Policing and law enforcement alone are not sufficient to address the complexity of the crime and violence situation, especially due to its linkage with the drugs trade and domestic violence. It has to work within an integrated system of counselling, psychological support, employment and education opportunity creation and community-wide awareness-raising. Such a view emerged during a meeting with CDC members: Drug rehabilitation clinics exist in larger cities, and one member wondered if that was an option for her community. However, discussions revealed that other community members were aware that drug addicts often resume their habits after undergoing rehabilitation treatment because of the lack of adequate community and family follow-up support.

So although clinics are important and should be considered for developing in slum communities, they have to be backed by a community and family support structure, requiring capacity building right down to the family level, and programme development and management at the organisational level within a broad-spectrum community crime and violence prevention agenda.

Structured training and capacity building on crime and violence prevention has not been undertaken under LPUPAP, nor suggested in the Safer Cities work plan. There is an important need for that at all levels beginning from LPUPAP/UPPRP management to family level at the community. The Safer Cities Programme at UN-HABITAT can assist in providing or facilitating training. Recent efforts at linking with legal aid agencies such as BLAST for training on legal aspects of domestic violence is a form of training that should be undertaken on a wide range of community crime and violence prevention measures and activities.

Some of the achievements of LPUPAP's domestic violence prevention activities were possible due to the pres-

ence of an extensive NGO and civil society network in Bangladesh active in human rights issues. There is a need to strengthen links with this network and perhaps UPPRP can facilitate development of electronic or membership-based networks, or participate in existing networks for crime and violence prevention for the urban poor.

One of the key disadvantages communities face is the lack of adequate information on aspects of crime and violence prevention. There are many successful examples from other countries (see for example UN-HABITAT 2002), and even within Bangladesh, which offer useful lessons and scope for adaptation, but slum communities do not have access to such information, nor are they directed towards it. LPUPAP had provisions for information sharing on various issues including women's and human rights, and also for cross-sharing exposure visits within the country and Asia. This idea should be extended to the field of crime and safety prevention so that community members can visit and learn from examples of good practice elsewhere. A concrete way forward would be the development of documentation and mapping of existing initiatives within Bangladesh and other similar contexts on violence and crime prevention for the benefit of communities, and also for the government and local authorities, for use when designing and planning projects and interventions.

An important possibility not considered so far is to link infrastructure and services upgrading to crime and violence prevention. Better street lighting at key spots, clean paved roads and community open spaces designed for safety are among some ideas that can contribute towards better community safety and security. Through community-based consultations, UPPRP can develop such physical planning options that are appropriate for specific locations and which can be implemented and monitored by the communities. Perhaps most importantly, it is necessary to commit some funds and human resources to such an initiative for community crime and violence prevention. It may not have to be a separate project component, even within the regular functioning of the project, attention has to be given to budget allocation, staffing and training for activities that specifically relate to safety and security issues. This would allow better performance, accountability and monitoring of impact.

The list of recommendations can be long and many issues will arise during implementation of even a few of them. The main element to highlight is the need for specific attention to community crime and violence prevention through a focused project component or campaign, building upon work done so far through the Safer Cities initiative. In the current UPPRP phase, there are plans for working in communities within Dhaka, which would allow addressing a higher magnitude and scale of crime and violence. The project is unique in many ways and is in a position to develop nationally replicable good practice and make great impact on crime and violence prevention for the urban poor in Bangladesh.

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Safety and Security in Slum Upgrading : LPUPAP, Bangladesh

SL	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANISATION
1	Mr. Mike Slingsby	Chief Technical Advisor	LPUPAP/UPPRP, Dhaka
2	Mr. Rezaur Rahim (and team)	Town Manager	LPUPAP/UPPRP, Mymensingh Project Office
	Mr. M. Sakhawath Hussain	Town Manager	LPUPAP/UPPRP, Tongi Project Office
3	Ms. Quazi Baby	Executive Director	Participatory Development Action Program, Dhaka & Consultant to LPUPAP
4	Ms. Husni Ara Quashem	Executive Director	Shoishab Bangladesh, Dhaka & Consultant to LPUPAP
5	Ms. Huraera Jabeen	Assistant Professor	BRAC University, Dhaka & Consultant to LPUPAP
6	Mr. Syed Shafiqul Islam Mintu	Ward Commissioner	Ward no. 6, Mymensingh
7	Ms. Muslima Akhtar Morjina	Chairperson	Rupsha Cluster, LPUPAP/ UPPRP, Mymensingh
8	CDC members and other community members		LPUPAP/UPPRP communities, Mymensingh

List of Key Persons Interviewed

Note: Most of the respondents were interviewed in Dhaka LPUPAP/UPPRP head office and LPUPAP/UPPRP project office and communities in Mymensingh city. LPUPAP projects in Narayanganj city were studied earlier (see Ahmed 2006) and a number of key informants were also interviewed at that time, some information from which has also been drawn upon for this report.



The most common mode of transport in the city of Dhaka, Bangladesh. © UN-HABITAT

Safety and Security in Slum Upgrading : LPUPAP, Bangladesh Investigation Checklist	
Date	Location
Name of Respondent(s)	Designation
Work details (collect business card, if available)	
Address:	Tel/Fax Email Website
No. of years service	Previous relevant experience
1. Background	
Context	
Target group/beneficiaries	
Objectives	
Expected outcomes	
2. Concept note	
Reference to safety and security issue	
Reasons why/ why not	
3. Steps taken and tools used to deal with safety & security	
4. Crime prevention category: Physical/Spatial, Social, Institutional, or combination	

5. Training to institutions**6. Measures implemented and impact****7. Measures not implemented and impact****8. Lessons learnt****9. Suggestions**

ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY AND SECURITY IN UPGRADING INITIATIVES: CASE OF CITÉ DE LA PAIX, DOUALA, **CAMEROON**

Meutchehe Ngomsi & Christine Nelle




Akwa in Douala, Cameroon. © Julius Mwelu/UN-HABITAT

1,907,800

DOUALA POPULATION

* CENSUS 2010



In many urban development initiatives, renewal or upgrading, Cameroonian planners and designers or local authorities rarely integrate safety in the list of issues which must be improved to enhance quality of life in cities and towns. Usually, public safety and security are perceived by public administration as the mandate of the police, gendarmerie and, to some extent, military. Although the government provided the legal framework under which private sector companies can offer safety services to society, mainly those who can afford to pay their high costs, crime prevention issues are not clearly stated in the action plans of local and national government.

This can explain why the integration of safety alongside projects' development and implementation cycles are marginal if not absent altogether. It is therefore difficult to measure impact of upgrading programmes or new development schemes on the reduction of crime and feelings of insecurity. The initiative was undertaken in order to provide citizens of Cité de la Paix and project managers of the Douala Infrastructure Programme (DIP) with pragmatic and comprehensive solutions to prevent crime and increase sense of security within the community in Cité de la Paix.

This is a neighbourhood of 22 hectares located in the centre of Douala City Council (inhabitants: 1,907,800 as per 2010 census report) and is a quarter created in the 1970s with a population of approximately 5,000 living in five sectors. The appraisal includes recommendations to reduce crime opportunities and increase sense of community and partnership among residents and local authorities so that they can join efforts to enhance quality of life of vulnerable groups, women and girls. The paper examines impacts and addresses a number of lessons learned which could be deeply analysed to improve future participatory safety audits.

Background

In 2002 the Cameroonian Government obtained a credit from International Development Association (IDA) to cover the cost for the Douala Infrastructure Programme (PID). Part of this credit was set aside for operations aimed at providing better access to basic infrastructure and services to the population.

The Douala Urban Council (CUD) is in charge of this programme in collaboration with the PID. In 2005, two neighbourhoods in Douala - *Bessengue* and *Cité de la Paix* - were chosen to serve as pilot projects for further action in the town. The aim of the upgrading initiative is to increase the "level of service" with a proper baseline and promote ownership and maintenance of investment and spirit of collaboration.

A participatory approach was identified as a technique to identify, analyze and prioritize problems and solutions which could be implemented. In the beginning, safety and security issues were clearly stated in the upgrading project - this had become a concern in Cité de la Paix after the identification of crime as being among the first three problems according to representative of the population. In Bessengue, this was not the case that is why focus was on Cité de la Paix where safety audit and training on crime prevention were conducted to realise an in-depth analysis of crime and insecurity. Some measures were implemented to reduce opportunity of crime and increase sense of security.

Methodology

This paper, which assesses the integration of safety issues in upgrading initiatives in Cité de la Paix, is based on literature review (project documents, safety audit report and mid-term reports on the level of implementation of activities), interviews with local leaders and project managers as well as representatives of inhabitants and field visits. After the collection of data, there was a thematic analysis with terms of reference and an analytical framework. Finally, Crime Prevention Through

Environmental Design principles were used to examine impacts and provide lessons learned in the application of safety audit ¹conclusions in participatory upgrading plans in Cité de la Paix.

Mainstreaming safety audit into neighbourhood upgrading: context and approach

Ten basic services were identified by managers of the DIP as problems which need more attention by the social researcher who conducted the rapid diagnostic of Cité de la Paix². Services and social facilities which were considered were mobility and accessibility in parcels, access to potable water, access to electricity and streetlighting, primary and secondary sanitation systems, waste management, commercial facilities, sport infrastructures, health facilities and a social house for community meetings.

Initially, safety and security issues were not raised either in the terms of reference or the concept note because these questions are rarely analysed by urban planners and designers or social researchers. Secondly, crime prevention problems are not usually integrated in urban or slum development projects in Cameroon, even if mentioned by citizens. The safety and security issues became part of the upgrading agenda when representatives of the local population mentioned that the lack of streetlighting is a source of insecurity in their neighbourhood. The team that conducted the diagnostic of problem tried to identify and to understand actions taken at community level to reduce insecurity.

It was then said that, in the first quarter of 2004, the chief of Cité de la Paix started a community safety project without appropriate analysis of factors of crime and victimization or sensitisation of citizens. The aim of this community-led crime prevention was to mobilize funds in the neighbourhood and to install approximately 19 streetlights per sector. This operation failed because fewer than 30% of household contributed and tenants refused to engage in the collective action. The request to establish a community police post sent by the chief to the commissioner of Police was also unsuccessful. The youth were to conduct night patrols to dissuade potential thieves in their respective sectors but a lack of financial incentive and insufficient tools prevented from reducing break-ins and physical assaults in the neighbourhood.

In September 2004, at the peak of crime and insecurity in Cité de la Paix, the Sub-Division officer of Douala III launched the safety committee using local resources to protect persons and goods.

The rapid appraisal of safety and security issues has shown that lack of safety co-ordination at different spatial scales (neighbourhood, sectors and parcels) was registered as the key obstacle for the implementation crime prevention measures identified by the safety committee.

With this in mind, one member of the review committee of reports produced in Cité de la Paix asked the Douala Safer Cities Initiative (DSCI) to conduct a comprehensive safety audit in the area. The principal objective of this operation was to provide citizens, local leaders, DIP managers and local government with a pragmatic action plan for the prevention of crime. The first step was to design the methodology of the safety audit using the 'exploratory walk' approach and based on six principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED):

- Know where you are and where you are going (sign-post and markings)
- See and to be seen (visibility)
- Hear and to be heard (noisy environment)hbnznik
- Obtain help and to be able to escape (accessibility and first aid)
- Live in a clean and welcoming environment (environmental issues)
- Work together (population implication in safety and security)

The principal objectives of the safety audit were to conduct the qualitative analysis of crime, localize hotspots, examine the influence of environmental factors in victimization risk, carry out crime mapping and to recommend social, institutional and urban planning actions which could reduce opportunities for crime. The second step consisted of organising two training sessions on crime and insecurity analysis, and technique to identify and prioritize prevention measures for a given crime. This was done using maps and aerial photographs and then documents containing definition and characteristics of crime and crime prevention. The sensitization of community representatives helped them to understand the difference between insecurity and crime, to examine the influence of social and environmental factors on risk of victimization and to learn more on the importance of comprehensive measures on crime prevention operations.

The local chief, seven sub-chiefs, two members of the neighbourhood watch committee, four representatives of local women, five members of youth associations and two staff members of the city council were part of the two exploratory walk teams. Each participant used an observation guide to identify and characterize environmental factors of crime in Cité de la Paix. The results were then compiled and aggregated before their validation by representatives of the quarter, the Douala City Council and the DIP.

¹ A participatory assessment exercise that identifies aspects of physical environment that contribute to feelings and reality of insecurity, and recommends remedial actions.

² Marilyn Douala-Bell (2005), *Diagnostic de la Cité de la Paix, Douala 3eme, Diagnostic physique, DGT, CUD, Douala*



Satellite map of Cité de la Paix in Douala, Cameroon. © Google 2010

Safety and security situations in Cité de la Paix between 2005 and 2009

Manifestation of crime and feeling of insecurity

Crime and sense of insecurity were classified in three categories: environmental offences, crime against goods, and crime against the person. On environmental hazards, the responses of the local people questioned, showed that the major problems were a poor sewage evacuation system, uncontrolled dumping of refuse and storage of iron in the neighbourhood and the presence of abandoned houses and neglected fields.

Burglary was the main crime against goods and properties and many respondents had been victims in the previous five years. The main trends were an increasing number of burglaries committed in the previous five years, these crimes happening in bursts and an increased level of violence. Perhaps unsurprisingly the most accessible blocks were the most vulnerable. Thirdly, physical assaults such as rape or fights were more difficult to assess, as they are sensitive and controversial. Generally, the safety issues are closely linked to social problems and various groups in the neighbourhood. Generation gaps, sexual discrimination and tribalism seem to be the cause of social tensions.

The safety audit called attention to different issues. During the participative diagnostic meeting, it was almost impossible to talk about violence against women.

No rape was admitted to have happened in the neighbourhood, even if committed by outsiders, and women could not talk freely about the issue due to fear of stigmatisation and also a non-enabling environment. It was difficult for the focus group to admit insecurity within their area because they, and not outsiders, are the main cause, and also because members of the development committee are reluctant to 'taint' the image of the pilot project committee. The main places at risk identified by participants were four entrances in the neighbourhood, two streets either with excess noise or which were too isolated at night and two junctions.

To find appropriate solutions for crime and insecurity problems, authors of the participatory safety audit were determined not to work from the basis of type of crime but to provide dwellers and managers of the DIP with preventive measures according to the characteristics of hotspots. Due to the importance of these hotspots in causing feelings of insecurity and fear of crime, it was decided to apply the place-based crime prevention approach to short listed actions which, when applied, could make the public places safer.

The aim was to offer short- and medium- term responses (SMTR) to participants. As not enough data was gathered on specific crimes, it was not possible to have a debate on offence-oriented measures. According to the team who undertook the safety audit, implementation of hotspot-oriented solutions would have quick wins, characterised by the increase of sense of security and reduction of personal crime, but they also favoured

involving the inhabitants in a comprehensive crime prevention initiative in the long run.

Impacts of safety and security measures

The integration of safety and security issues and measures was the consequence of dwellers willing to use the DIP to reduce the level of crime and insecurity in their neighbourhood. Inhabitants prioritized crime prevention as a component of the upgrading programme with the aim of improving quality of life. From the participatory safety audit, the main actions implemented were:

- Installation of five streetlights at the main hotspots areas
- Improvement of the visibility for pedestrians and drivers via the renewal of the road and sewage system
- Cutting back of higher grasses
- Construction of a small bridge with safe materials

To reduce teenagers' fights and verbal assaults among women at the only collective water well, the DIP also financed the construction of two boreholes and the rehabilitation of the collective water well. Nothing has been done yet to develop the community watch group which exists but lacks appropriate resources to function and respond to people's needs.

The principal criteria used compares the level of insecurity in the main hotspots is the presence or absence of environmental factors of crime. It appears that improvements were made and they have contributed to increase the feeling of safety and security. Actions implemented and their impacts could be summarized as follows:

- *Increased visibility.* Improvement of roads and installation of streetlights according to the logic of crime prevention have improved the feeling of security; according to residents, crime and violence seem to have reduced.
- *Reduction of noisy and inconvenient behaviour.* Reduction of illegal extending/sprawl towards public roads has enhanced feelings of security among residents and increased frequency of and confidence in the use of public spaces.
- *Environmental and sanitation issues.* Cutting high grass and better management of sewage disposal and dumping of refuse have made the neighbourhood more attractive and encouraged investment from local enterprises.
- *Reduction in crime/violence.* Reduction in simple offences, armed robberies and feelings of insecurity in the neighbourhood has been experienced. As of 2008, 11 of the 15 hotspots identified by the crime/neighbourhood mapping are considered safer by the residents.

- *Increase in social cohesion.* Addressing common problems has strengthened the sense of community and solidarity among residents, local authorities, local leaders and other stakeholders.
- *Building of capacity/understanding.* Training residents and local authorities in safety audit tool application and crime/neighbourhood mapping has enhanced awareness, capacity, and understanding of crime and violence issues.

The area under investigation used to be marshy, with narrow roads and steep slopes subject to erosion. It tended to be overrun by high grass. The fact that roads were not constructed also presented an environmental hazard that threatened to destroy houses, making the roads impractical, misused and unsafe and dangerous. With the rehabilitation of the roads and sidewalks, some hidden places were exposed or made more visible from afar. Young people playing cards at night on the main commercial street now represent less threat after midnight. Today, there is more visibility and the place looks more welcoming and safe.

Rating the sense of insecurity on a scale of 1 to 5, the 12 participants who attended the participatory safety audit were asked whether the level of insecurity or fear of crime has decreased in the principal hotspots. The result shows that the feeling of insecurity has been reduced in seven out of nine hotspots in Cité de la Paix. The rates of the feeling of insecurity in the two junctions remain the same in 2005 and 2009 due to the impact of better quality of road which has allowed people to drive much faster along it and they now represent a threat to the well-being of inhabitants.

The table below portrays the characteristics of hotspots in 2005 and 2008. The rating was established as follows:

- 5/5 : Very high feeling of insecurity / frequent assault
- 4/5 : High feeling of insecurity
- 3/5 : Medium feeling of insecurity/very little assault
- 2/5 : Low feeling of insecurity/ isolated cases
- 1/5 : Almost no feeling of insecurity
- 0/5 : No insecurity at all

IDENTIFIED HOTSPOTS	IDENTIFIED SOURCES OF INSECURITY IN 2005	IMPLEMENTED ACTION IN 2008
Entrance by BP Cité (at the bridge of the last chance)	• Lack of streetlight • Plant and high grass along the drain bank • Fragile bridge Very high feeling of insecurity (5/5)	• No streetlight • Constant cutting of grass • Pedestrian and Moto cycle bridge with handrail • More visibility from distance Low sense of insecurity (2/5)
Entrance by CAMRAIL	• Uncontrolled dumping of refuse • Accessible abandoned house • Lack of streetlight High feeling of insecurity (4/5)	• No uncontrolled dumping • The abandoned house was fenced • Road was improved (<i>increased visibility</i>) • Streetlight placed close to entrance Low feeling of insecurity (2/5)
Entrance through the commercial road	• Stagnant water reducing mobility • Lack of streetlight • Lack of signboard High feeling of insecurity (4/5)	• Drainage built along most street • Presence of streetlight • Reduction of illegal use of public road • Road improved Moderate feeling of insecurity due to high speed of vehicles (3/5)
Entrance through 'Scierie Design' –	• Lack of streetlight • Uncontrolled dumping of refuse around the dump site • Presence of stagnant water High feeling of insecurity (4/5)	• Streetlight • Still uncontrolled dumping of refuse around the dump site • Presence of stagnant water Moderate feeling of insecurity (3/5)
Street by CAMRAIL sports field	• Lack of streetlight • Long and dark corridor • Presence of a stadium not protected at night High feeling of insecurity (4/5)	• Two streetlights (close to the road and near the corridor) • More natural surveillance by neighbour Low sense of insecurity (2/5)
Street along 'la cité des cinq maisons'	• High grass • Blind corridors • Lack of streetlight • Frequent flooding on the road and narrow access High feeling of insecurity (4/5)	• Frequent cutting of grasses • Frequent clean up campaign • Residents' awareness on situational crime prevention efforts raised during the exploratory walks Low feeling of insecurity (2/5)
Street along 'scierie design' – what is this?	Abandoned shop High grasses along the road Lack of streetlight Moderate feeling of insecurity (3/5)	Streetlight at the junction at the entrance of the street Frequent cutting of grass Low feeling of insecurity (2/5)
Carrefour de 'beaucoup de bars'	• Road occupied by extension of several drinking parlor • Stagnant water • Inconvenience/discomfort due to the presence of the drinking parlours High feeling of insecurity (4/5)	• Road made up with drainage no more stagnation • At night street occupied by drinking parlours; the improved road has meant high speeds of vehicles - accidents have become more frequent High feeling of security (4/5)
Carrefour 'maquereaux'	• Presence of hiding place • Stagnant water • Inconvenience/discomfort due to the presence of the drinking parlours High feeling of insecurity (4/5)	• Road made up with drainage along the side to reduce stagnation and improve visibility • At night street occupied by drinking parlours; the improved road has meant high speeds of vehicles - accidents have become more frequent High feeling of security (4/5)

From the data above, it appears that upgrading measures have contributed to the reduction of minor environment offences. It can be deduced from peoples' attitudes that crime against the person and goods have gone down between 2005 and 2009. According to the chief of the Cité de la Paix, it was noticed that armed burglaries in houses located at the entrances of the quarter and crime against persons around hotspots are less frequent compared to 2005 or years before (interview done in March 2008).

The representative of the neighbourhood watch group indicated that women, the group most concerned by the lack of light, feel safer today in Cité de la Paix. He also mentioned that cases of serial theft are not more common but there are still a few robberies and assaults. In general, the members of the Cité de la Paix development association believe that insecurity and crime have been reduced by up to 75%.

It appears from interviews conducted with the national gendarmeries in charge of the area that petty theft and robberies are still prevalent within Cité de la Paix. In addition, the neighbourhood has a reputation for being a hideout for robbers that operate around the area - many have been arrested or known by the police. The frequency of the patrols has, however, helped to maintain a certain level of safety; the commander of the patrols said they would be more efficient if communication with the population was strengthened. The challenge remains that the criminals are relatives to the inhabitants of the neighbourhood but the inhabitants do, however, report crimes to the gendarmerie.

Weaknesses and Challenges

- Lack of a permanent dialogue between DIP managers, city council staff and the community on the effects of the integration of safety and security approach in the process of the upgrading initiative
- After the termination of the safety audit document, no feedback was done with the community to increase their understanding and their knowledge on how to apply the recommendations, even though they are the only implementing agent
- Absence of safety and security criteria in the evaluation meetings or reports on the impacts of the upgrading projects. No personnel in the city council have been empowered to permanently monitor the case of integration of safety and security issues in Cité de la Paix as a means to duplicating them elsewhere in Douala.
- Although lighting contributed to the sense and reality of better community safety/security, the maintenance of installed lights has been insufficient and inconsistent
- Absence of consistent social and community actions such as the creation of neighbourhood vigilance committees, has lowered the impact of community safety
- Delay in the programme implementation phase contributed to community fatigue, and possible suspicion towards the programme's objectives and actors



Local leaders on training urban planning and management in Douala, Cameroon. © Meutchehe Ngomsi /UN-HABITAT



A crime spot in Cité de la Paix before and after safety facilities improvement. © Douala City Council

Sustainability, lessons learned and recommendations

The participation of the population was a matter of importance. The upgrading programme has enhanced the coming together to discuss matters concerning local people, which gives them the responsibility for their neighbourhood and involves each and everyone. This strength was recognised during the 2008 cleanest neighbourhood competition organised by the Douala City Council when Cité de la Paix won the 3rd place in Douala III sub-division.

Here, the population showed an ability to work together and their intention to put up a vigilance committee is also an indication of this ability. On the other hand, the programme implementation phase is taking so much time that inhabitants are afraid that the delay may cause prejudice to their good will in the participation and the appropriation of the outcomes of the initiative.

The training of local leaders on crime prevention analysis has changed public perception on how to reduce risks of crime and insecurity effectively. It has also promoted the idea that police posts and streetlighting are not the only ways of reducing opportunities of crime, and that a sustainable approach should be based on comprehensive solutions.

Out of these two lessons came the third, which was that urban or slums upgrading programmes must be conceived in a systemic manner and should include not only 'visible' interventions such as road, sidewalks or water but more importantly social and organisational component (invisible actions). To design this type of programme, a shortlist of usual social, institutional and physical problems happening in slums must be inserted in the first terms of reference. Usually, such a model may imply more financial resources and/or human skills.

It is true that the complex nature of living conditions in Cité de la Paix requires the formulation of policies that go beyond the mere provision of basic infrastructure and services to the dwellers. As stated by the UNCHS-Habitat (2004) 'It is not possible to improve the lot of the urban poor by physically upgrading urban squatter areas if other measures are not taken simultaneously to create employment opportunities, extend adequate credit to the informal sector of the population, and/or facilitate access to land and participation in decision - making process affecting housing and living conditions'.

There are a certain number of additional elements that should be added when dealing with slums, unplanned or low income areas:

- Socio-economical and institutional empowerment for youth, women and retired adults
- Build capacity to enhance public health (community disease prevention strategy) and security of private environment
- Safe environments do not stop at roads and street-lighting as the provision of other infrastructure, such as public toilets, provides opportunities for enhancing safety
- Improve security of land tenure, which could encourage social and physical development
- Promote safety of electric and telephone cables, and water pipes. Mismanagement of electric cables has caused damage and death and the maintenance and management of facilities, infrastructure, and amenities is key to sustainability of urban upgrading investments.
- Put in place an enabling environment and an appropriate financial mechanism to promote community crime prevention initiative and/or neighbourhood watch committees



- Finally, the impacts of the use of the crime prevention approach to enhance levels of security in Cité de la Paix can be revisited in a more scientific way by comparing the influence of the upgrading actions in this neighbourhood and Bessengue where there was no integration of safety and security issues during the diagnostic phase.

Usually, the overall objective of urban planning is to provide citizens with a safe and secure landscape and social environment. In many urban development or upgrading projects in sub-Sahara Africa, when the issue of crime is raised by dwellers the solution to safety is to provide streetlighting. This approach is insufficient for planners or urban managers who really want to reverse the raising trend of crime.

sponses. Streetlights, refinement of road and sidewalks, better sewage and waste disposal or management, and improvement of communal wells and bore holes have reduced crime and sense of insecurity in some hotspots, improved visibility and territorial reinforcement and reduced interpersonal conflict such as teenagers' fights and conflict among women around wells. On the whole, these developments have not only increased the quality of life in Cité de la Paix but also rebuilt inhabitants' confidence vis-à-vis the City council and the State.

The other side of the coin is that there is a lack of ownership of upgraded or new infrastructures by the citizens and the municipal council. In addition, the fact that the social and organisational aspects were not considered either by the DIP or the city council even by the community development association is an indicator that the business of maintenance of newly provided services will not be effective.

Socio-organisational recommendations were suggested by participants of the safety audit as an option to enhance solidarity among residents and relation between them and local authorities. Our common understanding is that safety and security measures are far from the local government agenda although they were mentioned during the political campaigns.

There is a lack of political will and social commitment to address crime effectively using a scientific or common sense approach. Even the Douala Safer Cities Project jointly launched by the Government of Cameroon, UN-HABITAT and UNDP has not managed, despite many efforts to reach the attention of key decision makers and professionals, to positively influence mayors and the office of the Government Delegate to mainstream safety and security issues in their annual development plan.

The main reason for not engaging in this road is that it is difficult to evaluate crime prevention and present achievement to voters but also because safety and security measures are not frequently 'visible'. Many political leaders, donors' organisations and public administrations staffs like results that can be seen.

In conclusion, there is awareness that new realities generate new behaviour and new knowledge but also require appropriate ways of analysing and organising the knowledge which can be used to enable social and political changes. The participatory safety audit in Cité de la Paix and this paper have shown that there is doubt as to whether the structures at the DIP, city and municipal councils, neighbourhood level as well as the civil society will work to provide a helpful model and method to mainstream safety and security issues as part of the urban management and governance pillars.

The police alone will never deliver safety and security to population living in poor or unplanned neighbourhoods. There is a need to assign municipal authorities with full powers of urban settings management which includes crime prevention. The solution to pro-poor safety and security in urban areas will not come from national government but through decentralisation of powers to local governments as well as empowerment of citizens, urban professionals and decision makers to deal with crime and insecurity are conducted.

It is strongly believed that from the outcomes of the series of rapid appraisals of the integration of safety and security in urban upgrading initiatives, UN-HABITAT Safer Cities Programme will work out a new strategy to raise awareness and develop tools on pro-poor crime prevention strategies in developing countries.

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Satellite map of city Douala. © Google 2010

BUILDING URBAN SAFETY THROUGH URBAN PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY

Bernardo Pérez Salazar




A normal congested day in the overpopulated city of Dhaka, Bangladesh, July 2007. The transport system of Dhaka has severely deteriorated in the last 10 to 15 years. © Manoocher Deghati/IRIN

2.5 – 5.0%

URBAN ANNUAL GROWTH RATES RANGE

* PAPUA NEW GUINEA,
BANGLADESH & KENYA



Background

The case studies considered in this book are widely diverse, covering urban settings that range from medium sized cities (pop. 500,000, as in the case of Port Moresby), to mega cities such as Dhaka (pop. 13.5 million). In most cities where specific slum-upgrading initiatives were studied, population living in slums or informal settlements is estimated between one and two thirds of the total. In many cases this share is increasing rapidly, particularly in countries such as Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh and Kenya where rural-urban migrations are in due course and urban annual growth rates range between 2.5 – 5.0%. Generally, a significant amount of households living in this type of urban setting are tenants of owners who do not have formal land tenure or property rights. Many depend for their income on informal activities and are likely to be subordinated to some form of constrain by local customary or openly illegal power structure. Racketeering activities such as extortion of local businesses, transport, and construction sites, as well as housing rents and supply of basic services such as water and electricity supply, are widespread in this kind of environments.

Violence among drug dealers over turf for drug peddling as well as theft and muggings are common events, as is harassment and violence against women, including domestic battering, rape, sexual abuse and exploitation, among other crimes. Security and safety are thus listed among the top concerns of households living in slums. Studies suggest that about two thirds of households surveyed in informal settlements refer having been victims of crime over the past twelve months and as a result feel unsafe in their neighbourhoods.

In some cases, the demand of the “right to the city” is highly relevant particularly in the context of countries going through massive rural-urban migration processes and uncontrolled growth of urban peripheries. New migrant demands for shelter and public services often overwhelm the technical and financial capacity available of city government authorities. Commonly, official response is to adduce that constraining national and lo-

cal normative and institutional frameworks are in effect and that migrant newcomers in urban peripheries are infringing these regulations. Consequently needs and demands from these areas are graded as coming from “offenders” and local governments are released from the obligation of allocating public investment resources to address them.

Institutional and policy adjustments in this kind of scenarios are complex and resource demanding. Government in countries in the middle of the rural-urban demographic transition tend to be centralised, so shifting constraining urban policies implies reforming legal and institutional frameworks. Yet the complexities of political manoeuvring required in achieving this goal pale in the face of assuring and channelling the needed financial resources to cope with massive oncoming demands. Even when resources are made available through donors and financial aid institutions, governments’ technical and institutional capabilities are permanently challenged in designing, organising, steering, monitoring and evaluating the delivery of complex upgrading interventions which require integrating infrastructure, local social and economic development, institutional capacity building, community empowerment and local security and safety components . Both in centralised and decentralised government environments, efforts of this kind require a great deal of local government institutional capacity building and massive technical assistance.

Not surprisingly, slums and informal settlements are stigmatized by local city officials and police authorities, whose first response when conflicts and violence emerge is to recur to policing and repressive measures focused mainly on the illegal status which characterizes almost all aspects of life in marginal urban slum areas.

Past Policy Outcomes

“Criminalization” of slum and informal settlement dwellers is reported to have been a common urban policy response during the 1980’s in the majority of case studies under consideration. The 1990’s saw a policy shift in this

regard as government officials became aware that slum areas threaten to turn into major urban sanitary and environmental hazards and that “criminalizing slums” was delivering excluded households into the hands of criminal organisations, which quickly managed to control these areas and make them their strategic “safe havens”. Rising urban violence involving youths in these areas, both as victims and victimizers, was also of concern to public officials at national and local levels of government.

Public security and safety concerns were prominent in policy analysis addressing the need to deal with slum upgrading and rapid urbanisation. Yet early initiatives and interventions failed to explicitly incorporate security and safety components into their programme designs. Cases in point are the Local Partnership for Urban Poverty Alleviation Project –LPUPAP– in Bangladesh, and the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme –KENSUP–. Both initiatives were promoted by national governments aiming to upgrade basic infrastructure and improve public spaces, legalize land and property tenure, and improve housing. Complementary actions targeted social development by endorsing local income generation through access to job training, micro-finance systems, and support to entrepreneurs, among other. Yet neither explicitly included in their intervention designs a component to address security and safety concerns. In Brazil, the Favela Barrio programme, and in Colombia, the Integrated Urban Project –PUI in its Spanish acronym– were promoted and implemented by municipal governments. In addition to upgrading public spaces, service infrastructure and housing improvement, these local government initiatives reinforced social development components by constructing nurseries, health care centres, schools, parks, sport centres and libraries, as well as by providing for full time education and after school support for children and youth at risk, together with adult education and support for income generation opportunities. However, no security and safety components were foreseen in either of these programme designs.

Most upgrading interventions under review did include an institutional capacity building component in order to promote and empower community participation, and in some cases, to activate local government agencies and other organisations in order to provide more responsive services to local communities through multi-sectoral interventions. Yet even in the face of reports about threats to project team members and incidents which delayed project completion and forced negotiation with local gang lords (who on occasions imposed employment of particular persons, as was the case in Rio de Janeiro and Medellin), safety and security issues were not listed in the formal agendas of any of these institutional capacity building components.

The assumption that security and safety concerns would improve as a result of progress in household living conditions through community empowerment and

social development components, along with investments in housing improvement and urban public spaces, walkways and street lighting, among other, was a common statement shared by most upgrading programmes in their initial design. Additionally, concerns such as urban security and safety and dealing with organised crime were commonly considered as issues to be addressed by a top-down approach involving national level authorities. Due to a simplistic vision of public safety primarily as policing, local government officials tended to write off security and prevention concerns as a legal mandate exclusively assigned to police forces. Frequent allegations of police corruption further hindered the involvement of police and other authorities responsible for crime control and prevention in discussing slum upgrading programme designs. Moreover, in contexts in which national security policies are dominated by repression and confrontation approaches, slum upgrading programme managers showed reluctance to involve police and other security authorities because of the negative impact that this could have in establishing rapport between programme team members and community grassroots organisations.

Consequently security and safety concerns have been incorporated as “afterthoughts” into slum upgrading programme designs. In Dhaka, Douala and Nairobi, efforts were made to advance complementary security and safety projects in parallel with the ongoing slum upgrading programmes. Multiple methodologies were implemented to engage local community participation in the process. Local safety audits involving local leaders proved effective for establishing priorities in regard to security and safety concerns as well as for developing community leadership skills in Nairobi. In Doula, “Crime Prevention through Environmental Design” principles were used successfully to implement safety audit conclusions by means of a place-based crime prevention action plans, as well as to engage local residents in the process. UN-HABITAT’s Safer Cities programme approach, based on strengthening the capacity of local authorities to address urban safety issues and promote crime prevention initiatives through building partnerships, guided the development of a framework and a work plan to address community safety, violence against women and access to justice concerns in Dhaka. In Medellin a general cross-cutting security and safety component was incorporated in to the local municipal development plan, which included violence prevention and safety management in public spaces, modernisation of local security and justice agencies, a peace and reconciliation programme to support the reintegration to civil society of demobilised members of illegally armed groups and rehabilitation programmes for prison inmates.

However, difficulties persisted in many cases. In Dhaka the decentralised local engineering agency implementing the project was strained beyond its institutional capabilities when additionally to the infrastructure and service



A view of Kibera Slum in Nairobi, Kenya. © Julius Mwelu/UN-HABITAT

components it had to integrate other components such as local government capacity building, community empowerment, social development, and safety and security. In Port Moresby, the Integrated Community Development Project was completely abandoned as a result of conflicts and disputes between local stakeholders, among them landowners controlling customary lands. In Douala, lack of social development and institutional capacity building components in the Doula Infrastructure Programme design hampered active community participation in decision making processes affecting their living conditions, particularly in regard to local security and safety concerns.

Assessing security and safety in slum upgrading initiatives

Most case studies note that lack of a baseline in regard to the security and safety situation previous to the beginning of upgrading interventions was a major obstacle for assessing security and safety in this kind of initiatives. Preliminary assessments related with infrastructure and housing improvement as well as social needs and expectations in regard to these aspects were carried out in a systematic fashion prior to upgrading interventions. Yet aspects specifically related with crime and violence, were barely dealt with in programme designs. In the case of Medellin, areas identified and selected for upgrading interventions were demarcated based on their lagging Human Development Index (HDI) scores and persistently high homicide rates. The impact of Medellin's Integrated Urban Project was hereafter monitored by following local progress in homicide rates and index scores. However

in the final assessment, general indicators such as violence rates and HDI scores were found to be insufficient as these failed to reflect the complex security and safety situation in marginal urban areas and did not allow measuring the specific impact of the upgrading intervention in regard to these concerns.

From a qualitative perspective, effects of slum upgrading initiatives on local security and safety are viewed through different shades. In Rio de Janeiro, increase in land and property value as a result of programme interventions is seen by some observers to have caused speculation in upgraded areas. In contexts where land and property rights are not clearly established and legal mechanisms for this type of conflict resolution are often not accessible or operative, conflicts over land and property tenure become an aggravating source of violence. On a similar note, some practitioners observe that slum upgrading interventions which do not alter local power structures controlled by gang lords or criminal organisations may ultimately contribute to consolidate their political standing within these communities, instead of empowering local leaders and grassroots organisations. In Rio de Janeiro this particular concern led upgrading project managers to shed their initial partnerships with voluntary community leaders in intervention areas, who are considered by many as local gang lord spokesmen. Instead "community agents" were selected from among local residents, and then trained and paid by the local government to stand as intermediaries between programme managers, service providers and target populations.

In another key, empowerment of women through their involvement in community participation groups promoted by the slum upgrading intervention in Dhaka allowed them to make the issue of domestic violence against women a visible concern. A “Crime Welfare Fund” was created by setting aside 1% of the funds allocated for infrastructure and economic development and the money was made available for emergency domestic violence cases. Support garnered through a range of services –skills development, education, health and day care centres for children of working women– contributed to their growing engagement not only with domestic but also community security and safety. Rapport built through direct contact with influential local officers who were enlisted by the programme to support community processes, enabled women leaders to take an active role in putting these contacts to work in order to access police help in their neighbourhoods. Though violence against women was not addressed systematically in the first phase of the Dhaka upgrading intervention, the concern was central in the on-going discussions about how to incorporate the issue into the programme design of a second phase.

Challenges

Many local security and safety concerns considered by the studies under discussion are rooted in deeply entrenched social and community structures, as is the case of domestic violence against women, gang lord control over community leaders and grassroots organisations and police corruption, among other. Adequate responses to some of these problems and particularly those related to criminal organisations and corruption are definitely beyond the means of slum upgrading programmes or local government, and require clear coordination frameworks with national government in order to deal successfully with them. Other problems are within the range of local authorities but require sustained initiatives over long periods in order to achieve expected results, as is the case with violence against women, alcohol and drug abuse and vandalism, among others.

Most national contexts covered by the case studies are challenged by the lack of appropriate normative frameworks that clearly define roles and responsibilities of national, regional and local governments in building urban security and safety through urban planning and management. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities between levels of government allow for improved communication and information flows which enhance the coordination of complementary public action plans and more efficient and effective use of public resources. Unclear definitions of roles and responsibilities in regard to urban security and safety is at the base of simplistic visions that reduce public safety to policing and withdraw from urban planning and management concerns issues related to local

urban security and safety in slum upgrading interventions. It also obstructs the development of effective strategies to fight against functioning illegal markets, criminal organisations and police corruption in urban settings. Implementation of crime prevention measures that require coordination at different spatial scales, as is the case with public investment for social and economic development programmes focused in youth, is another security and safety area negatively affected by unclear definition of institutional roles and responsibilities.

As for local governments, many are challenged with maintaining public space quality, infrastructure and services once upgrading interventions conclude. Community ownership of recovered and improved urban components such as communal playgrounds or watershed conservation areas often erodes shortly after these are delivered. In some cases, residents are reluctant to pay for services and property taxes once public service domestic connections are installed and land and property rights are legalised. In other cases, continued expansion of upgraded informal settlements as a result of new coming poor households attracted by improved service infrastructure and access to social services, causes both infrastructure deterioration by over demand as well as conflict and violence arising from land tenure disputes. Avoiding rapid deterioration of upgraded public spaces and service networks as well as violent land disputes in intervened settlements is central since their occurrence usually leads local security and safety conditions to follow in due course. Grassroots organisations originated in upgrading intervention processes can play a key role in countering these trends. Yet many of these organisations are not completely consolidated once upgrading interventions conclude, which calls for the development of local mechanisms which will carry over support for community organisation, economic development and crime prevention initiatives beyond the duration of the upgrading projects.

Urban governance of security and safety concerns is also frequently challenged in local contexts due to the lack of adequate means to properly characterise and appraise collective conflicts or problem situations, as well as the specific interests, resources and interactions among strategic stakeholders involved. A key element for local security and safety governance is the presence of functioning decision-making nodes and coordination spaces that effectively engage and mobilise partners and stakeholders concerned with crime and violence issues. Consequently, suitable local institutional arrangements must be in place in order to enable the design and implementation of cross-cutting urban security and safety strategies integrated to slum upgrading, local economic development and improvement of urban planning and design, among other initiatives.



Medellin, Colombia. © UN-HABITAT

The Way Ahead: Conclusions and Recommendations

Project staff and experts involved in the referred slum upgrading initiatives suggest a number of actions that envision the way ahead. A first step in building urban security and safety through urban planning and management is to develop appropriate frameworks to assess a systematic security and safety baseline prior to upgrading interventions, in order to allow for the specific assessment of the project's impact in this particular dimension. Relevant indicators which adequately mirror local concerns and expectations in regard to security and safety issues must be developed in order to provide the flow of useful and significant information and engage strategic stakeholder participation in local decision-making nodes and coordination spaces. This will, in turn, enhance the effective integration of cross-cutting security and safety strategies for urban governance. Local participatory safety audits seem to be useful tools for this purpose, as they reflect local residents' particular concerns. This, in turn, allows managers to adjust project objectives to meet specific needs and demands in this respect.

There is a clear need for toolkits to support training in participatory local safety audits based on crime prevention through environmental design principles, as well as to enhance effective governance of urban security and safety. Community dialogue and the development of conflict resolution mechanisms should also be addressed by these toolkits. Another process which needs to be resourced is the adequate information cycle and indicator systems design in order to monitor and evaluate specific urban and safety issues of concern to local residents and

strategic stakeholders involved with this matter, as well as to support quantitative and qualitative assessment of upgrading interventions' impact on local crime and violence. Currently most of these processes seem to rely exclusively on community meetings, speeches by key persons and cultural and community events. Practitioners consider that the development of these toolkits will visibly improve performance and the quality of outcomes. All these supporting resources should also be incorporated into a formal training programme for project staff before the initiation of new upgrading interventions.

As mentioned above, different demographic, institutional and policy environments require particular adjustments to build effective urban security and safety through urban planning and management. Appropriate steering and coordination in these policy areas will benefit with the enactment of modern national legal and institutional frameworks explicitly drawn to respond to urban poor and rural migrants demanding their "right to the city". Legal reform of land rights and land use in urban and urban expansion areas is a major issue in countries where obsolete norms are constraining the process of formal urbanisation, and forcing highly conflictive informal urbanisation processes which hold serious urban security, safety, sanitary and environmental hazards. Central governments' institutional, technical and financial roles in urban planning and management as well as in urban security and safety must be clearly defined, as is the case with the complementary functions in these areas that are to be performed by regional and local governments.

Governments overwhelmed by rapid urbanisation processes are seldom able to control private initiatives,

ready to assist for a profit shelter and service demands unattended by public agencies. Though this issue is not properly addressed in any of the case studies under review, it is of central concern since privately sponsored urbanisations in insufficiently regulated environments tend to originate informal settlements which are highly prone to hazard risks. Yet in rapid urbanisation scenarios it is practically impossible to exclude private concerns from becoming involved in the provision of housing and related services, which include security and safety. Consequently legal and institutional frameworks should also address and regulate public-private partnership arrangements as a complementary strategy for building urban security and safety through urban planning and management.

Experiences reviewed in case studies covered in this paper suggest that both in centralised and decentralised government environments, integrated slum upgrading programmes require a great deal of local government institutional capacity building in order to prepare interventions and allocate resources efficiently. Feasible urban planning strategies must previously compile and process information needed to classify and select appropriate urban areas for upgrading as well as expansion areas for new urbanisation. Criteria for doing so include physical aspects (geological suitability of the areas, access to utilities, road plans), social and economic characteristics (socioeconomic status of residents, types and levels of security and safety concerns, community organisation and readiness to participate) and normative and administrative considerations (urban perimeter constraints and status of previous public programmes delivered in the

area), among others. Differentiated scales of needs and types of public interventions must be coherently defined and structured in order to rationalize priorities and criteria for resource allocation, and prevent undesirable situations which may give rise to social and environmental hazards. Performing these tasks will require the development of significant technical capabilities at local government levels.

Local governments that enjoy sufficient political and financial autonomy in decentralised environments have in their municipal development plans very effective tools to incorporate urban security and safety, local economic development and environmental risk and hazard management as cross-cutting strategies in planning, implementing, monitoring and assessing urban improvement interventions. Experience proves that “cross-cutting strategies” can be translated into effective integrated multi-sectoral action of local government agencies under the decisive leadership of mayors equipped with adequate strategic management tools that allow for permanent monitoring of project progress on the ground, timely identification of bottleneck sources, and their prompt solution. Furthermore, local crime prevention strategies visibly contribute to reduce violence and other criminal offenses in contexts where local social service agencies are in capacity to receive individuals at risk who are in police custody, and then, integrate institutional and social resources to respond effectively to cover the specific attention needs of the person under protection.



Medellin, Colombia. © Julián Roldán

Finally, some recommendations in regard with upgrading intervention programme design. Developing sustainable community ownership of public spaces and service infrastructure delivered through urban improvement programmes must be a major goal from the very first moment in intervention designs, as local security and safety conditions will critically depend on this outcome. Therefore two key components seem to be necessary in all upgrading intervention designs. First, a security of land and property tenure rights component and second, a capacity building component to support community empowerment processes as well as the activation of institutional processes in local government agencies and other organisations explicitly designed to provide more responsive services to local community needs and demands through multi-sectoral interventions. Fruitful interaction in upgraded areas between grassroots organisations and a local network of government agencies in regard to issues such as addressing gender based violence, improving community access to regular police and justice services, ensuring appropriate maintenance of service infrastructure and public spaces by service providers, dealing with new households attracted to squatting in neighbourhood border or conservation areas, contracting community labour in local publicly funded constructing activities in order to benefit job creation for youths, and developing permanent counselling and psychological support services, among others, will ensue in an enduring self-sustained mechanism that will help to carry over support for community organisation, economic development and crime prevention initiatives beyond the duration of the upgrading projects.

Footnotes

- 1 Given the diversity of stakeholders, its very difficult to get unanimous decisions/concurrence on the achievement of the goals and objectives.
- 2 Safety and security can be seen as a governance issues, and in particular the extent to which vulnerable groups, such as women and youth, are involved in major decision making processes that shape their lives.
- 3 There is however no evidence that safety design principles were applied.
- 4 This scheme is being undertaken under KES \$100 million debt swap between Kenya and Finland Governments.

BUILDING URBAN SAFETY THROUGH SLUM UPGRADING

Among the several forms of urban development interventions, slum-upgrading offers an incomparable opportunity to provide urban safety for the poor. Slum-upgrading, the orchestrated process to improve the built environment of a human settlement, could mobilize many different actors in diverse policy areas at various levels. And it could give momentum to the idea that improving a neighbourhood comprises an overhaul of all dimensions of its life, including the freedom of citizens from the occurrence or risk of injury, danger, or loss, that is, their safety. Contemporary crime prevention tools are up to the task. Progressively, the field has shifted its main concern from reducing measurements of either crime or violence to improving the quality of life. A holistic notion of "safety" has been brought into play and slum-upgrading interventions set a suitable scenario to realize its practical implications.

Developing sustainable community ownership of public spaces and service infrastructure delivered through urban improvement programmes must be a major goal from the very first moment in intervention designs, as local security and safety conditions will critically depend on this outcome. Therefore two key components seem to be necessary in all upgrading intervention designs. First, a security of land and property tenure rights component and second, a capacity building component to support community empowerment processes as well as the activation of institutional processes in local government agencies and other organisations explicitly designed to provide more responsive services to local community needs and demands through multi-sectoral interventions. Fruitful interaction in upgraded areas between grassroots organisations and a local network of government agencies in regard to issues such as addressing gender based violence, improving community access to regular police and justice services, ensuring appropriate maintenance of service infrastructure and public spaces by service providers, dealing with new households attracted to squatting in neighbourhood border or conservation areas, contracting community labour in local publicly funded constructing activities in order to benefit job creation for youths, and developing permanent counselling and psychological support services, among others, will ensue in an enduring self-sustained mechanism that will help to carry over support for community organisation, economic development and crime prevention initiatives beyond the duration of the upgrading projects.

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